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Summary 
 
Natural right constitutionalism: A theory of political liberalism expounded from 
contemporary Thomistic resources 
 
This thesis outlines a species of political liberalism and an understanding of human rights 
developed from contemporary interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’s moral, legal and political 
theory.  
Working from a reading of Aquinas’s ethics that stresses both its eudaimonism and the 
capacity of practical reason to immediately apprehend certain human goods, the work builds 
on this ethical understanding by propounding a substantive approach to justice and natural 
right in the legal-political domain. It is argued that a Thomistic conception of justice and 
natural right is consistent with the notion of subjective human rights, including both 
fundamental human rights and certain ‘liberty’ or ‘choice’ rights. The thesis demonstrates 
that Aquinas’s innovative approach to justice and the political common good is useful in 
addressing key points in debates in political theory on human rights practice, ideal theory 
and forms of social criticism. 
Such an approach to natural right is developed into a particular species of political liberalism, 
based on the genus type put forward by John Rawls and Jacques Maritain before him. The 
work justifies a form of political liberalism in which public reason is focused on building an 
overlapping consensus on the political common good between citizens through practical 
reasoning, but one in which there is a permissive approach to the use of metaphysical or 
religious arguments in the public domain. 
The work concludes by offering a defence of a form of political rather than legal 
constitutionalism; one that takes normative orientations on the nature of political freedom 
and the consequent role of government from neorepublican theorists, whose positions are 
held in some respects to be complementary with those of political liberals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter sets out the issues that spurred the genesis of this work; the originality of its 
content and its intended impact before outlining the broad methodology employed by way of 
a brief prolegomenon. The chapter closes with an outline of the overarching structure of the 
thesis. 
 
1). The genesis of the thesis 
The genesis of the work lies in the ongoing dispute between theorists who claim the same 
philosophical and theological patrimony in Augustine and Aquinas yet come to radically 
different conclusions about the compatibility of their theoretical approach in relation to 
contemporary approaches to liberalism and human rights. On the one hand the work of 
theorists such as John Milbank, Alasdair MacIntyre, Tracey Rowland1 and Robert Kraynak2 
are examples of those using an ostensibly Augustinian and Thomist framework and who 
come to positions that are strongly critical of contemporary theories of liberalism and human 
rights. On the other side of the debate figures such as John Finnis (and his theoretical 
collaborator Germain Grisez), Paul Weithman,3 Robert Markus,4 Jean Porter5 and numerous 
other theorists who emphasise the compatibility of Augustine and Aquinas’s philosophical 
and theological approach with some form of liberalism and subjective human rights. How can 
interpretations of, and constructive orientations from, the same sources differ so widely on 
such important matters? 
 
While I do not go as far as those who argue that the work of MacIntyre and Milbank has the 
effect of undermining (American) democracy,6 if MacIntyre and Milbank are right about 
liberalism and rights then much, if not most, normative work in English language political 
theory is fruitless. This work therefore aims to address some of the issues involved in such 
debates by setting out a constructive approach in relation to political liberalism and rights by 
working through some of the key issues relating to natural law, justice and the common good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Tracey Rowland, Culture and Thomist Tradition: after Vatican II (London: Routledge, 2003).	  
2	  Robert Kraynak, Christian Faith and Modern Democracy (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2001).	  
3	  Paul J. Weithman, ‘Toward an Augustinian Liberalism’ Faith and Philosophy, 8 (1991), 461–80.	  
4	  Robert A. Markus, Christianity and the Secular (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). 
5	  Jean Porter, ‘Natural Right, Authority and Power, the theological trajectory of human rights’, Journal of Law, 
Philosophy and Culture, 3 (2009), 299-314. 
6	  This is the view of Jeffrey Stout who describes Milbank and MacIntyre as the ‘new traditionalists’ in: Jeffrey 
Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).	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as theorised by Thomas Aquinas. I arrive at a view of political constitutionalism, grounded in 
classical and mediaeval conception of natural right and the political common good as 
received and transformed by Aquinas, which I argue can be viewed as a species of the 
genus political liberalism (using John Rawls’s nomenclature).7  
 
Attempts have been made by New Natural Law theorists to outline a theory of limited 
government which is partially perfectionist.8 Others have drawn direct parallels between 
liberalism and natural law theory,9 often in a way that emphasises a neat fit between ancient 
and medieval natural law theories and modern classical liberalism (after the tradition of 
Locke or the American Founders).10 This is not the position taken in this thesis11 as I instead 
attempt to construct a form of political liberalism using Aquinas’s ethical theory (which I see 
as being a eudaimonistic virtue ethic more than it is a ‘basic goods’ or even a natural law 
ethic) and his wider legal theory (founded on the political common good and general justice). 
In pursuing this aim I set aside questions in relation the scope and limits of civic virtue for 
future research, and only address explicitly theological questions insofar as they directly 
impinge on the philosophical matters at hand, such as when the question of eudaimonia or 
human fulfilment is treated in chapter 2. 
 
2). The originality the thesis and its intended impact 
The originality of the thesis is twofold. First, it goes beyond the thirty year stalemate that has 
been reached between traditionalist natural law theorist and the ‘basic goods’ natural law 
theory outlined by John Finnis and Germain Grisez (often called ‘New Natural Law’ theory). I 
attempt this by using a eudaimonistic and virtue based interpretation of Aquinas’s moral 
theory (heavily indebted to, but not wholly taken from, the work of the contemporary Swiss 
moral philosopher Martin Rhonheimer) that nonetheless incorporates a crucial insight from 
Finnis and Grisez’s reinterpretation of Aquinas’s ethics. I hold that this synthesised position 
is textually credible and resolves some of the seemingly intractable disputes between the 
traditionalist and New Natural Law positions within Thomism.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  By making this claim I am not asserting anachronistically that Thomas Aquinas was a political liberal, only 
that certain political ideas and concepts from Aquinas’s oeuvre can be used constructively to come to an 
understanding of civil association consistent with key aspects of political liberalism. 
8	  Robert P. George, Making Men Moral (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
9	  Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).	  
10	  For a clear example of this see: Harry V. Jaffa, ‘Thomas Aquinas meets Thomas Jefferson’, Interpretation: A 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 33 (2006), 177-184.	  
11	  For example, I would hold that the position outlined in this work would be consistent with the public 
provision of significant welfare services and the universal provision of health and education services financed 
via direct taxation – something that classical liberals have rarely agreed as theoretically defensible.	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Secondly, the originality of the thesis relates to how this understanding of Thomistic moral 
theory and natural right may usefully cohere with political liberalism. New Natural Law 
theorists such as John Finnis and Robert George have regrettably focussed their work on 
their differences with John Rawls on matters such as abortion or euthanasia, or have 
focussed on particular aspects of Rawls’s own species of political liberalism rather than 
addressing the usefulness or otherwise of Rawls’s generic conception of political 
liberalism.12 Following Martha Nussbaum’s example of developing a conception of political 
liberalism which is non-deontological (in which the good is conceived as being prior to the 
right), I develop an outline conception or species of political liberalism that can be seen as 
compatible with Aquinas’s ethical and political theory. Like Nussbaum - though on a 
Thomistic basis - I depart from Rawls’s own species of political liberalism (‘justice as 
fairness’ and Rawls’s particular understanding of primary goods), while retaining central 
aspects of political liberalism’s generic form. This, to my knowledge, has not been outlined 
before in the rather vast literature on political conceptions of liberalism. 
 
In terms of the intended impact or outcome of this work I hope that those attracted to 
Thomistic or more generally Catholic orientations in practical philosophy - be they 
philosophers or theologians - will re-evaluate their predominant scepticism or hostility 
towards the generic notion of political liberalism as a result of the arguments presented 
here.13 This could generate three particular benefits or impacts. 
First, I hope that my approach will help theorists who eschew deontological or primary 
constructivist approaches to normative political theory to actively consider using a generic 
framework of political liberalism and constitutionalism. Dissatisfaction with deontological 
moral conceptions of liberalism and human rights as ‘side constraints’ on the human good 
has led some public intellectuals and policy thinkers to look for alternatives to ‘liberalism’ as 
it has been traditionally conceived. This may be what contemporary public intellectuals and 
think tank leaders have picked up on with their recent notions of the ‘Big Society’ or the 
‘Good Society’ in the thought of so called Red Tory or Blue Labour intellectual movements 
respectively.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Using an analogy from biological taxonomy, New Natural Lawyers may be confusing the ‘type species’ of 
Rawls’s own version of political liberalism with its genus. In other words Rawls’s form of political liberalism 
gives its name to the genus as well as being the classic example of the species within the genus.	  
13	  For a recent example of this deep scepticism see: Thaddeus J. Kozinski, The Political Problem of Religious 
Pluralism: And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It (Lanham, MD: Lexington books, 2010).	  
14	  See for instance Phillip Blond, Red Tory (London: Faber and Faber, 2010) or on the centre left see: Maurice 
Glasman, ‘Labour as a Radical tradition’, Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture, 46 (2010), 31-41. Both 
Blond and Glasman lay great stress on the common good and a virtuous citizenry. 	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Secondly, though this would be difficult to prove counterfactually, in my judgement the rise of 
human rights in the discourse of the public sphere and legal structures of the world order in 
the twentieth century has led to less domination and repression than would have otherwise 
have taken place. In reinforcing the arguments for subjective human rights from a Thomistic 
perspective I aim to sustain the breadth of discourse on human rights so that its remediating 
impact can be sustained. In a similar way, the United Nations Human Development Reports, 
which have been influenced by the capabilities approach in social and political theory, have 
helped develop policy based approaches to solving problems of global poverty and injustice. 
The theoretical perspective outlined here is consistent in some important ways with the 
capabilities approach and thus may be seen to widen the breadth of theoretical backing for 
the work that flows from the UN Development Programme and other associated agencies. 
Finally, in a society with a plurality of understandings of final human ends, agreement on 
legal-political measures that appear both to touch on final human ends and intermediate 
human goods or needs sometimes requires some conceptual unpicking. A conception of 
political liberalism can assist with this, especially for some religious citizens or those with a 
convinced philosophical standpoint. For example, some citizens or politicians who are 
religious believers, or who have certain metaphysical views on marriage, may hold that the 
theological and metaphysical fullness of marital union can be found only in the heterosexual 
‘one flesh union’ of husband and wife, may on the basis of practical reasoning (or on a mix of 
practical and theoretical reasoning) nonetheless recognise that same sex partnerships can 
realise certain fundamental human goods or meet basic needs and thus recognise the case 
for substantive forms of legal recognition of such relationships.15 This could be the case 
even if the same citizens did not proceed to advocate that the formal marriage rites of their 
religion be extended to same sex couples. This is, in effect, how many religious believers 
across several parties in the UK Parliament - including the Prime Minister of the day - were 
able to justify the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. This Act could therefore be 
construed as an example of political liberalism in action. In a system of political liberalism, 
we may say that (pace Voltaire) the best (the summum bonum) does not have to be the 
enemy of the good. 
3). The methodological approach 
In one sense this thesis consciously retrieves the understanding classical notions of 
philosophy as it was transformed theologically by Thomas Aquinas. As a school of thought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Some argue that aspects of New Natural Law theory itself can justify recognition of same sex unions, see: 
Joshua D. Goldstein, ‘New Natural Law Theory and the Grounds of Marriage: Friendship and Self-
Constitution’, Social Theory and Practice, 37 (2011), 461-482.	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Thomism is subject to a variety of diverse and somewhat incommensurable readings.16 This 
may bewilder the general philosopher, but in a way it also shows the fertility of a school of 
thought that it has adapted to some degree to the prevailing philosophical conditions of the 
age. In Alasdair MacIntyre’s parlance, Thomism has survived various ‘epistemological 
crises’17 and has come out ‘the other side’ with proponents convinced of the durability of its 
key tenets in forms that retain a continuity with central ideas found in St Thomas’s oeuvre.18 
The focus of this thesis is ethics and politics – what Aristotle calls the ‘philosophy of human 
affairs’. In the view outlined here, a theory of political right (droit politique) or legal justice is 
distinguishable but not separable from the ethical domain. The challenge for a contemporary 
interpreter of Aquinas’s political theory is that St Thomas himself did not leave an already 
elaborated or coherent ‘Thomistic political science’,19 though clearly he left sufficient material 
in his treatment of law, prudence and justice to inspire political orientations among those 
who draw inspiration from him. The pitfalls of interpreting Aquinas are significant - there is 
precious little agreement on whether his commentaries on Aristotle are representative of his 
own views and there continues to be a sharp debate about the extent to which Aquinas’s 
works outline a philosophical position as well a theological position. It is important to state 
that, unlike some early and mid twentieth century neo-Thomists, I do not see Aquinas as 
offering all the answers to contemporary philosophical or theological problems. I also, by 
writing of the Thomistic tradition do not wish to underestimate how contested such a label or 
concept is.20 
Despite this Aquinas’s moral and social theory offers insights into some contemporary 
ethical and political problems. His ethical theory combines a eudemonistic virtue ethic with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For an excellent guide see Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).	  
17 ‘Epistemological crises’ arise for MacIntyre when two intellectual traditions come into direct confrontation, 
forcing the tradition to deal with powerful critical arguments questioning the underpinning elements of that 
philosophical position. Thomism for MacIntyre is the most successful tradition of inquiry in this respect, having 
survived a confrontation with voluntarism, Lutheranism, Kantianism and so on. As MacIntyre writes: “To have 
passed through an epistemological crisis successfully enables the adherents of a tradition of enquiry to rewrite 
its history in a more insightful way. And such a history of a particular tradition provides not only a way of 
identifying the continuities in virtue of which that tradition of enquiry has survived and flourished as one and 
the same tradition, but also of identifying more accurately that structure of justification which underpins 
whatever claims to truth are made within it...” Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry: 
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 169. 
18 Though key aspects of Thomist thought has been formally endorsed by the Roman Catholic Church, this 
thesis does not proceed on the basis of an official ecclesially endorsed account of Thomas Aquinas’s thought. 
This is important because the Roman Catholic Church claims the competence and authority not only to teach 
authoritatively the content of revealed divine law (as one might expect), but also to teach in a definitive way the 
application of natural law precepts in certain moral norms, such as in relation to contraception and other 
controversial questions.  
19	  Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after his interpreters (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 46-56.	  
20	  Mark Jordan writes that “there has always been fierce rivalry among claims on Thomas’s authority. 
“Thomist” like “Christian,” is a term that stakes a controversial claim, not one that records a neutral 
designation”, in Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 6. 
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innovative practical principles applied in the moral and political spheres. I use Aquinas’s 
theory by consulting the translated primary texts but mainly by using contemporary 
interpreters who have constructively used Aquinas to address the social and moral issues of 
our time. 
This is where a brief prolegomenon on the overarching method that I employ in this work of 
practical philosophy may be helpful.21 This methodological starting point is based on the 
classical dialectical method. The genesis of this work is thus a series of questions deriving 
from the fundamental question of classical political philosophy: Which is the best regime?  
Further questions derive from this macro question, and those questions are prompted by the 
cultural context of modernity where societies face a new set of critical challenges. In this 
context the sub-questions deriving from the question of the best regime are not entirely 
original: they relate to the rational or moral basis of legal/political rule in the pluralistic 
societies: 
“Since the structure provided by the political/legal order will rule over all equally, how 
can the universalism of political/legal structural principles square with the pluralism 
and self-direction required by human flourishing? Hence, how is it possible to have 
an ethical basis for an overall or general social/political context…..that will not 
require, as a matter of principle, that one form of human flourishing be preferred to 
another? How, in other words, can the possibility be achieved that various forms of 
human flourishing will not be in structural conflict?”22  
The converse but related question to those posed above is just as important, as one may 
ask: “How can we identify social demands that all have sufficient reason to acknowledge as 
moral demands?"23 These questions are real ‘existential’ questions in that they affect how 
we act in the world and relate to others. They are questions not only for academics but 
ultimately for all persons. That philosophy should address real questions posed by people is 
important for a theorist such as Alasdair MacIntyre, who argues that neither the university 
nor the activity of philosophy is any longer seen as engaging the questions of "plain 
persons." For MacIntyre these questions include: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Brevity is helpful in prolegomena as Jeffrey Stout quips that “preoccupation with method is like clearing your 
throat: it can go on for only so long before you lose your audience.” Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1988), 162.  
22 Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist 
Politics (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 284-285. 
23 Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 262.	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"What is our place in the order of things? Of what powers in the natural and social 
world do we need to take account? How should we respond to the facts of suffering 
and death?...What is it to live a human life well? What is it to live it badly?"24 “[A]nd 
[for] those who have hitherto accepted their assigned place in the social order may 
now ask: “Is this order just?”25  
I agree with MacIntyre that “[p]hilosophy answers questions that are or should be of interest 
to everyone”26 and that philosophers, when acting for the common good, should take care to 
address the questions of plain persons in addressing life’s questions and not only address 
the technical questions posed by one’s academic peers. 
Pierre Hadot’s reflections of the role of philosophy in Greco-Roman antiquity echo 
MacIntyre’s concerns. Hadot charts how philosophy was seen as ‘a way of life’ for free men 
who seek after, but never fully attain, wisdom (a philo-sophos rather than a sophos).27 This 
pursuit of wisdom involves practicing philosophy as a profound self examination, an 
intellectual, moral and even a spiritual exercise – a process not restricted to detached or 
abstract speculation. Socrates’ dialogue with his interlocutors in this understanding was not 
to impart pre-formulated truths but to draw them into philosophy as process of re-formation 
and conversion of self. This conversion brought about a change in life as it was lived and “to 
look on the world in a new way”.28 Philosophy was not seen as a withdrawal from the true 
concerns of life. Hadot sees Socratic dialogue as a social process of self-criticism or 
examination of conscience that becomes “a communal spiritual exercise.”29 Similarly the 
Platonic dialogue, also with its dialectical method, is closely related to the notion of 
philosophy as a spiritual exercise for Hadot. Painstaking and discursive though this method 
may appear at times, its fruits are finally to give light to questions on how to live and how to 
die. 
Donald Philip Verene, in his book Philosophy and the Return to Self Knowledge, expresses 
some of the same philosophical sentiments, arguing that the Delphic injunction ‘Know 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Alasdair MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical 
Tradition (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 9.	  
25	  MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities, 10.	  
26	  MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities, 10.	  
27 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Arnold I. Davidson (Ed.), trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), 90. Leo Strauss also recognised this point and connected this conception of philosophy with 
the political when he wrote: “The highest subject of political philosophy is the philosophic life: philosophy – not 
as a teaching or body of knowledge, but as a way of life – offers, as it were, the solution to the problem that 
keeps political life in motion”, in Leo Strauss, ‘On Classical Political Philosophy’, What is Political 
Philosophy? (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988 [1959]) at 91. 
28 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 107. 
29 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 90.  
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Thyself’ gives philosophy one of its core tasks.30 Though he uses Renaissance thinkers and 
Vico as much as the Ancients to make his case, Verene holds that critical philosophy is 
unable to help people solve the problem of how to live and this form of philosophy instead 
becomes turned in on itself. Descartes’ quest for certainty in philosophical disciplines (in his 
Discourse on Method) marginalises the studia humanitatis (including moral philosophy) on 
the basis that it is merely probabilistic. This sets the epistemological bar for critical 
philosophy, which perpetually seeks foundations that are certain for all forms of reasoning. 
The linage from Descartes to contemporary ethics can be seen in the philosophical sub 
discipline of metaethics, which examines the very basis of ethical action and its fundamental 
metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions. But as Verene writes “critical reflection 
can never generate virtue”31 or the communal virtue the Ancients called civil wisdom. As 
MacIntyre might claim, the painstaking dissection of the basis of all ethical language by 
analytical metaethicists may not help a ‘plain person’ live her life – well or otherwise. As 
Martin Rhonheimer writes, highly abstract metaethical reflections appear “not to be problems 
of ethics at all, but rather problems that philosophers have with ethics”, whereas the genuine 
problems about the nature of the good that metaethicists seek to investigate are in fact 
“problems that must be answered in the course of undertaking ethical reflection itself”.32 
A year after Philosophy and the Return to Self Knowledge was published Pope John Paul II 
opened his programmatic encyclical letter on the relationship between philosophy and 
theology by recalling the central importance of self-knowledge to ethical life. He wrote: 
“within the horizon of personal self-consciousness: the more human beings know 
reality and the world, the more they know themselves in their uniqueness, with the 
question of the meaning of things and of their very existence becoming ever more 
pressing… The admonition Know yourself was carved on the temple portal at Delphi, 
as testimony to a basic truth to be adopted.... [A] cursory glance at ancient history 
shows clearly how in different parts of the world….., there arise at the same time the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Donald Phillip Verene, Philosophy and the Return to Self-Knowledge (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 
1997). I am indebted to Bruce Haddock’s article ‘Against the Current: Speculative Knowledge and Practical 
Wisdom’ in Glenn Magee (Ed.), Philosophy and Culture: Essays in Honor of Donald Phillip Verene 
(Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Centre, 2002), 15-35, for drawing attention to Verene’s book.	  
31	  Verene, Philosophy and the Return to Self Knowledge, 58.	  
32	  Martin Rhonheimer, The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics 
(Washington, DC:, Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 4.	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fundamental questions which pervade human life: Who am I? Where have I come 
from and where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life?”33 
Pierre Hadot, however, disputes whether the development of medieval Christian thought can 
be seen as consistent with his understanding of classical philosophy. For Hadot the notion of 
‘Christian philosophy’ subalternated philosophy to theology and focused spiritual 
contemplation on the revealed word of God. Philosophy in late scholasticism thus became 
abstractly theoretical and divorced from life. Philosophy only regains it orientation for Hadot 
in the work of Henri Bergson, Nietzsche and the existentialists. This picture may be correct 
in some respects in relation to late scholasticism and neoscholasticism, but whether this is a 
valid criticism of Aquinas and his contemporaries is rightly disputed by Wayne Hankey.34 
Fears about a strong form of foundationalism include that it will require a form of social or 
political monism that is inattentive to human difference and legitimate forms of ethical or 
religious plurality. This question derives in part from the ancient philosophical issue of the 
One and the Many. If there is just one clearly justified form of the human good - a summum 
bonum for all people - then a foundationalist political theorist may feel that there are grounds 
for the enforcement of this highest good politically through coercive measures. This appears 
to be how, historically, many Western societies treated some minority groups before the 
advent of liberalism or human rights,35 where religious or ethical norms were not infrequently 
enforced through fear, incarceration, or the pain of death. This last matter is a legitimate 
concern and it is one that needs to be answered. 36 
As we see in chapter 2, the ethical method I endorse avoids primary constructivism as it 
contends that ethics is fundamentally eudaimonistic and first person centred. Primary 
constructivists, be they discourse ethicists or Kantians, hold that ethical norms - not only 
political norms - should be agreed through the application of universal procedures or 
principles. They see this as necessary because they hold that practical reason cannot, in 
any reliable way, apprehend human goods. Eschewing primary constructivism does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  John Paul II, Encyclical Letter: Fides et Ratio, §1, promulgated on 15 September 1998, emphasis in original. 
Available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_15101998_fides-et-ratio_en.html , accessed 9 August 2011. 
34	  Hankey denies that the proper Thomist position abnegates or undervalues philosophy maintaining that the 
medieval universities in fact helped to transmit the legacy of ancient philosophy. Hankey thus maintains that 
both philosophical and theological exercises have a rightful and valuable place from a Christian perspective. 
Wayne. J. Hankey, ‘Philosophy as Way of Life for Christians? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on 
Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas’ Laval Théologique et Philosophique, 59 (2003), 193–224.	  
35	  Which is of course not to say that unjust war and oppression has not occurred in the modern period by states 
that have supposedly adopted aspects of liberalism or human rights.	  
36	  The counter reaction to the Wars of Religion is cited by John Rawls as one of the key impulses behind the 
development of liberal constitutionalism in the first place. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, revised edition 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xxiii ff. 
10	  
	  
mean that the application of universal principles is not helpful specifically in a political 
context (secondary constructivism). 
(a) Was Aquinas a foundationalist or an essentialist? 
Thomas Aquinas has been seen as an exponent of both foundationalism and essentialism 
and thus many contemporary theorists would question the fecundity of using his theory as a 
point du départ for moral or political theory. Foundationalism has been considered important 
in practical philosophy because of the perceived need to ground or justify either a theoretical 
or normative account of ethics or politics. The justification of an ethical or political theory has 
often not been fully self standing but related to a wider chain of inferred justifications from 
foundational premises. Foundations are thus considered basic beliefs beyond which no 
further or deeper justification should be given. Such foundations in the history of philosophy 
have often been theistic, naturalistic, empiricist, or based on some other philosophical 
doctrine. It serves as a basis for the objectivity of justificatory reasons – to oneself or others - 
in individual or communal judgement. Such foundations metaphorically serve as anchors 
upon which justifications can be built or constructed. They can serve as the basis for the 
construction of ethical or political principles upon which moral or social understandings may 
be elaborated. 
Realist forms of philosophical reasoning have been critiqued by a variety of theorists, 
including (modern) sceptics, emotivists, post-modernists and relativists. I need not explore 
this wide variety of philosophical critiques of realism – including foundationalism – but will 
consider in what sense Aquinas may be seen as a foundationalist, if at all. This issue has 
been recently surveyed and assessed by A.N. Williams, who judges that Aquinas was not a 
foundationalist because he did not hold to the conventional meaning of the term in modern 
epistemology. Williams interprets Aquinas’s fundamental epistemological stance to be that in 
“this life there is not so much a hierarchy of knowers as a community of trusters”37 as 
although Aquinas “does not ascribe error to the human formulations which are the articles of 
faith, or to the divine revelation..,[as] the very process of theological reasoning is 
theoretically open to error; …, Aquinas is not willing to deem either the church’s tradition or 
philosophy as possessing any kind of certitude ([ST I] q. 1, a.8, ad 2).”38 
Many of Aquinas’s other interpreters hold that we can reach an adequation between the 
subject’s knowledge of objects (quiddities) and thereafter their essence or nature, rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See A.N. Williams, ‘Is Aquinas a Foundationalist?’ New Blackfriars, 91 (2010) at 20-45, 38. Williams cites 
other interpreters who support her verdict that Aquinas was not a foundationalist, as well as a number of figures 
who think he was a foundationalist to a lesser or greater degree.	  
38 Williams, ‘Is Aquinas a Foundationalist?’ at 39.	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than certainty.39 It is relevant to note here that Aquinas also maintained that the 
philosophical knowledge of God in this life was not self-evident or easy to attain, even to the 
wise.40 In relation to practical reasoning Aquinas also stresses the difficulties and fallibilities 
in human action the further away from general principles one moves,41 which is one reason 
why Aquinas’s ethics gives such an important role to the virtue of prudence. 
The moral and political theory outlined in this work eschews both foundationalism and 
primary constructivism. It eschews foundationalism because the ethical basis on which it is 
based (on facts or concepts about human nature) are not held to be known with certainty or 
in a way that makes them immune from revision. I acknowledge that many moral norms or 
outlooks that have been considered binding or definitive in societies - including Western 
societies - have shown themselves to be a product of contingency or human prejudice. 
There is thus a legitimate contemporary philosophical caution in holding that a philosophical 
concept or a concrete moral or political norm is universally binding, as if determined sub 
specie aeternitatis. This does not preclude a notion of moral objectivity or validate a form of 
relativism, but it certainly may cause us to treat with some caution the modern conception of 
epistemic certainty (as first established in mathematics or the natural sciences) as applied to 
ethics or politics - as if human ethical action was akin to working through a scientific 
theorem. 
The accusation of essentialism against Thomas Aquinas and later Thomists is a related 
question. Essentialism - the philosophical notion that classes of entities or quiddities (such 
as ‘God’ or ‘humans’) have set universal and clearly definable characteristics or properties - 
has also come under significant philosophical critique. Skeptics, Kantians, existentialists, 
phenomenologists, historicists and Heidegerians have all critiqued essentialism in different 
ways. Essentialism is criticised for its philosophical naiveté and its lack of historical or 
contextual consciousness. Martin Heidegger’s critique is based on what he viewed as a 
forgetfulness of Being, where the proper metaphysical distinction between Being itself and 
actually existent beings is overlooked. In relation to theism, Heidegger thought that 
Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance, in his eyes perpetuated by Aquinas and the 
scholastics, made God into a ‘being’ somehow on the same plane as finite beings (albeit as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Adequation should not be seen as synonymous with probabilistic understandings in epistemology. 	  
40	  Something pointed out by John Finnis in his Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980), 32 (citing ST, I, q.2, a.1).	  
41	  “The practical reason is occupied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and 
consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the 
more frequently we encounter defects. . . . In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, 
as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of 
detail, it is not equally known to all. . . . And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we 
descend further into detail.” Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 94, art. 4.	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a ‘supreme being’) – creating the baleful philosophical outlook he called he called 
ontotheology. 
The extent to which Aquinas might be described as an essentialist is also disputed. Certain 
strands of neoscholasticism stand accused of propounding an ‘essentialist Thomism’. Partly 
in reaction to this the twentieth century saw a more historically informed understanding of St 
Thomas’s thought emerge, as propounded by figures such as Etienne Gilson. Gilson denied 
that Aquinas put forward an essentialist understanding of God, or of human beings. A new 
school of Thomism (inspired by Gilson) - ‘existential Thomism’ – emphasised what it saw as 
Aquinas’s unique metaphysical innovation. This innovation, a departure from Aristotelian 
metaphysics as they saw it, was the notion of God as Pure Act or ipsum esse subsitens 
(‘being itself subsisting’).42 In Gilson’s reading of Aquinas, essence and existence are fully 
coextensive in God alone - whereas essence and existence can be distinguished in some 
way in created beings. Thus God is not a ‘being’ - an entity in the created order - but is 
wholly on a different metaphysical plane to human beings. 
What allows humans to even conceive of God in Aquinas’s theory is his doctrine of analogy 
or the analogia entis (the ‘analogy of being’). In this understanding the uncreated God and 
creation is separated by an ‘analogical interval’ that admits an infinite ontological distance 
between the transcendent creator and beings in the created order. For one interpreter this 
idea of the analogia entis leaves one with a “largely apophatic, almost antimetaphysical 
ontology – or even meta-ontology.…now that revelation has obliged us to take leave of a 
naive metaphysics that would oblige us to grasp God through a conceptual knowledge of 
essences or genera.”43 Therefore any ascribed or predicated commonality between human 
persons (‘beings’) and the triune divine Persons (subsistent ‘Being’) must be accompanied 
by an acknowledgement of their vastly greater dissimilarity. Aquinas uses a neo-Platonic 
‘metaphysics of participation’ inherited from Augustine and the Greek Fathers to help span 
this creator / creation distinction. 
Aquinas’s position on human nature, in my understanding, is not that of a straightforward 
essentialist, though there are noted interpreters of Aquinas who read his anthropology in 
such a manner.44 Aquinas considers the very notion of human nature as “a double 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  See Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1956), chapter 1, 29ff.	  
43	  David Bentley Hart, ‘The Destiny of Christian Metaphysics’, in Thomas Joseph White (Ed.) The Analogy of 
Being (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdemans, 2011), 396. 
44 See, for example, Steven A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2010).	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abstraction”,45 in that he firstly conceives of human persons as ‘existents’ and he never 
writes of human nature as if it actually existed apart from the providential order. Some follow 
Etienne Gilson by writing of Thomas’s ‘existentialism’ - though distinguishing his form of 
rational existentialism from the “anti-rational” and voluntarist version propounded by 
twentieth century French existentialists.46 
Influential readings of Thomas’s anthropology have emphasised Aquinas’s creative 
integration of Greek philosophy with scripture and patristic theology. Although Aquinas did 
employ Aristotelian philosophical categories which are the mainstay of conceptualist 
metaphysics (form and matter, substance and accident, act and potency), his anthropology 
is clearly individuated to an important degree. Human beings as existents have individual 
souls (a form) that interpenetrates the body (as matter) in a way that subsumes into itself all 
those lower material formalities which the body has as an organised entity. In other words 
the soul possesses a unique individuality which is not derived from bodily matter.47 It is the 
soul – the form of the body – that constitutes the substantial form of the entity Aquinas calls 
a human person, a term which is itself is analogously related to the Persons of the Trinity. 
 
(b). The integrative role of metaphysics 
Reference to the role of metaphysics will be made at various points throughout this work and 
so it is appropriate to outline what I may mean by such a term. I see the task of metaphysics 
as examining the nature of reality to its widest and fullest extent – to think about ‘being as 
being’ (in Aquinas’s definition of metaphysics’ proper object). Thus the proper object of 
metaphysics is not God in himself (as subsistent Being), who cannot be seen or truly known 
in this life, but the natural order itself. Only insofar as the natural order points, through chains 
of causality, to an Uncaused Cause then metaphysics concerns itself with what has been 
called natural theology.48 This clearly opens metaphysics to a theistic perspective but does 
not reduce the whole of metaphysics to natural theology. In relation to a philosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Harm Goris writes that for Aquinas a concept of human nature would “not only…[be], abstracted from 
concretely existent, individual human beings, but it also abstracts from the actual history of salvation of this 
world, .…. A state of pure nature (status naturae purae) does not exist in reality”. See Harm Goris, ‘Steering 
Clear of Charybdis: Some Directions for Avoiding “Grace Extrinsicism” in Aquinas’, Nova et Vetera, English 
Edition, 5 (2007), 67–80, at 68.	  
46	  Eric Mascall vividly concludes that Thomas’s philosophy is “far from, as is too often imagined, couched on a 
bed of amaranth and moly in an essentialist nephelococcygia, is concerned above all else to grapple with the 
obstinate realities of existential fact.” See E.L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 1949), 64.	  
47 As Eric Mascall expresses it since “the specific essence is constituted not merely by a mere logical anteriority 
of the universal to the particular, but by a common life generated by the individual existents in their concrete 
activity.” See Mascall, Existence and Analogy, 62.	  
48 Natural theology is to be strictly distinguished from revealed theology, which for Aquinas is a deliverance of 
the theological virtue of faith.	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anthropology for example, the findings of the natural sciences (especially psychology), and 
the social sciences play a role, but in order to fully organise and evaluate the findings of the 
senses and the findings of the natural and social sciences, an interdisciplinary and 
integrative perspective is required. This perspective is provided by metaphysics.49 
 
Various schools of Thomism delineate the role of metaphysics differently. ‘Essentialist’ 
Thomists hold that persons can establish the need to reason metaphysically prior to, or apart 
from, the findings of natural philosophy or the natural sciences.50 The special sciences 
(scientia) in Aquinas are disciplines and areas of knowledge with their own formal subject 
matter and methodological points of departure. They include the ‘philosophy of nature’, 
classically considered to be physics. The role of metaphysics is to integrate the findings of 
the special speculative sciences and to order them to the goal of wisdom. In the 
contemporary Thomistic understanding of metaphysics I outline here,51 it is for natural 
science to establish a posteriori the necessity of immaterial being(s) as unobservable causes 
reasoned to from observed effects, without which metaphysics may not be seen to have a 
real referent, and thus not be a real science.52 Some Thomists see modern natural science 
to be part of the philosophy of nature – the position held here - while others like Jacques 
Maritain held that natural philosophy and modern science are different. Thus in modern 
terms the natural sciences (medicine, biology, psychology) have a role in helping to establish 
some understanding of human nature through speculative reasoning. 
Among these speculative special sciences metaphysics would have an integrative role in 
bringing together and organising the (always provisional and revisable) findings of the 
natural sciences (and the human sciences in a different way). A metaphysical anthropology 
would then have the role of bringing such findings together to address more fundamental 
existential questions such as: When does the life of a human being begin? What is a human 
person (as opposed to a human being)? Do humans have souls? Is there a unity between 
the human self or soul and the human body? Is there life after death? The answers to these 
questions will be found by the seekers, I do not claim that there is a formulated philosophia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  The influence of here of Benedict Ashley’s approach to metaphysics is clear, which is that of the ‘River Forest 
School’ of Thomism (or Aristotelian Thomism as Ashley prefers to call it) at least as it is concerned with 
metaphysics. I do not share all of Ashley’s views in relation to practical philosophy, which may differ in ways to 
some of the positions outlined in out chapter 2. Ashley prefers to call metaphysics ‘metascience’ in order to 
capture its role eponymously. See Benedict Ashley OP, The Way towards Wisdom: An interdisciplinary and 
intercultural introduction to metaphysics (South Bend, IND: Notre Dame University Press, 2006).	  
50	  The contemporary Thomist Lawrence Dewan holds such a position. For a collection of his essays on the role 
of metaphysics see: Lawrence Dewan, Form and being: studies in Thomistic metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2006). 
51 See Ashley, The Way towards Wisdom, especially chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
52	  For a survey of how modern science and neo-Aristotelian conceptions of science can be mutually enriching 
see John Lamont, ‘The Fall and Rise of Aristotelian Metaphysics’ Science and Education, 18 (2009), 861–884.	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perennis that need only to be passed down through the generations like a religious creed. 
This would be to misunderstand the task of metaphysics, which as Fergus Kerr writes is “not 
a body of knowledge to be imparted (like British history, physiology, or quantum mechanics) 
but an activity - a way of being in the world - into which one is best initiated in face-to-face 
exchange…. Wittgenstein, after all, maintained that “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but 
an activity” (Tractatus 4.112) - a conviction only confirmed in his later work.”53 
	  
The concept of metaphysical realism in contemporary ethical theory is much contested. 
Many theorists from different background deny the role of metaphysics in ethical thinking, 
holding to the Humean “is-ought” distinction. Emotivists and noncognitivists for example 
generally disavow essentialism altogether while other theorists may be considered moral 
realists (such as like Hilary Putnum or Martha Nussbaum), but appeal to a non-metaphysical 
form of essentialism often known as ‘internal realism’ or ‘internalist essentialism’. In their 
understanding, no external metaphysical viewpoint can establish the nature of things, but we 
can evaluative “from within” what is essential from what is accidental in human life and what 
“is deepest and most indispensable in our lives”.54 Here it is possible to both agree and 
disagree with Nussbaum: the evaluation of what is deepest and most indispensible does 
indeed commence with the person’s self-experience as a practical agent, including her 
speculatively undervied experience of basic human needs and goods - this self-experience 
can generate some shared understandings of what is necessary and good in human 
existence.  
I disagree, however, with Nussbaum’s denial of a teleological or properly metaphysical 
understanding of human persons and their end(s), and hold that such a understanding can 
be found - however provisionally (and without modern ‘certainty’) – through speculative 
inquiry. I concur, for instance, with Douglas Rasmussen’s helpful use of Aquinas’s 
metaphysical distinctions against Nussbaum’s and Hilary Putman’s critique of naïve 
metaphysical realism, arguing that a form of metaphysical realism can be useful in 
underpinning ethical claims, and that relying wholly on interpretative or practice based 
understandings of ethical understandings is insufficient.55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Fergus Kerr, ‘Fides et Ratio, Analytic Philosophy, and Metaphysics of Goodness’, Nova et Vetera, English 
Edition, 3 (2005): 615–636, at 628.	  
54 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defence of Aristotelian Essentialism’, 
Political Theory, 20 (1992), 202-246, at 207-208.	  
55	  See Rasmussen’s effective use of Aquinas in Part IV (a) and (b) of: Douglas B. Rasmussen, ‘The Importance 
of Metaphysical Realism for Ethical Knowledge’, Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (2008), 56-99. At 91, he 
quotes Aquinas “For although it be necessary for the truth of a cognition that the cognition answer to the thing 
known, still it is not necessary that the mode of the thing known be the same as the mode of its cognition.” 
(Summa contra Gentiles, II, 76); this distinction, for Rasmussen “allows us to acknowledge many of the 
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Philosophers in modernity often try to establish what they can about the natural order and 
the good without first pursuing questions about God’s existence. In this regard Fergus Kerr’s 
view is more attractive when in noting the revival of forms of non-theistic ethical naturalism 
(such as that put forward by Philippa Foot) he affirms that: 
“one might....be happy to delay the introduction of theistic considerations in favor of 
saying as much as possible within the ambit of a naturalistic ontology and 
philosophical anthropology. Since analytic metaphysicians are unlikely to turn to 
natural theology in great numbers in the proximate future, we really have no 
alternative—unless, of course, we prefer to keep aloof.”56 
 
Such studied aloofness is not necessary from this perspective as there is already a double 
delay in the introduction of metaphysics into ethics and politics; first in relation to the proper 
initial role of the natural (and social sciences) in speculative philosophy, and secondly in the 
allowance of a significant and initial role for the exercise of practical reason. This double 
delay may allay the legitimate fears of some that Thomistic approaches have unduly upfront 
metaphysical commitments - even if it does not persuade those who rigorously maintain the 
post-metaphysical tenor of contemporary philosophy, or the necessity of understanding 
religious claims themselves on so called “weak thought”.57 
That said I consider that a position that excludes all reasoning that might be thought of as 
metaphysical chastens the proper role of philosophy in the academy and in public life, 
leading to the undue fragmentation of knowledge.58 Though the intellect is limited in the truth 
that can be attained through metaphysics, it nonetheless plays an important role in thinking 
about humanity and the world in which we live. Transcendental reflection on the conditions 
of moral agency – itself a limited form of metaphysics - offers no substitute for an ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
important points often advanced against epistemological realism by its critics, without having to give up the 
claim that we can nonetheless come to know things more or less adequately.”	  
56	  Kerr, ‘Fides et Ratio, Analytic Philosophy, and Metaphysics of Goodness’, at 630. Kerr suggests fruitful 
dialogue with neo-Aristotelian and naturalistic philosophers like Foot: “While we have discovered, in recent 
years, that there is much more to “Thomism” than “Aristotelianism,” the possibility lies open for a re-
engagement with Aristotle’s philosophy in ways that could bring Thomists and some analytical philosophers 
together to find common ground”, at 635.	  
57 See for example Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002). Here Vattimo accepts Nietschean, Heideggerian and historicist critiques of the Greek, Medieval 
and modern understandings of ‘truth’, which are cited as examples of ‘strong thought’. ‘Weak thought’ for 
Vattimo eschews truth claims as they have been traditionally conceived and instead rests on interpretative 
understandings of religion and ethics in a fully contextual and post modern way.  
58 Martin Loughlin, whose project of re-establishing the centrality of political right in theorising about public 
law I sympathise with, remarks that “modern disciplinary specialisation has contributed to certain losses in 
understanding” particularly relating to juristic discourse. See Martin Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 9ff. 
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(metaphysically integrated) philosophical anthropology.59 The fact that different varieties of 
metaphysical realism or forms of ethical naturalism seem to be regaining some credence in 
analytical ethics is an interesting turn.60 
(c) The perdurance of the ‘the theological-political question’ 
The subject matter of this work is the philosophy of human affairs and thus the focus of the 
work is philosophical rather than theological and focussed primarily on the ‘natural’. 
However, it does not exclude Christian theological ideas, especially those theological 
conceptions as they necessarily relate to discussions of human nature and human ends (as 
we see particularly in chapter 2).  
A perspective in philosophy that is open to a theological or theistic completion can be seen 
as helpful rather than disadvantageous in some contemporary social and political thought. 
Though it may not be right to go as far as Carl Schmitt in his bald assertion that “all 
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”, 
61 his statement indicates the indebtedness of Western political theory to its Christian 
inheritance. I concur with more recent continental theorists that, contrary to some of the 
sociological theories of the 1960’s that forecasted the complete secularisation of Western 
society within a few decades, there remains for many citizens and social theorists of many 
stripes an irreducible relationship between human conceptions of God’s relationship with the 
created order and understandings of political life.62 Whether Western countries are entering 
into, or have entered into, a ‘post-secular era’ or are undergoing ‘desecularisation’ is difficult 
to discern and depends on one’s initial definition of secularisation. The notion of the secular 
is now, at least, receiving proper theoretical treatment in the hands of a range of scholars in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In seeing the advantages of an Aristotelian Thomism in speculative philosophy of the kind Ashley espouses, I 
do not wish to wholly deny the Transcendental Thomist insight, gained from Joseph Marechel’s and Karl 
Rahner’s friendly confrontation with Kant, that there are passages in Aquinas that may used to parallel a 
‘transcendental’ reflection on the conditions of agency, in that “every act of knowing and choosing as implicitly 
knowing and choosing the truth and goodness which is the mystery of the divine being… [the experience of 
which discloses to the agent] the a priori conditions that Thomas took for granted in his understanding of human 
experience: namely, that in every act of knowing and loving the human being is tacitly and no doubt mostly 
unwittingly growing closer (or further away) from God.” See Kerr, After Aquinas, at 208. 
60 Among the philosophers who have made some use of what may be understood as ethical naturalism or 
metaphysical realism in their ethical theory (apart from those already mentioned such as MacIntyre and Foot), I 
include Alan Donegan, David Wiggins, John Haldane, David Oderberg, Candace Vogler, Michael Thompson, 
Warren Quinn, Gavin Lawrence, Anselm Müller, John Cottingham, and before them, the late Peter Geach. 
61 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 36. This quotation clearly 
oversimplifies the issues not least because it does not in turn acknowledge the partial indebtedness of Christian 
theological thought to its forebears in Roman and Greek thought, both philosophical and juristic. In any case I 
am far from convinced that Schmitt correctly outlined the proper outlines of the theologico-political problem not 
least because he did not correctly explicate Aquinas’s view on the relationship between the political order and 
theology. 
62 See for example Claude Lefort, “The Permanence of the Theologico Political,” Political Theologies: Public 
Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 153–159, though it is not clear 
what normative conclusions Lefort draws from the permanence of the theologico-political in his essay. 
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a way that will prove useful to the debate regarding multiculturalism in political theory. 63 It 
therefore appears that Tertullian’s question ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’ will 
continue to be a relevant question for the foreseeable future. This is not a question avoided 
in significant parts of this work. 
(d) Philosophy and ‘value free’ social science 
Many social and political theorist in modernity turned to the methods of the natural sciences 
to help solve the methodological vacuum purported left by metaphysics and theology. 
Positivism in its various forms took a strong place in legal, social and political studies in the 
late nineteenth and twentieth century, not least as a result of the rise of the German model of 
modern research university which differed in scope from the humanistic concerns of the 
medieval university. To the extent that forms of positivism have attempted to put forward 
wholly or mainly ‘value free’ social or political theories, such claims have been contested. 
Leo Strauss was a particularly trenchant critic of positivism, as was Eric Voegelin, though 
members of the Frankfurt School and Jurgen Habermas have issued their own rather 
different critiques of positivism. 
John Finnis, on a different basis to each of these critics, also denies the possibility of value 
free social sciences, claiming that at some stage the analysis of human practices, even on a 
descriptive basis, “can be fully understood only by understanding their point, that is to say 
their objective, their value, their significance or importance, as conceived by the people who 
performed them.”64 Though I do not go quite as far as Peter Winch in stating that “any 
worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character” we may largely agree with 
the remainder of Winch’s sentence that “any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with 
the nature of human society.”65 I hold that the social sciences themselves, including political 
science, are useful and in some cases indispensible in breaking down and unpicking social 
phenomena so that value based theoretical inquiry may proceed with a sound factual 
apparatus. This said, I concur with Peter Wagner that when taken to a reductive extreme, 
such methods pose the “danger of systematically directing attention away from the nature of 
the political in modern societies” and that political science methodology “cannot be 
decoupled from problems of social theory in general, [such as] conceptualising the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2007) is a prime example of 
this trend from a (Catholic) philosopher. A different approach from a non-theist may be found in William E. 
Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist (Minnesota, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
64 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 1. 
65 Peter Winch, The Idea of Social Science and its relation to Philosophy, second edition, (London: Routledge, 
1990), 3.	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constitution...”66 I therefore agree that social theory and political theory must to some degree 
relate to philosophical concerns, as will be clear in particular ways throughout this work. 
(e) Normative political theory – controversies on method 
My view of philosophy more broadly is that it should proceed via a dialectical method in 
addressing important and, in some way, relevant questions. The role of abstraction or 
idealization in political theory has caused significant controversy in the last decade or so. 
Critics of various currents of normative theory complain that the idealisation of human 
behaviour in much normative theorising removes political theory from reality, with the 
consequence that it does not address the world as it is. Theories constructed on the 
foundations of ideal theory are thus alleged not to have the optimum critical purchase.  
Here I may call for assistance from Leo Strauss, who helpfully describes how the antique 
spirit of philosophy relates to what we now call ideal theory. It is a picture that I find more 
convincing than modern realist approaches that seemingly sever political morality from 
ethics, including a conception of natural or political right.67 Classical political philosophy, in 
Strauss’s interpretation, was about finding the best regime or constitution in accordance with 
natural right, and its consequent idealism was very different from modern utopianism (such 
as that of Marx). For Strauss, Plato and Aristotle’s legitimate utopianism was: 
“not a theoretical construction, but a practical ideal. By calling….[the ideal 
constitution] candidly an object of wish or prayer, they left no doubt as to the gulf 
separating the ideal from reality, they considered that the realization of the ideal is a 
matter of chance,.…. [t]hey did not make any predictions. While completely 
suspending their judgments concerning the realization of the ideal, they were definite 
as to the ideal itself: this ideal was….the standard of sincere, uncompromising 
judgments on the real. The practical meaning of this utopianism was…..[thus] merely 
to point out the direction which efforts of improvement would have to take. They did 
not seriously believe that the perfect order of society would ever become a reality; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Peter Wagner, A History and Theory of the Social Sciences (London: Sage, 2001), 39. 
67	  Though sharing criticisms of primary constructivism with realists, I do not share their fundamental criticism 
of ‘political moralism’ as Bernard Williams labels even John Rawls’s Political Liberalism. See Bernard 
Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’, in Bernard Williams and Geoffrey Hawthorne (Ed.), In 
the beginning was the deed: realism and moralism in political argument (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 2.	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for, being an object of wish or prayer, there is no necessary reason why it should; but 
they felt that any actual order could bear improvement, substantial improvement.”68 
I therefore do not accept a general critique made by many political realists, that an ‘ethics 
first’ conception of politics is necessarily problematic, a fact attested to by the chapter 
structure of this work. Indeed I concur with G.A. Cohen, though on a very different 
philosophical basis, that in normative political theory a primacy is accorded to fundamental 
normative ‘principles’ rather than ‘facts’.69 Non-normative facts (feasibility considerations or 
‘principles of regulation’) cannot in themselves cancel out or mitigate fundamental normative 
requirements in this view. Cohen was concerned that John Rawls’s acceptance of economic 
incentives within the structure of his theory of justice would justify undue economic inequality 
– something contrary to justice for Cohen. What seems a key issue in this debate is that, 
when adopting a constructivist position, one ought to take care not to include considerations 
that have an implicit or explicit normative impact into purportedly factual understandings of 
the ‘circumstances of justice’. 
I believe that it is important to distinguish a legitimate form of ideal theory from utopianism in 
two ways. Firstly, some modern utopians hold that the tragic in life is avoidable and perfect 
justice is attainable - or at least at some stage in the course of human history. I do not hold 
this position and maintain that, to a lesser or greater degree, earthly social or political 
utopias are not possible and that the tragic in life is ineliminable.70 This opposition to certain 
forms of modern utopianism does not, however, dispense with the need for ideal theory, 
which I define as the theorising in relation to a perfectly just (as far as this is possible in this 
life) political society and regime. The view of political theory propounded here still 
emphasises that a key task of political philosophy must be to eliminate the great harms that 
are still experienced throughout the world by people in different contexts. Just as a 
physician’s ultimate aim is to promote and sustain the health and well being of the patient, 
the principle of beneficence includes within it the imperative of “first do no harm”.  
I may therefore agree with the realist in that much political betterment may not derive from 
improving the already good but from ameliorating the very bad. Indeed, an enacted theory of 
political rule aimed at ‘the good’ may well achieve its greatest advances in people’s quality of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Leo Strauss, ‘What can we learn from political theory?’, The Review of Politics, 69 (2007), 515–529, at 522, 
italics in original. The article is a previously unpublished a lecture by Strauss from 1942. This citation of Strauss 
here does not infer an endorsement of other aspects of Strauss’s theoretical approach. 
69	  Gerald A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31 (2003), 211–45.	  
70	  Paul Cornish highlights Augustine’s view of the tragic, going so far as to write that his “emphasis on the 
tragic nature of political action is itself a major contribution to the history of republicanism.” Paul J. Cornish, 
‘Augustine’s Contribution to the Republican Tradition’, European Journal of Political Theory, 9 (2010), 133–
148, at 145.	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life simply by eliminating the harms that dysfunctional regimes or failed states generate. 
Thus a political liberalism aimed at protecting and advancing the human good and meeting 
basic human needs is also one that necessarily addresses human evils. Ideal theory allows 
us to set ourselves the goal of the best – in a way strongly reminiscent of the ancient 
approach to political philosophy (as Leo Strauss summarised above) – without undermining 
incrementalism or a legitimate sense of the tragic. 
To this classical model of political moralism I may also add a Thomistic theological 
consideration, one based on the doctrine of original sin.71 Though a Thomist may allow for 
the reality of original sin and the disruption that this brings to just relations in human affairs, 
such an allowance for the inevitability of human wrongdoing or selfishness should not mean 
that normative theories should be constructed in a way that unduly builds in the human 
tendency to wrongdoing, as this may distort the very normative purpose of the theory. In the 
Augustinian and Thomist perspective, for instance, moral badness and sin do not have an 
intrinsic ontological reality – which is not to deny the actuality of (widespread) evil acts and 
vicious moral agents – but Augustine held that evil or “what are called vices in the soul are 
nothing but privations of natural good” (the doctrine of the privatio boni).72 
The theologian John Milbank, rightly cautions Christian theorists against building normative 
theory upon the superstructure of an ‘ontology of violence’ or conflict (i.e. an ontology in 
which evil is an opposite ontological reality to ‘the good’), as he holds that the (theo-
)ontology of Catholic Christianity is essentially that of an ‘ontology of peace’. On the same 
basis some other Christian theorists have expressed serious reservations about agonistic 
political theory in that it makes conflict (albeit non-violent conflict) a positive and central part 
of its normative understanding of politics.73 
4). The chapter structure 
The structure of the thesis reflects the method I have outlined above.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  G.K. Chesterton half quipped that the doctrine of original sin was the only Christian doctrine that was 
demonstrable through empirical observation. See G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Chicago, IL., Moody Publishers, 
2009, [1908]), 28.	  
72	  St Augustine, The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Press, 1996 [1961]) at 
11-12 (and chapters 10-23 more generally). John Milbank says that with the notion of the privatio boni: “that 
nothing is evil insofar as it exists, then it is evil insofar as its failure to be related to God, to infinite peace, and 
to other finite realities with which it should be connected to form a pattern of true desire. Evil becomes the 
denial of the hope for, and the present reality of, community.” John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 
second edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 440.	  
73	  See, for example, Charles Matthews in his A Theology of Public Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 266-274, referring to Chantal Mouffe’s democratic theory.	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Chapter 1 – this introduction - has set out some of the reasons that has prompted the writing 
of this thesis, its intended impacts, and some of the background methodological 
presuppositions operating throughout the work. 
Chapter 2 proceeds to outline an understanding of human ends, goods and needs through 
an exploration of contemporary interpretations of ancient, and particularly, Thomistic ethics. 
The chapter broadly follows the outlines of the Thomist ethical theory persuasively 
elaborated by the contemporary Swiss Thomist philosopher Martin Rhonheimer, though this 
theory is enhanced with the adoption of important ideas derived from Julia Annas (on virtue) 
and Henry Richardson (on the structuring of human ends). 
Chapter 3 establishes how justice, natural right and the political common good can be 
properly understood. The chapter addresses the development of natural and human rights 
from the natural right tradition and how they might be philosophically justified. The chapter 
concludes by addressing the usefulness of the concept of natural right and human rights as 
a basis for social criticism and the concrete remediation of human injustices. 
Chapter 4 draws on a variety of contemporary interpretations of Thomist and second 
scholastic understandings of political and legal theory to address the question of global 
justice and human rights through the concept of the universal common good and the ius 
gentium. I then critique and reconstruct Rawls’s later conception of political liberalism, taking 
on board criticisms from other theorists, such as Martha Nussbaum, to elaborate a form of 
permissive political liberalism which can be seen as a species of political liberalism as a 
genus type. 
Chapter 5 elaborates a species of political liberalism with a reflection on contemporary 
forms of republicanism and constitutionalism. The chapter concludes by critically marshalling 
insights from both traditions to specify more clearly a form of political liberalism. 
Chapter 6 concludes the work by drawing the various themes in the thesis together while 
addressing the question of how legal and political duties can impact on one’s ethical outlook. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ETHICAL UNDERPINNINGS GROUNDING POLITICAL ASSOCIATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
a). Purpose of the chapter 
The chapter will explore an approach to practical rationality based on a classical virtue ethic. 
I examine the eudaimonistic underpinnings of classical and Thomistic ethics, looking at the 
similarities and differences between classical and modern approaches to human fulfilment. I 
examine the different ways in which human fulfilment (eudaimonia/beatitude) has been 
conceived in its contemporary Thomistic guises, critically examining the role of natural law 
theory in Aquinas’s ethical theory with reference to the key primary texts. I argue that 
Aquinas’s natural law theory is one important element within his wider eudaimonistic ethic, 
which is itself embedded in a metaphysically and theologically grounded framework. In 
expounding this moral theory I will critique understandings of Aquinas’s ethical theory that 
stray too far from eudaimonism and a virtue based approach (such as John Finnis), and 
other exclusively theological readings of Thomistic ethics (as propounded by scholars such 
as John Milbank), on the other. 
In the context of this work generally, I argue that the structuring of human ends in classical 
and Thomistic ethics is consistent with the importance of justice and civil association, as 
explored in later chapters. I argue, principally using the work of the Swiss philosopher Martin 
Rhonheimer, that Aquinas’s notion of imperfect beatitude takes full account of the goods of 
civil life. Aquinas’s natural law theory, as a part of his eudaimonistic approach, plays an 
important role in explaining how moral agents apprehend certain human goods that motivate 
action. This chapter will not address some of the more intricate meta-ethical questions 
alluded to in chapter 1,1 though in the course of the chapter I will explore some of the key 
dividing lines between classical approaches to ethics and deontological ones.  
b). Background 
The established narrative of twentieth century moral philosophy places G.E.M. Anscombe’s 
uncompromising lecture ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (to the Oxford Voltaire Society) as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Not least because I would suggest that “[m]eta-ethics cannot be understood as a separate discipline, but [is 
best viewed as] as a working out of some of the conceptual implications of our best normative theory.” 
Christopher Tollefsen, ‘Natural law and modern meta-ethics’, in Mark J. Cherry (Ed.), Natural Law and the 
Possibility of a Global Ethics, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 39-56, at 54. 
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watershed moment. The lecture, published in 1958, contains Anscombe’s long gestated 
dissatisfaction with English moral philosophy in the 1950’s. Her broadsides against 
deontological ethics and the newly christened ‘consequentialism’ raised questions that were 
not addressed fully until the 1980’s and later in the academic literature. Anscombe’s lecture 
and other writings helped to reignite academic interest in ethics from the perspective of the 
acting person (including action theory) and classical notions of human flourishing, virtue and 
vice. Though Anscombe’s authorities in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ are ancient rather than 
medieval (Aristotle is mentioned repeatedly - Aquinas and the scholastics are not cited), she 
refers throughout to the divine law conception of ethics and the “Hebrew Christian ethic”.2 
Interest in the classical and scholastic traditions of ethics flowered in the period after Modern 
Moral Philosophy, a profusion that continues unabated. In the English speaking academy 
works by Peter Geach, Anthony Kenny, Bernard Williams, Iris Murdoch, John Finnis, John 
McDowell, Alasdair MacIntyre and later in published works by Phililpa Foot, Julia Annas and 
Rosalind Hursthouse. The renewed focus on classic ethics has in turn turned attention to 
neglected elements of the moral philosophies of Kant, Bentham and Sidgwick (Anscombe’s 
putative opponents in Modern Moral Philosophy) that deal with moral psychology and the 
virtues.  
Martha Nussbaum helpfully characterises three common tenets of the revival of virtue ethics 
– whether classical or Kantian: (1) a concern “with the agent as well as choice and action”, 
(2) a concern with “the inner moral life, and with settled patterns of motive, emotion, and 
reasoning” and; (3) a focus on “the whole course of an agent’s life”.3 Nussbaum sees the 
retrieval of such aspects of moral theory as indicating a renewal across different schools of 
moral philosophy rather than as an alternative to Kantian or utilitarian ethics. Nussbaum 
acknowledges that Anglophone moral philosophy in the 1950’s through to the 1980’s had not 
paid much to questions of virtue emphasising instead the role of human choice.4  
I shall structure my discussion in this chapter around Martha Nussbaum’s three points of 
convergence between different ethical schools (which will be taken in reverse order). In 
addition to these points from Nussbaum’s discussion, I consider a fourth: the contested 
teleological or naturalistic underpinning of classical ethics. I shall discuss these four points 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 33, no. 124 (1958), 1-19, at 6, 10-13. 
3 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?’ The Journal of Ethics, 3:3 (1999), 163-201, at 
170. 
4 Notable exceptions from this period of course includes the (rarely highlighted) third part of John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) where he explores the idea of an agent’s ‘plan of 
life’. Later analyses of Kant’s ethics (by theorists (such as Onora O’Neil and Christine Korsgaard) emphasising 
the importance of the inner life have helped to bridge the gap between universalistic and particularistic 
approaches to ethics. 
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with particular reference to classical philosophers and particularly Aquinas as paradigmatic 
virtue ethicists, considered through the lens of key contemporary Thomistic (and Aristotelian) 
interpreters. 
2). “A focus on the “the whole course of an agent’s life”, or ethics as ‘eudaimonistic’ 
(a) Classical understandings of Eudaimonia 
The view of view of ethics lived over the course of an agent’s life is seen most clearly in the 
notion of eudaimonia or “a life which turns out well”.5 It refers to the final or highest good of 
the person or agent. Though agents may disagree as to what substantively this might 
constitute, eudaimonia (for Julia Annas) is a “thin specification of the final good”6 and is 
commonly translated by contemporary philosophers as ‘happiness’ or ‘well being’. 
Anscombe herself introduces the term ‘human flourishing’ in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ to 
describe the something like the eudaimonistic good for the agent.7 I retain the original term 
eudaimonia in this discussion to emphasise that I understand the concept in a way similar to 
classical ethicists. Eudaimonia is a ‘thin’ specification of the final good because although it 
names “’true’ or ‘real’ happiness”, it specifies that about which “there can be substantial 
disagreement” that “cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard”.  8 In this sense 
a eudaimonistic ethic does not necessarily rest on epistemological foundationalism. 
The concept of eudaimonia for Aristotle is an active rather than passive term and is not 
synonymous with the experience of pleasure or various temporary subjective psychological 
states as it is in some versions of subjectivist and utilitarian ethics. It refers to the state that a 
person reaches where: (1) no other end or purpose in life as a whole is seen as greater; and, 
(2) life is experienced as in some sense as satisfactory by the agent. For Robert Spaemann 
eudaimonia is not “a particular goal in relation to which other goals are subordinated as mere 
means” but is “the determinate reflectively obtained ‘conceptual essence’ which allows all 
that is desirable in all its multiplicity to grow together, into a desirable whole”.9 
J.L. Akrill clarifies eudaimonia in Aristotle’s terms as being “what all men want – it is not, he 
insists the result or outcome of a life time’s effort: it is not something to look forward to (like a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Robert Spaemann, Happiness and Benevolence, translated by J. Alberg (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 8. 
6 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), at 43-46. 
7 Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 18-19. 
8	  Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue Ethics’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) 
Spring 2009 Edition. URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/ethics-virtue/  accessed 5 October 
2009, at section 2.	  
9 Spaemann, Happiness and Benevolence, 14, 22-34. Spaemann amplifies this point by stating that although 
“Aristotle uses the eudaimonistic language of ‘end and means’, he saw the objects of the will as contents of the 
good life do not stand in end-means relation but rather they are related to another like as parts to a whole” (at 
22). 
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contented retirement), it is a life enjoyable and worthwhile all through.”10 It is a truly final end 
where nothing is lacking, a complete and ultimate good (summum bonum) that is therefore 
not comparable with other goods (NE 1097b14-15). Yet Akrill (and others interpreters such 
as T.H. Irwin) make a strong case for “eudaimonia being inclusive of all intrinsic goods”, 
though not in a merely aggregative way.11 Spaemann’s uses a musical analogy to describe 
the organisation of different intrinsic goods towards eudaimonia - an agent’s goal which is 
not a final end in itself can be viewed as a distinct movement of a symphony – a discrete 
part of a whole symphonic work while being more than simply a means to the symphonic 
end. Eudaimonia thus gives “actions a meaning, which they do not possess from the 
immediate objective of the agent, that is through his or her direct intention”.12 In a 
eudaemonic ethic the ‘ends’ of action have three general degrees of finality: [1] means 
alone, [2] ends which are also means, [3] an absolutely final end (eudaimonia) which are not 
also means.13 
Both Akrill and Henry Richardson in different ways eschew a ‘dominant’ or ‘monolithic end’ 
view of eudaimonia put forward by other interpreters of Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics 
(book X, 7), Aristotle’s own preferred route to eudaimonia was a life of philosophical 
contemplation. ‘Monolithic’ end interpreters of Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia see 
contemplation as being the exclusive ‘dominant’ end of an agent, inferring that other intrinsic 
goods, such as moral virtue, cannot properly be thought of as included in the eudaemonic 
good. Akrill acknowledges that Aristotle never spells out how intrinsic goods other than 
contemplation partly constitute eudaimonia but that it his conception of eudaimonia does 
allow us to do this through an ‘inclusivist’ hierarchy of human ends.14 Unconvinced with both 
dominant end and aggregative interpretations of eudaimonia in Aristotle, Richardson has put 
forward a persuasive interpretation of eudaimonia, which he terms ‘structured inclusivism’.15 
In this reading, non-final ends which constitute intrinsic goods are nonetheless structurally 
ordered and subordinated to the ultimate eudaemonic end. Intrinsic value is generated not 
only by the final end alone but also by non-final intrinsic ends, including moral virtue and 
natural or external goods such as health or one’s reputation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 J. L. Akrill, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, in A.O. Rorty (Ed.), Essays on Aristole’s Ethics, (London: University 
of California Press, 1980), 15-33, at 19. 
11 Akrill, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, at 22. 
12 Spaemann, Happiness and Benevolence, 24. 
13 I take this threefold formulation of human ends from: Henry S. Richardson, ‘Degress of Finality and the 
Highest Good in Aristotle’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992), 327-352, at 331. 
14 Akrill, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, at 27-28 and 30-32. Scholars continue to differ on this question in 
interpreting Aristotle, not least because different passages within the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean 
Ethics seem to point in different directions on the matter. 
15 Richardson, ‘Degress of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle’, at 349-352. 
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Philosophers in the modern era, such as Hobbes, Kant and Sidgwick saw the classical 
preoccupation with personal fulfilment or eudaimonia as unattractively selfish or egotistic. 
Though Kant does incorporate the achievement of happiness in his moral theory, he does so 
in a somewhat diminished role. According to one interpreter Kant views happiness “as 
personal contentment and success in achieving the ends we want” arguing “that morality is a 
constraint on the pursuit of a happy life rather than the means to it or an element of it”.16 The 
pursuit of the summum bonum, which for Kant is the “union of virtue and the morally 
appropriate happiness that virtuous persons deserve”,17 is only of moral worth when it is 
dutifully pursued with good will and according to universal principles established by the ‘pure 
practical reason’; pure in the sense that its independent of the inclinations of our nature and 
desire for personal happiness. This modern reworking of Aristotelian ethics, founded on the 
notion that classical ethics is egotistic in a way that militates against just social relations, is 
much contested by some theorists.  
Annas denies that classical ethics are fundamentally egotistic, writing that eudaimonia is 
only self-centred in this rather basic sense that a person “aims at her own flourishing and not 
mine just in the sense that she is living her life and not mine. There is no implication that she 
is furthering her own interests at the expense of mine”.18 She claims that while classical 
ethics may have been “formally” self-centred, they need not be self-centred “in content”19 as 
this would entirely depend on what the agent understood to constitute their ultimate end. 
Hedonist theories of flourishing, for example, clearly prioritise the experience of pleasure 
over other criteria. Yet the “moral virtues, such as courage and justice, commit the agent to 
respecting the good of others” while philia (friendship) might also lead an agent to grant “non 
instrumental weight to the interests of others” as Aristotle argues himself. In other words, 
one “can care for others for their own sake [, and] consider their good is part of my own” 
from a eudaimonistic perspective.20 
Though Aristotle’s understanding of philia is somewhat restricted to kith, kin (and through 
civil association) the fellow citizen, Annas argues that the Stoic conception of ‘familiarization’ 
broadens the scope of concern to the whole of humanity. It achieves this by simultaneously 
asserting self concern and other-concern. Annas thus holds that Stoic or Stoic inspired 
versions of eudaimonia can be committed to a form of impartiality or “moral egalitarianism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Thomas E. Hill, ‘Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 16 
(1999), 143-175, at 143. 
17 Hill, ‘Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics’, 159. 
18 Julia Annas, ‘Virtue Ethics’, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, David Chopp (Ed.), (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 515-536, at 522. 
19 Julia Annas, ‘The Good Life and the Good Lives of others’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 9 (1992), 133-148, 
at 135. 
20 Annas, ‘The Good Life and the Good Lives of others’, at 136-137. 
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which, though not as thorough as Kant’s, is nonetheless reminiscent of it in some way”.21 As 
is emphasised in chapter 1, this animates the commitment of classical ethical theories to 
virtue as an ideal, that: 
“ethical thought essentially includes an aspiration to be better than we are. Classical 
virtue theories are marked both by realistic recognition of the socially embedded 
nature of our ethical life, and by insistence that if we are thinking ethically, we are 
striving to be better, to reach an ideal that is not already attained.”22 
I take forward the retrieval of a classical virtue ethics, with its accent on virtue and 
eudaimonia, with Aquinas’s transformation of eudaimonia into his central notion of beatitude. 
(b). Aquinas’s transformation of eudaimonia 
Thomas Aquinas follows Aristotle and St Augustine in arguing that happiness is a complete 
and self-sufficient good. Aquinas's questions within the Summa theologiae that deal with 
happiness share some of Aristotle’s outline analysis of eudaimonia. At the same time there 
are crucial elements to Aquinas’s understanding of ‘beatitude’ (‘blessedness’ - the 
theological term Aquinas uses for eudaimonia) that stand in distinction to the authority 
(Aristotle) he named ‘the Philosopher’. Following scripture and his forebear Augustine, the 
complete good (summum bonum) is only achieved only in union with God in the heavenly 
life. Aquinas distinguishes three forms or stages of eudaimonia or beatitude as presented in 
the figure below:23 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Annas, ‘The Good Life and the Good Lives of others’, at 141, f.n. 25. 
22 Annas, ‘Virtue Ethics’, at 523.	  
23 I have adapted somewhat Don Adams’s typology of happiness or eudaimonia in this figure. See Don Adams, 
‘Aquinas on Aristotle on Happiness’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991), 98-118, at 117. 
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Figure: Aquinas’s structuring of eudaimonia/beatitude 
IMPERFECT 
EUDAIMONIA 
/ BEATITUDE 
 
‘Natural’ 
beatitude (i.e. 
possible 
without grace) 
E1 The earthly eudaemonic fulfilment of the life lived according to 
the moral virtues (vita activa) ST I-II q.5 a. 5c & q.4a 6c, a 7c), 
following NE. 1.7. 1098a7-12; 1098a16. 
(Also called felicitas civilis / civil happiness) 
[The formal object of moral philosophy for Finnis and the object of 
moral philosophy and moral theology for Rhonheimer.] 
E2 The earthly eudaemonic fulfilment of the contemplative life 
(vita contemplativa), including the contemplation of the creator 
God as First Cause. (Summa Contra Gentiles III, c.37, following 
NE book X.7). 
PERFECT 
EUDAIMONIA 
/ BEATITUDE 
(only possible 
by grace) 
E3 ‘Supernatural’ eudaemonic fulfilment to the fullest extent; the 
eudaimonia / beatitude involving one's speculative intellect and 
one's resurrected body” (the Visio Dei) (ST I-II, q.3, a.8). 
[The formal object of moral theology for Denis Bradley, and the 
formal object of the theological virtues for Rhonheimer and Finnis.] 
Key 
E = Form of eudaimonia / beatitude 
E1 and E2 are aspects of what Aquinas describes as ‘imperfect beatitude’, a form of 
happiness that is in some sense qualified (secundum quid), while E3, more familiarly known 
as the visio dei or the beatific vision, is eudaimonia in a strict and unqualified sense 
(simpliciter). E2 and E3 clearly indicate what has been described as the intellectualist aspect 
of Aquinas’s approach to eudaimonia/beatitude. E2 clearly parallels Aristotle’s argument in 
book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, that the contemplative life is superior to the active life 
and should be considered truly fulfilling.  
Some recent studies of Aquinas’s ethics have placed the Treatise on Beatitude (ST I-II, qq.1-
5), rather than the Treatise on Law (including natural law), as playing an architectonic role in 
Aquinas’s ethical theory. In these five questions in the Treatise on Beatitude, scripture is 
cited as an authority sixty times, the Church Fathers sixty one times, ‘the Philosopher’ sixty 
six times, and Boethius thirteen times.24 The positioning of the Treatise on Beatitude at the 
beginning of the second part of the Summa theologiae is interpreted as being important by 
Servais Pinckaers, not least because it precedes the Treatise on Law, but also as it echoes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Servais Pinckaers, ‘Beatitude and the Beatitudes in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae’, in John Berkman and 
Craig Titus Stevens (Eds.), The Pinckaers Reader: renewing Thomistic moral theology, translated by M.T. 
Noble, (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 115-129, at 115.	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Aristotle’s treatment of eudaimonia in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics. This does 
not mean that the Treatise on Beatitude and the Treatise on Law (and particularly natural 
law) have to be seen as offering contradictory emphasises (as Finnis infers, as we shall 
see). It does this, for Terrence Irwin, because the first precept or principle of natural law 
simply directs the agent to the good as an end, the same good that reaches its practical 
terminus in ultimate end of eudaimonia/beatitude (“the first directing of our acts toward the 
end comes about through natural law”, ST q. 91. a.2, ad 2).25 Such interpretations go against 
many influential readings of Aquinas that give his ethical theory a clear legalistic and 
deontological orientation, such as that put forward by J.B Schneewind26 and Alan Donegan. 
The structuring of final and non-final ends in Aquinas is also subject to a similar 
interpretative dispute, though with the added issue of the how eudaimonia relates to 
heavenly fulfilment (E3). These disputes cluster around two distinct questions. The first 
question is theological insofar as it relates to Aquinas’s understanding of scriptural texts and 
the testimony of the Church Fathers as much as it relates his use of the philosophical notion 
of eudaimonia. It concerns whether ultimate human fulfilment is fundamentally ‘supernatural’ 
(relating to the heavenly vision of God) or whether the human person can properly be said to 
have two ultimate ends: one a proportionate ‘this worldly’ natural end attainable without 
grace and the other a supernatural end only attainable through grace. The first position is 
associated with the twentieth century Catholic theologian Henri de Lubac, the Thomist 
philosopher Etienne Gilson and more recently with the Georgetown philosopher Denis 
Bradley. Their positions on this question has subsequently been radicalised by the 
theologian John Milbank and by members and American Communio school.27 
The ‘dual end’ position is associated with neo-scholastic theologians, certain neo-Thomists 
such as Jacques Maritain, and contemporary Thomists such as Ralph McInerny and Steven 
A. Long. This issue is methodologically crucial because the assertion of a single ‘dominant’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  See T. H. Irwin, ‘Aquinas, Natural Law and Aristotelian Eudaimonism’ in Richard Kraut (Ed.), The Blackwell 
Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 323-341, at 327. Irwin states that “attention 
to natural law does not turn us away from the eudaemonist outlook, it simply expresses this eudaemonist 
outlook”, at 327. 
26 Terrence Irwin addresses this point in his three volume magnus opus on the history of ethics, where he 
devotes 217 pages to Aquinas’s ethics (nearly double the treatment he gives to Aristotle, of whom he is a noted 
interpreter). Irwin contradicts Schneewind’s view (expressed in the latter’s influential work The Invention of 
Autonomy) in which Aquinas is portrayed as rendering the virtues as “basically the habits of obedience to laws”. 
Irwin comprehensively documents how this is not in fact Aquinas’s position as he sees it. See Terrence Irwin, 
The Development of Ethics: A historical and critical study, Volume I: From Socrates to the Reformation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), quoted at f.n. 80, at 570. Irwin’s discussion in chapter 21 of that work 
is illuminating on the nexus of questions relating to whether Aquinas in a sense completes Aristotle’s 
eudaimonistic ethics or whether we should view Aquinas as one of the first deontologists. I am very sympathetic 
to Irwin’s interpretation as set out in chapter 21. 
27 Though not every author who publishes in the American edition of the theological journal Communio: 
International Catholic Review can be said to take this position. 
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supernatural final end has been used by Milbank and others as a key argument to justify the 
rejection of any substantive form Thomistic ethical or social philosophy (as opposed to a 
moral theology), which in turn is used to reject attempts to defend overlapping practical 
agreement in a pluralistic society on justice and human rights. These naturally apprehended 
human goods are called ‘infravalent ends’ by the neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain and 
constitute “the good of civil life” (i.e. E1).28 They relate to non-final ends that are intrinsically 
valuable or good, but which are hierarchically subordinate to, and ordered towards, human 
ends such as the philosophical contemplation of God. For Maritain it is upon infravalent ends 
(such as health, education, material sustenance, and other social goods) that overlapping 
agreement in the political sphere is possible. This is a “practical moral task” for Maritain and 
one shared by believers and unbelievers alike, while the higher achievement of a “common 
doctrinal minimum” - agreement on final ends – is “a pure fiction”.29  
In his wider theological meta-narrative John Milbank, following Henri de Lubac, sees the 
assertion of a dual end for human persons as inaugurating a clear separation of the natural 
and supernatural orders, which leads to nature being treated as self-sufficient and fully 
autonomous within its own order. An extrinsic relationship between the natural and 
supernatural orders is thus established for Milbank, which helps launch a proto-modern 
notion of moral autonomy and the questioning of God as integral to human flourishing and 
thus to social and political life.30 It is argued that this process evolved over the centuries with 
the successive emergence of voluntarism, nominalism, neo-scholasticism, rationalism, 
Kantianism (where God’s existence is a postulate of practical reason), culminating in forms 
of atheistic secularism. Cajetan, and especially Suarez, are seen as the founders within the 
neo-scholastic era of a notion of ‘pure [human] nature’, which has nothing but an ‘obediential 
potency’ for grace which becomes, over the centuries, an anthropology that asserts that 
human nature has two ends (finis duo) rather than a final end with a twofold aspect (finis 
duplex).31 
De Lubac claimed that this separation of human ends led to the exiling of the supernatural 
“both from intellectual and from social life – leaving the field free to be taken over by 
secularism” which taken to its logical conclusion would end in “total secularization which 
would expel God not merely from the life of society, but from culture and even from personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, translated by M. R. Adamson. (London: The Centenary Press, 1946 
[1938]), 127. 
29 Maritain, True Humanism, at 200. 
30 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, second edition, (London: Blackwell, 2006), especially 
chapters 1 and 8. 
31 David Braine is helpful in locating this development and relating it to de Lubac’s work: David Braine, ‘The 
Debate Between Henri de Lubac and His Critics’, Nova et Vetera, English Edition 6 (2008), 543-590, at 560 and 
571. 
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relationships”.32 This account is questioned both in its fundamentals and in its details. De 
Lubac, in a series of works from the 1940’s to the 1960’s, sought to recover what he saw as 
the original Christian and patristic understanding of ‘man’s last end’ which for de Lubac is 
summed up in Augustine’s statement “you have made us for yourself and our hearts are 
restless until they rest in you”.33 Milbank remarkably asserts that de Lubac’s first major 
publication on this issue Surnaturel in 1946 was “almost [as significant] an event of cultural 
revision as Being and Time or the Philosophical Investigations”.34 
De Lubac’s key thesis is that Aquinas taught that human beings have ‘a natural desire for 
the supernatural end’ (E3), which is their sole end. This innate intellectual drive toward the 
transcendent is a teleological ordering to God imprinted on each human person due to the 
possession of a ‘spiritual’ soul.35 This natural drive is just that - it is not a form of grace.36 De 
Lubac is clear that he does not mean that that human persons are able to attain perfect 
heavenly beatitude without grace, nor does he contest that there is not a twofold aspect to 
beatitude/eudaimonia (that is the perfect beatitude of the visio dei and a ‘this worldly’ 
imperfect beatitude.37 Traditionalist contemporary Thomists such as Steven Long directly 
contest de Lubac’s position.38 They argue from Aquinas’s texts and the neoscholastic 
commentarial tradition on Aquinas that, apart from grace, human nature has its own 
proportionate eudaemonic finality which is an essential finality in its own (natural) order. 
There is thus a clear human ‘essence’ bearing an ontological density that is, in principle, 
intelligible to human reason. Imperfect beatitude of the philosophical contemplation of God 
(E2) is, for Long, the intelligible proportionate finality for human nature as set out by Aquinas. 
This contemplation is not of God’s essence or nature - as in the visio dei39- but is the 
successful use of speculative reasoning in coming to know of God as creator through 
created effects, by way of metaphysical reasoning. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, translated by Rosemary Sheed, (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1967 [1965]), xi-xii. 
33 St Augustine, Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), I.1, at 3. 
34 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans), 2005, at 63. 
35 De Lubac strongly emphasises the Pauline and patristic tradition of understanding to human person to be a 
unified composite of body, soul and spirit, where the spirit “is the principle of a higher life, the place of 
communication with God”, see Henri de Lubac, Theology in history (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 125. 
De Lubac holds that this tripartite anthropology was taught by Thomas Aquinas (at 155-163). 
36 It is agreed by all orthodox Christians that divine grace, as a free gift, cannot be in any sense owed to human 
beings. De Lubac was initially accused of compromising this gratuity, despite his strongest denials, which were 
present from his earliest writings. 
37 Henri de Lubac, ‘Duplex Hominis Beatitudo’, Communio, 35 (2008 [1948]), 599-612, at 610-612. 
38 Steven A. Long, Natura pura: on the recovery of nature in the doctrine of grace (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2010). 
39 These interpreters acknowledge that perfect and truly ultimate beatitude was for Aquinas the vision of God 
revealed in the next life through grace. However, Long argues that this is not properly a human final end 
because it requires a non-human (supernatural) intervention for it to become known of, let alone achieved.  
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Responding to this renewed debate between Thomists, David Braine concedes that de 
Lubac’s argument contains some significant argumentative flaws, but argues that de Lubac’s 
core thesis still holds: there is a natural human appetitus directed towards the vision of the 
divine essence (E3). Braine, an analytical Thomist, helpfully distinguishes between the 
finality of human nature in abstracto and the finality of existing human persons in the actually 
existing order of creation, as Aquinas viewed it within his theological frame.40 Braine equally 
sees the later development of a hypothetical postulate of a ‘pure’ human nature (in an 
alternative order of providence), as proposed by Suarez and the neoscholastics, as 
characterising the “tradition of seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalism, and has no 
place in the interpretation of St Thomas”.41 
Despite insisting on the primacy of the supernatural eudaimonia of the human person, de 
Lubac does not belittle the integrity or importance of human nature. He holds that although 
human “nature is not conceived as an order able to an end definitively upon itself” this does 
not mean “that nature is without proper consistency”.42 He gladly adopts Aquinas’s axiom 
that ‘grace perfects nature and does not replace or abolish it’ (“gratia perficit naturam, non 
tollit” ST I. q.1. 8 ad 2). De Lubac approvingly quotes a contemporary that “[r]espect for 
natural values in their own structure is the best measure of our respect for the supernatural 
in its absolute originality”.43 Indeed, one contemporary and sympathetic interpreter of de 
Lubac insists (contra Milbank) that his position “actually requires the affirmation of such 
relative perfection or consistency” to nature and thus “Lubacians have good grounds for 
making common cause with neo-Thomists [such as Maritain] in defence of a robust concept 
of nature, [and] of natural law…”44 Despite the obvious interpretative difficulties involved in 
this matter, I find the interpretation offered Aquinas by Braine and Healy (via de Lubac, but 
pace Milbank) convincing, both as an interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of beatitude, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As Braine says, in the actually existing order of creation as Aquinas would have seen it “this [supernatural] 
finality is something to be ascribed to each human person as such, and not to his nature as a human being, 
because it is a real attribute of the person but existing in the person only by virtue of a relation”: Braine, ‘The 
Debate Between Henri de Lubac and His Critics’, at 570. This distinction can perhaps help us explain the 
problematic paradox of how ‘human nature’ as an ontological category - which in theology is distinct from 
grace - can be imprinted with a supernatural finality without grace being in some sense owed to nature. Braine 
takes his understanding of personal attributes from Aquinas’s own understanding of the personhood of the 
Trinitarian Persons. 
41 Braine, ‘The Debate Between Henri de Lubac and His Critics’, 588-589. 
42 De Lubac, Theology in history, 288. 
43 De Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 30. 
44 Nicholas J. Healy, ‘Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace: A note on some recent contributions to the debate’ 
Communio, 35 (2008), 535-564, at 562. I note that in de Lubac’s preface to The Mystery of the Supernatural 
(xiv, f.n. 7), where he reflects on the negative contemporary social aspects of the separation between nature and 
the supernatural, de Lubac cites Jacques Maritain’s neo-Thomist socio-political manifesto Integral Humanism, 
in an approving manner. Similarly, de Lubac quotes Maritain approvingly when the latter criticises Descartes, 
among others, for thinking up “a purely natural man.…upon whom was superimposed the theological virtues 
and a duty to merit heaven.” See De Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 233. 
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and as a ‘structurally inclusive’45 notion of eudaimonia/beatitude that respects the integrity of 
the human person’s ‘this worldly’ ends.  
How theorists relate the Thomistic conception of eudaimonia/beatitude to his overall ethical 
theory varies considerably. Those who endorse de Lubac’s interpretation of 
eudaimonia/beatitude in Aquinas often see consequences for the viability of a fully fledged 
Thomistic ethical philosophy. Denis Bradley - who agrees with de Lubac’s view of the natural 
desire for supernatural eudaimonia/beatitude - claims that “imperfect or civil beatitude is 
subject to profound restrictions and transformations of meaning that are largely ignored by 
Thomist philosophical ethics” not least because, Bradley takes imperfect beatitude be the 
philosophical contemplation of God as First Cause through his created effects (E2).46 Thus 
for Bradley imperfect beatitude and perfect beatitude “are objectively and formally diverse, 
so too are the moral sciences that they respectively ground”.47  
Bradley sees the practical and speculative orders in Aquinas as being clearly distinct, and 
that contemplative wisdom is difficult and rarely achieved.48 He states that within a Thomistic 
schema “speculative knowledge of man’s natural end is remarkably inefficacious in 
promoting moral virtue”,49 asking: “What can an autonomous Thomistic philosophical ethics 
know of a supernatural end that utterly transcends man’s metaphysical and moral capacity to 
achieve?”50 This, for Bradley, makes the whole project of a Thomistic moral philosophy 
methodologically unviable. The natural ‘endlessness’ of the human person causes a 
disruptive aporia which, according to Bradley, affects any actual project of establishing a 
philosophical ethics. Only a moral theology - an ethic explicitly based on scriptural and 
doctrinal sources - can properly constitute a eudaimonistic ethic. In a sense, I interpret 
Bradley as holding that supernatural perfect beatitude/eudaimonia (E3) is a ‘dominant’ or 
‘monolithic’ end in a similar way that some interpreters of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia as 
contemplation sometimes do. 
Theologians in the ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ school (such as John Milbank) and leading members 
of the American Communio school interpret this dominant supernatural end argument to 
mean that an ethics founded on natural law is of extremely limited use. They argue that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Referring of course to Henry Richardson’s aforementioned construal of eudaimonia in Aristotle: Richardson, 
‘Degress of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle’.	  
46 Denis J. M. Bradley, Aquinas on the twofold human good (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1997), at 488. 
47 Bradley, Aquinas on the twofold human good, at 509. 
48 Bradley (in Aquinas on the twofold human good) also notes that Aquinas believed that only the old, learned 
and leisured have the time and wisdom to engage in the sort of metaphysical speculation that the contemplation 
of God requires, at 489. 
49 Bradley, Aquinas on the twofold human good, 489. 
50 Bradley, Aquinas on the twofold human good, 53.	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natural law is certainly not utilisable as a basis on which to establish practical agreement on 
human goods which can be used to build a shared commitment to justice or human rights in 
a pluralistic society. They assert, for instance, that natural law ethics cannot in any 
significant way be detached from an explicitly Christological and Trinitarian ethics.51  
The question of the ‘detachability’ of Aquinas’s ethical theory from its undoubted 
metaphysical basis is therefore strongly contested by John Milbank. Finnis initially proposed 
a detachability thesis in his Natural Law and Natural Rights by pointing to the fact that 
Aquinas does not take the existence of God - arrived at through speculative reasoning - to 
be self evident, even though Aquinas does believe theistic belief to be philosophically 
intelligible.52 On Finnis’s reading human goods are understood immediately through the 
practical reason. In chapter 13 of Natural Law and Natural Rights Finnis gives his own 
formulation of Aquinas’s cosmological argument, giving a theistic underpinning to his natural 
law theory. Finnis, however, claims that this - and other such philosophical arguments – are 
initially speculative and so he views them as “detachable” from natural law reasoning.  
Martin Rhonheimer agrees with Finnis on this key point and further states that the acting 
person does not initially apprehend the moral good (through natural law principles) to be an 
imperative dictated by a promulgated form of ’law’, literally or analogically. He takes the 
fundamental moral experience of humans as experiencing the truth of the good and of “the 
good to be done” rather than of rule following in a conscious way.53 This does not mean that 
when a virtuous agent acts toward “the good to be done” they are not, in doing so, 
complying with natural law in a preceptive (rule following) sense. It is, however, in 
subsequent theoretical (including metaphysical) reflection that agents may recognise the 
‘participated’ and lawful character of the natural law. This means that the experience of 
practical reasoning does not require foreknowledge that the natural law is a “participation of 
the eternal law in the rational creature” (ST I-II q.91. a.2).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See for example D. Stephen Long ‘The Way of Aquinas: Its Importance for Moral Theology’, Studies in 
Christian Ethics, 19 (2006), 339-356 at 354; and, F.C. Bauerschmidt, ‘Aquinas’ in William T. Cavanaugh & 
Peter Scott (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 48-61at 54-55, 
and 58. This approach also can be seen to a remarkable degree in the three opening essays on natural law theory 
by David L. Crawford, Glenn W. Olsen and Tracey Rowland, in the ‘Natural Law’ issue of the American 
Communio, 35 (2008). 
52 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 48-49. 
53 He writes “even if the natural law…possesses in the real sense the character of law, the ratio legis is not made 
explicit or concomitantly reflected at the moment when these practical judgements of the natural law are carried 
out”, Martin Rhonheimer, ‘The Cognitive Structure of Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity’, in The 
Perspective of the Acting Person: Essays in the Renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy, by Martin 
Rhonheimer, trans. by Joseph T. Papa, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008) 158-
194, at 170.  
36	  
	  
With Denis Bradley, Rhonheimer agrees that the natural appetitus for supernatural fulfilment 
married to the incapacity of humans to reach their ultimate end without divine aid creates an 
aporia that renders a complete ethical philosophy unviable. A philosophical ethic that seeks, 
but fails to find, a natural ultimate end that fulfils human yearnings will, for Rhonheimer, yield 
a truncated and seriously deficient ethical product - a moral torso in need of proper 
embodiment.54 Like Bradley he views the imperfect beatitude of the contemplative earthly life 
(E2) as being not particularly helpful in guiding the ‘this worldly’ active life.55 
Despite this common ground Rhonheimer and Bradley disagree on two key points. First, 
Rhonheimer believes that even this moral torso as a leaves a philosophical ethic that, 
despite its thinness, provides a fundamental orientation towards true human goods that can 
help constitute, through a life of moral virtue, a certain practical orientation. Secondly, 
Rhonheimer – following the Thomistic maxim ‘grace perfects nature’, argues that the 
supernatural end (E3) does not abolish the ‘this worldly’ imperfect beatitude of the virtuous 
active life (E1) with its bodily and external goods. The pursuit of and reflection on ‘imperfect 
beatitude’ in the earthly active life constitutes at least a fragment of an ethical philosophy for 
Rhonheimer. The theological virtues of faith, hope and charity direct Christians to their 
ultimate human fulfilment in the life of the world to come (H3) but this does not negate the 
importance of the penultimate ‘this worldly’ active life of virtue. In this way perfect beatitude 
does not become for Rhonheimer an exclusive or dominant final end.56 
I find Rhonheimer’s position more persuasive than Bradley’s or Finnis’s on the question of 
imperfect eudaimonia. Finnis takes a non-intellectualist reading of imperfect beatitude 
arguing that the contemplative end (E2), is subsidiary to the active life of virtue (E1).57 Yet in 
a more recent article, Finnis seemingly questions the persuasiveness of Aquinas’s 
understanding of beatitude altogether, writing that it “yield[s] for a philosophical ethics little or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Martin Rhonheimer, trans. G. Malsbary, The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic 
Virtue Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 81-82. 
55 Rhonheimer, The Perspective of Morality, 83ff. 
56 As perfect beatitude (E3) is speculative and achieved in the heavenly realm is not apt to generate a practical 
science of moral theology for Rhonheimer. Instead the orientation given by faith, hope and love in this life sheds 
new light on, and gives a new orientation to, the earthly active life (H1) of the Christian rather than establishing 
a heavenly practical science relating to the life of the world to come. The effect of grace on the active life of the 
Christian for Rhonheimer is thus to strengthen and radically elevate the natural virtues - allowing them to more 
faithfully and effectively realise true human goods and fulfil the precepts initially apprehended by the agent’s 
practical reason (i.e. through the natural law). See Martin Rhonheimer, ‘Is Christianity Morally Reasonable? On 
the Difference between Christian and Secular Humanism’, in Martin Rhonheimer, The Perspective of the Acting 
Person: Essays in the Renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2008), 1-17, at 6-13. 
57 John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), at 221, 
n.11, and also see 110. 
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no fruit beyond the paradoxical notion… [of] imperfecta beatitudo”.58 Against T.H. Irwin, 
Finnis sees a clear separation between Aquinas’s view of practical reasoning directed clearly 
towards the achievement of ultimate ends in the Treatise on Beatitude and Aquinas’s natural 
law theory. Finnis thus views Aquinas’s eudaimonism as being of peripheral importance for a 
revived Thomistic ethic when contrasted with the central importance of his natural law 
theory.59 As the active life of virtue is ordered to the human good for Aquinas, Finnis 
interprets imperfect eudaimonia/beatitude as fulfilment of the basic human goods that 
practical reason apprehends through the disposition of synderesis,60 and the first principles 
of the natural law. It is to the theory of law and natural law as expounded in the Summa 
theologiae that I now discuss. 
c). Law and Natural Law in Aquinas 
The Treatise on Law in the Summa theologiae is clearly an important part of Aquinas’s 
ethical approach. For Aquinas law is an exterior principle of human action in the sense that it 
originates from beyond the person. Law is a rule and measure of actions, a rule that helps 
guide the agent to her eudaimonia/beatitude (“the law regards most of all the direction 
towards happiness”, ST I-II q.90. a.2). Aquinas also states that all “law is something 
pertaining to reason” (ST I-II q.90. a.1). However, the Treatise on Law itself is not centred on 
natural law as for Aquinas law exists in various modes, all of which in some way participate 
or share in the ordering Divine Wisdom of the ‘eternal law’, which is “a set of archetypes in 
the divine mind” rather than a promulgated form of law.61 
Law, for Aquinas, is a rule of action promulgated by an authority that has care of a particular 
community (ST I-II q.90, a.4). Promulgated law is fourfold for Aquinas. The divine law is the 
law revealed by God to the community of humanity in history – firstly the Decalogue and 
precepts (the Old Law) revealed to Israel, and the New or Evangelical Law revealed in the 
person of Jesus Christ. Divine law became necessary for Aquinas because of the Fall, and it 
operates as an exterior principle leading people to their beatitude in his theological system of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 John Finnis, ‘Foundations of Practical Reason Revisited’ American Journal of Jurisprudence, 50 (2005), 109-
131, at 120. 
59 Finnis seems to hedge his bets by describing Aquinas’s moral theory as both ““teleological” and “deontic”, 
and not more the one than the other”. See the untitled introduction to John Finnis, ‘Aquinas' Moral, Political, 
and Legal Philosophy’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), edited by Edward N. 
Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/aquinas-moral-political/> , accessed 23 February 
2009. 
60 Synderesis is not a power or a law, but is an innate habit that enables the agent to hold to the first 
principle/precept of the natural law (ST I-II, Q. 94, a.2). 
61 Anthony J. Lisska, ‘On the Revival of Natural Law’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 81 (2007), 
613-638, at 622. The eternal law is thus a metaphysical concept used by Aquinas to name the providential 
ordering of the universe. 
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exitus and reditus.62 The natural law is promulgated by God for the community of humanity 
and is universal in that it is authoritative over all humans and is naturally knowable to 
humans on the basis that they are unique in creation in that they are rational animals (ST I-II 
q.94 4 & q.94 a.6). Human positive law is derived from natural law - not from divine law - and 
is promulgated by a constitutionally established authority within a political community. 
The first precept of the natural law is that ‘the good is to be done and evil avoided’ (ST I-II 
q.94, a.2, ad.2). This is a parallel axiom for the operation of the practical reason as the 
principle of non-contradiction is for the operation of speculative reasoning. Many 
contemporary interpreters treat this precept as a ‘first principle of practical reason’, as well 
as being preceptive in nature. Aquinas then describes how certain “natural inclinations” 
specify this precept, inclining agents to particular human goods. Some of these inclinations 
Aquinas writes, relate to a human’s animal nature, such as self preservation and the 
nurturing of offspring, while others pertain to a person’s rational nature; such as living in 
society, knowing “the truth about God”, and neighbourly conduct. This “order of natural 
inclinations” Aquinas states “is the order of the precepts of the natural law” (ST I-II q.94, a.2). 
There are thus many precepts of the natural law, though each derives from the root of the 
first precept: the good is to be pursued and the bad avoided. These are some of the primary 
precepts of the natural law, and, as Aquinas states at the outset of this same quaestio, they 
are known to the acting person immediately and undemonstratively (‘per se nota’).  
Aquinas believes that the second tablet of the Decalogue - the last six commandments 
ordering people to the love of neighbour – reflect primary precepts of the natural law and the 
duty of justice toward other human beings (ST I-II, q.100, a.3). The ‘summary of the law’ in 
the Gospel according to Matthew including the imperative that “one should love thy 
neighbour as oneself” is cited alongside Aristotle’s statement that "friendship towards 
another arises from friendship towards oneself" (NE 9.4. 1166) by Aquinas (ST I-II q.99. 1, 
ad.3). He further alludes to the maxim ‘grace presupposes nature’ in referring to the fact that 
the moral precepts of the Old Law are known naturally as well as being known as revealed 
divine law (ST I-II q. 99, 2, ad.1). Commandments against murder or theft which, though 
revealed in the Torah, are thus part of the natural law and as such are capable of being 
known immediately to humans by the use of natural reason. The impulse to the natural virtue 
of justice (rendering to others their due) is thus a precept of the natural law for Aquinas - 
unlike the impulse to some other virtues which are, by implication, preceptive only in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Aquinas, following the Pseudo-Dionysius, establishes an overarching schema of an exitus from God (in 
creation ex nihilo), followed by a reditus back to the Creator through God’s providential action and salvation. 
Some see this exitus-reditus schema in the very structure of the Summa theologiae, though this interpretation is 
contested.	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secondary sense. Aquinas also considers that the virtue of justice, unlike other virtues, 
generates clear moral duties to others - as the nature of the justice – ‘rendering due’ - would 
infer (ST I-II q.99, 5, ad.1). These points will become particularly important when considering 
natural right and civil association in chapter 3. 
The ‘secondary’ precepts of the natural law are known, not immediately or per se nota, as 
with primary precepts, but by demonstration (‘as conclusions following closely from first 
principles’ (ST I-II q.94, a.6). As the secondary precepts are known less immediately they 
are far more susceptible to transgression in action. Indeed, the transgression of the 
secondary precepts can be very widespread in societies according to Aquinas (ST I-II q. 94, 
a.6, ad.1), and can occur through poor reasoning from first principles, as a result of 
concupiscence, or because of negative social mores or customs. From this point the 
interpretation of the questions dealing with natural law in the Summa theologiae begins to 
diverge. For many theorists - including the New Natural Law school – the ends of the natural 
inclinations provide “the normative specifications for the first practical principle or at least 
provide the immediate justification of the relevant norms”.63 On Finnis and Grisez’s reading, 
the first principles of practical reason “picks out and directs one toward a distinct intelligible 
good, which,….can be called basic”.64 
The New Natural Law approach to quaestio 92 was established in contrast to the traditional 
or classical understanding of Aquinas’ theory of natural law and practical reason, as 
established by Suarez and the commentarial tradition. This classical Thomistic tradition 
stressed the priority of speculative reason over the practical reason in human action. In the 
characterisation given to this approach by Germain Grisez, having become aware of the 
natural law precept to do good and avoid evil, “man would consult his nature [through the 
speculative intellect] to see what is good and evil. He examines his action in comparison with 
his essence to see whether the action fits human nature or does not fit it”.65 Traditional 
natural law theory was thus perceived as a clear form of ethical naturalism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 As Jean Porter portrays it, in her ‘Does the Natural Law provide a Universally Valid Morality?’, in Lawrence 
S. Cunningham (Ed.), Intractable Disputes about the Natural Law: Alasdair MacIntyre and his Critics (Notre 
Dame, IND.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 53-95, at 61. 
64 Finnis, ‘Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy’, section 2.4.1. Mark Murphy describes this as Finnis 
and Grisez’s “principle of intelligibility of action”, in which “only action that can be understood as conforming 
with this principle, as carried out under the idea that good is to be sought and bad avoided, can be understood as 
an intelligible action.” See Mark Murphy, ‘The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Fall 2008. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/natural-
law-ethics/, accessed 18 February 2009, section 1.3. 
65 Germain Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 
Question 94, Article 2’, Natural Law Forum, 10 (1965), 168-201, at 168. This article in many ways marked the 
inception of New Natural Law theory. 
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Jean Porter is one contemporary interpreter of Aquinas who espouses a form of unabashed 
ethical naturalism based on Aquinas’s natural law theory. She rightly comments that Aquinas 
does not spell out exactly how the natural inclinations ground specific norms in quaestio 92, 
and instead propounds her own understanding of the importance of the natural inclinations, 
in which they are not viewed as precepts of the natural law as such, but as providing a 
naturalistic foundation on which “theoretical reflection on their significance and normative 
import” begins.66 It is from this theoretical reflection on human nature that moral normativity 
is derived for Porter. On either the ‘inclinationalist’ (Finnis/Rhonheimer) or ‘derivationalist’ 
(Porter) readings of quaestio 92,67 Aquinas affirms the priority of the good over the right in 
the sense that whether a human action is “right is logically posterior to whether that action 
brings about or realizes some good”.68 According to this (somewhat contested) 
interpretation, right action according to Aquinas’s natural law theory is “that action which 
responds nondefectively to the good”.69 
Martin Rhonheimer is critical of the dervationalist understanding of natural law, 
characterising it as positing “a kind of code of moral norms, found in nature as an object of 
knowledge”70 which “once known, imposes itself immediately as a norm of moral action.”71 
He sees the neoscholastic reception of natural law as essentially ‘dualistic’ – with the 
objective order of nature standing over the subjective order of moral knowledge and human 
reason. For Rhonheimer this leads to “a physicalist notion of the natural law” in which law is 
identified with the merely natural structure and natural ends, upon which moral normativity is 
conferred in an immediate way.72 Rhonheimer sees this as a misreading of Aquinas and 
better reflects the position of Stoic natural law theory. The Stoics, for Rhonheimer, saw the 
eternal law in the cosmic order which is then “decipherable through a knowledge of nature”73 
or as Cicero put it: “right reason, in agreement with nature”. Despite its partial influence on 
the early Church this Stoic tendency to ‘read off’ ethical norms from nature for Rhonheimer is 
not fully consonant with the Christian natural law tradition properly understood, which 
originates in the Church Fathers and reaches its apex in Aquinas. In this understanding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Porter, ‘Does the Natural Law provide a Universally Valid Morality?’ at 76. 
67 I owe this twofold characterisation to Mark Murphy, who sees moral normativity as emerging in the New 
Natural Law approach in an ‘inclinationalist’ manner while that of Suarez and natural law theories similar to 
Porter’s see them emerging in a ‘derivationalist’ way from human nature. Mark C. Murphy Natural law and 
Practical Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6ff. 
68 Murphy, ‘The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics’, section 1.3. 
69 Murphy, ‘The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics’, section 1.4, (cf. ST I-II q.18, a.1). 
70 Rhonheimer, ‘The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity’, 159. 
71 Rhonheimer, ‘The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity’, 159. 
72 Such ‘physicalist’ or ‘naturalist’ understandings of the natural law can be seen in some teachings of the 
Roman Catholic Church, where, in the 1950’s, certain organ transplants were deemed to be against natural law 
(a stance soon altered by subsequent Papal teachings). ‘Perverted faculty’ arguments that used to reign in 
Thomistic discussions of sexual ethics were another good example of this approach. 
73 Rhonheimer, ‘The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity’, 171-172. 
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natural law is “the light of natural reason” which “impresses the divine light within us” which 
allows the acting person to discern good and evil in deliberating contingent actions (ST I-II 
q.91, a.2).74 
In Finnis (and Rhonheimer’s reading) the human goods apprehended through the primary 
precepts (or principles) of the natural law are self-evident and non-deduced but are not 
intuitional as they “they require insight (intellectus) into data of experience”.75 As they are 
immediate apprehensions rather than deductions Finnis claims that these basic goods are 
not subject to G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, something that Finnis is at pains to avoid. As 
example of how these goods are to be conceived, Finnis gives the example of the basic 
good of knowledge (and thus overcoming ignorance). He says that by a “well nigh 
simultaneous insight one comes to understand that this knowledge is not merely a possibility 
but a good (bonum), that is to say an opportunity, a benefit, something desirable as a kind of 
improvement (a perfectio) of one’s or anyone’s condition, and as to be pursued”.76 For Finnis 
and other New Natural Law proponents, this means that ‘objective’ human goods are 
benefits to the person and are directly linked to the ‘subjective’ motivational sets of 
persons.77  
John Finnis attempts to resolve what he believes to be Aquinas’s problematic understanding 
of beatitude by introducing the concept of ‘Integral Human Fulfilment’. Alongside other New 
Natural Law theorist he develops this approach in an original way by categorising the basic 
goods apprehended by natural law practical reasoning into seven irreducibly separate ‘basic 
human goods’,78 which are each alike in being non-instrumental goods of persons. The basic 
human goods posited by Finnis, Grisez and Boyle have been summarised in the following 
manner: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 A Stoic natural law theory does not include the ‘participation metaphysic’ that Aquinas took from the Old and 
New Testaments (rendered philosophically intelligible through the Middle and Neo-Platonic categories used by 
the Fathers) and which makes this ‘natural light’ aspect of natural law theory comprehensible. 
75 Finnis, ‘Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy’, section 2.4.1. 
76 Finnis, ‘Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy’, section 2.4.3. 
77 This addresses the point that the analytic philosopher Bernard Williams wished to address when he wrote 
about internal and external reasons for action. In Williams’s view, only ‘internal’ reasons related to subjective 
desires can truly motivate moral actions, thus providing a genuine ‘reason for action’ for the agent. In view of 
New Natural Law theorists, intelligible goods subjectively motivate the agent to pursue goods beneficial to the 
agent - but do so in a way that is at the same time ‘objective’ and true. See Finnis’s New Natural Law 
collaborator Joseph Boyle’s article: ‘Reasons for Action: Evaluative Cognitions that Underlie Motivations’, 
American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46 (2001), 177–197; and Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External 
Reasons’, in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-113. 
78 Each basic human good is incomparably good in its own way and thus incommensurable for New Natural 
Law theorists. Therefore there can be no lexical or hierarchical ordering among the basic goods. Trade-offs 
between the basic human goods to maximise overall human fulfilment are therefore conceptually impossible, 
though this incommensurability does not mean for New Natural Law proponents that the agent has to give equal 
weight or emphasis to the achievement of each of the basic goods. 
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(1) “self-integration or inner peace (practical reasonableness) 
(2) peace of conscience between oneself and its expression 
(3) peace with others; friendship, neighbourliness 
(4) peace with God or some other non-human source of meaning or value.”79 
 
These four basic human good are ‘reflexive’ in the senses that they are based on human 
choices between good and bad. The final three basic human goods are ‘substantive’ and 
are: 
(5) “human life and health 
(6) knowledge of the truth and appreciation of beauty 
(7) playful activities and skilful performances – humans as sharers of culture.” 80 
‘Integral Human Fulfilment’ for Finnis is constituted by these basic human goods; as “a kind 
of synthesis of them: [namely] satisfaction of all intelligent desires and participation in all the 
basic human goods… and thus a fulfilment which is complete and integral”.81 In contrast to 
classical eudaimonism and many readings of Aquinas’s notion of beatitude, Finnis and 
Grisez posit a master moral principle that “all one's acts of will be open to integral human 
fulfilment, that is to the fulfilment of all human persons and communities now and in future”.82 
It is not clear to us that in posting such a strongly universalistic ‘master principle’ in their 
understanding of eudaimonia/beatitude New Natural Law theorists do not dispense with the 
classical, and for many, Thomistic notion of eudaimonia/beatitude.83 In this understanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, second edition (Huntingdon, IND.: Our Sunday Visitor, 
2003), at 95.	  
80 Ibid., 95. 
81 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 85-86. 
82 Finnis ‘Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy’, section 3.2. New Natural Law theorists take this to 
be an outworking of Aquinas’s endorsement of the ‘summary of the law’ commandment to love one’s neighbour 
as oneself, which is itself a natural law precept and a form of the cross cultural Golden Rule. Remarkably, 
Finnis writes that this ‘neighbour-as-self’ master moral principle that he reads in Aquinas’s moral theory 
“functions… rather like the categorical imperative of the kingdom of ends in Kant.” Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, 
Political and Legal Theory, 131. 
83 This is something that, at times, Finnis writes candidly about: “it may be thought that the primary moral 
principle of love of neighbor as oneself is another reason to doubt (despite appearances) the strategic role of 
eudemonism in his ethics. Aristotelianising interpretations of Aquinas' ethics normally make central the notion 
of fulfillment, understood (it seems) as the fulfillment of the deliberating and acting person – to which the 
requirement of neighbor love does not have a perspicuous relationship.” See Finnis, ‘Aquinas’ Moral, Political 
and Legal Philosophy’, section 3.2. Reacting to Finnis’s ‘modern’ interpretation of Aquinas’s ethics, 
Rhonheimer holds that Finnis’s ethical theory remains in the logic “of a moral theory in the “After-Virtue-age” 
and criticises Finnis as holding that Aquinas’s treatment of the virtues “fails to provide a basis for the 
formulation of the propositional contents of moral rationality”, inferring that in Finnis’s treatment, speaking of 
the virtues “has not a normative, but rather an exclusively a ‘parenetic’ sense” which does not help resolve how 
an agent might act rightly. The modern distinction between the right and the good is crucial here, as analysed by 
W.D Ross. ‘Right making’ properties refer to normative questions of what action one is to take in a specific 
situation while ‘Good making’ properties are refer to intentions and inner dispositions such as the qualities of 
the heart and the will. See Martin Rhonheimer, ‘Norm Ethics, Moral Rationality and the Virtues’, in Martin 
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one acts, in a fundamental sense, for one’s own fulfilment, rather than acting directly for the 
universal attainment of human goods for all persons. In the classical understanding already 
outlined, the good of others becomes part of the eudaemonic end of the agent through the 
habitus of virtue, for example through friendship or the virtue of justice. This is not to say that 
Aquinas did not think of the ‘neighbour-as-self’ commandment as a precept of the natural 
law (being a moral precept of the Old Law), but that he saw it as a practical principle related 
to the virtue (and duty) of justice (ST I-II q.99, a.4, ad.3) and to friendship (ST I-II q.99, a.1, 
ad.3). 
Finnis interprets Integral Human Fulfilment in the active life of virtue as being perfective in its 
own order, in a way reminiscent of the duplex ordo (duel end) approach to beatitude. He 
does not give any indication of the ‘disruption’ that Rhonheimer and Bradley see as created 
by the aporia of a naturally ‘endless’ life. Finnis’s sees in Aquinas a clear methodological 
distinction between the revealed theology in Aquinas’s works, and the philosophical 
elements outlined within the same works.84 He appears to hold that there is in some sense a 
complete and stable ethical philosophy to be found in Aquinas’s oeuvre, one that can be 
held up against other ancient and modern ethical philosophies.  
Rhonheimer’s view of imperfect beatitude avoids both the Scylla of Finnis’s implausibly 
complete Thomistic ethical philosophy and the Charybdis of Bradley and Milbank’s negation 
of the viability of any ethical philosophy. Rhonheimer further takes on board the valid critique 
neo-scholastic forms of Thomism, commenced by Grisez, that focussed ethics principally on 
the achievement of the natural contemplative end of imperfect beatitude (E2), wherein 
metaphysics in some ways precedes and, to a certain degree overlooks, the original self-
experience of the acting person in their practical reasoning towards intelligible and 
subjectively motivating human goods as proximate ends of action. Rhonheimer’s disavowal 
of natural law theory as a comprehensive or fully formed universal philosophical ethic (pace 
Finnis) is persuasive - not least in the face of widespread pluralism about final ends. He 
rightly sees no requirement to specify a list of basic goods beyond the open ended list that 
Aquinas sketchily outlines (in ST I-II q.94, a.2) and because of the truncated nature of 
natural ethics he does not posit a complete or ‘integral human flourishing’ in the fulfilment of 
such goods.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rhonheimer, William F. Murphy (Ed.), The Perspective of the Acting Person: Essay in the Renewal of 
Thomistic Moral Philosophy, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 18-36, 
quotations at 22 and 21 respectively. 
84 Finnis writes that Aquinas views perfect beatitude as being “dictated by the needs of a specifically theological 
pedagogy, as open to telling objections, and as detachable from (or at least as methodologically posterior to) the 
working and sound foundations of his moral philosophy and his treatment of specific moral issues – detachable, 
that is to say, in a way that Aquinas would not need to regard as inappropriate in the different context of today's 
discourse.” Finnis, ‘Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy’, section 1.2. 
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3). A concern with “the inner moral life, and with settled patterns of motive, emotion, 
and reasoning” 
Aristotle opened the Nicomachean Ethics by arguing that “the good is that which all men 
seek”, following Plato and other Ancient philosophers who place the moral agent’s 
participation in the good at the centre of ethical concerns. Martha Nussbaum has herself 
contributed substantially to the revival of the passions in contemporary ethics, though she 
does not offer an account of the emotional life in Aquinas’ moral theory.85 In fact, the 
passions play a central role in Aquinas’ understanding of human life. His Treatise on the 
Passions in the Summa theologiae is longer than the Treatise on Beatitude, with 27 
questions and 132 articles (more questions than that on law and grace).86 For Aquinas, 
discerning what is a ‘true’ good for the agent rather than just an ‘apparent’ good is a central 
challenge of morality. This discernment is not only a matter for the rational aspect of the 
person but also the affective and sensate (or ‘sensible’) part of the human person. The 
human volitional appetite is, by nature, attracted to the good through the intellect (ST I-II 
q.34, 1). In Aquinas, the emotions are also a key way in which the agent is moved by her 
animal nature, rather than her specifically human intellectual nature, to the goods 
experienced by the moral agent.87 
The right ordering of the emotions in Aquinas theory is disrupted by the theological doctrine 
of original sin. The loss of original justice that humanity possessed before the Fall88 in which 
there is a right relationship between the reason and emotion, leads the emotions to become 
disordered within the soul. Thus reason and emotion lose their proper relationship with the 
emergence of concupiscible desires, which by their nature prevail over the workings of the 
practical intellect in pursuing ‘true’ rather than merely ‘apparent’ human goods. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Carol Leget among others have tried to fill in Nussbaum’s lacuna, see: Carol Leget, ‘Martha Nussbaum and 
Thomas Aquinas on the Emotions’, Theological Studies, 64 (2003) 558-581. 
86 See Servais Pinckaers, ‘Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions’ in John Berkman and Craig 
Steven Titus (Eds.), translated by M.T. Noble, The Pinckaers Reader: renewing Thomistic moral theology, 
(Washington, D.C: Catholic University Press of America, 2005), 273-287, at 273.	  
87 In Aquinas’ philosophy and theology this transcendent good is capable of being shared as the Thomistic 
principle ‘Bonum est diffusivum sui’ (the good pours itself out) suggests, though human goodness can only be 
considered to be analogical to God’s transcendent goodness. In Aquinas’s anthropology the soul has a 
vegetative part (concerned with growth, nutrition, reproduction) a sensate part, and an intellectual part. The 
sensate part and the intellectual part each have apprehensive and appetitive faculties. The emotions found in the 
sensate appetite are known as the passiones animae those of the intellectual appetite (the voluntas or will) are 
called affectus. Love, fear, pain, hatred and so on are all produced by the appetitive functions. These faculties 
are directed at being moved by the good as apprehended either by the intellect or the internal or external senses. 
The lower appetitive faculties participate in reason in that they are designed to follow the higher part of the soul. 
See Pinckaers, ‘Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions’, at 274. 
88 The Roman Catholic Church, for example, follows Augustine of Hippo in teaching that the Fall, as narrated in 
Genesis 3, is figurative and should not be read as a record of a specific historical event. That said, the Roman 
Catholic Church maintains that the story of Adam and Eve in Genesis 3 signifies a kind of primeval reality 
(‘Adam’ being a translation of the Hebrew ‘Man’). 
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Concupiscence is the affective desire of the lower appetite that is contrary to reason.89 For 
example, the practical intellect and the emotions incline agents to the true good of certain 
external goods (such as material possessions and honour) and bodily goods (such as 
health), which in due moderation can be virtuous (under the cardinal virtue of temperance). 
However, the postlapsarian disordered relationship between reason and emotion results in 
the vice of avarice or greed where the emotional attraction to material and bodily goods is 
not properly moderated and governed by reason. 
The Fall for Aquinas does not lead, as in certain forms of Calvinism, to the decimation of the 
natural inclination to true human goods. The effect of original sin instead leads to the 
emergence of concupiscence, which is a distortion of the proper relationship between the 
emotions and human reason. This is consistent with Aquinas’s insistence, received from 
Augustine and the Fathers, that sin is fundamentally a privation of the Good. Aquinas holds 
that the emotions play a crucial and fundamentally positive role in the moral life of person, 
but that a person’s emotions should be regulated by reason. The emotions in Aquinas can 
thus be described as “a foretaste or herald of meaning that reason can then bring to light”.90 
We can say that the emotions – and not just the moral agent’s strictly rational capacities - 
are teleologically oriented to the human good. Establishing a virtuous harmony between the 
emotions and reason is therefore critical. The emotions in this understanding are linked to 
the question of eudaimonia or beatitude. Servais Pinckaers views the emotions in Aquinas 
as “a direct and necessary component of the response to the question of beatitude” and links 
the marginalisation of the passions from moral philosophy in some modern philosophers to 
the loss of the primacy of eudaimonia in ethics.91 
The soul for Aquinas is the unique ‘form’ (or ‘principle of life’) of the body, in which human 
nature is fundamentally constituted. In spite of the internal conflicts people experience, 
Aquinas affirms “a substantial union and natural harmony between the body and the soul” 
and a “harmony in the interplay between the human faculties: reason, will, sensation and 
sense perception, they tend to function together in coordination in, for example, in free 
choice”.92 Broadly following Aristotle’s analysis of choice, personal freedom (not in this sense 
political freedom) for Aquinas is: 
“a faculty processing from reason and will, which unite to make the act of choice. For 
him, free will was not a prime or originating faculty, it presupposed intelligence and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Concupiscence is not a sin, but is a result of the loss of prelapsarian righteousness. 
90 Livio Melina, ‘An Ethics of the Good Life’ in Livio Melina, trans. William E. May, Sharing in Christ's 
Virtues (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 34-58 at 44. 
91 Pinckaers, ‘Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions’, 276 
92 Pinckaers, ‘Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions’, 278 
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will. It was rooted, therefore, in the inclinations to truth and goodness that constituted 
these faculties.”93 
According to some recent readings of moral theology and philosophy the progressive 
transformation of this Thomistic conception of virtue and practical reason towards modern 
conceptions of human freedom begins with the emergence of nominalism of the fourteenth 
century. Pinckaers writes that “[n]ominalism disrupted the harmony between the human 
faculties” by concentrating freedom in the will, and morality in the law, leaving no other 
choice than “strict obedience or rebellion” to the moral law.94 The medieval philosopher and 
theologian William of Ockham begins this transformation by losing the key notion that natural 
appetites and inclinations are in a sense the foundation of moral virtue - albeit a foundation 
that must be governed ultimately by reason. Virtue begins therefore to be reduced to the 
habit of observing obligations or rules while eudaimonia is lost as the key focus of ethics. 
The close bond between personal freedom and human fulfilment that abided in classical and 
Thomistic ethics was thus obscured. Human free will teleologically oriented to the good and 
the true is thus replaced by a ‘freedom of indifference’ in Ockham and his successors. In this 
Ockhamist schema free will begins to be conceived primarily as a power of self-
determination with the potential to countermand reason, a sort of existential “first fact of 
human experience”.95 Antinomies of law and freedom, reason and appetite, subject and 
(moral) object begin to emerge. Instead of agents acting to pursue their eudaemonic 
fulfilment, they act according to an external obligation. From this process the familiar 
approach of ‘divine command ethics’ begins to emerge, where moral agents are subjected to 
extrinsic commands from an inscrutable and omnipotent God. It is in this context that 
modern moral philosophy emerges, with its concern to resolve problems arising from moral 
agency – something clearly seen in Kant’s attempt to overcome the autonomy/heteronomy 
problematic. The lineage from Ockham’s approach and the Kantian notion of ‘pure practical 
reason’ (reason freed from the perceived distortions of natural inclinations) and the centrality 
of a ‘good will’ in dutiful obedience to rationally constructed universal moral laws is apparent. 
4). Concern “with the agent as well as choice and action” 
The stance of classical virtue ethics has been (over)simplified as characterising an ‘ethics of 
being’ whereas deontological ethics is essentially an ‘ethics of acting’. Standard versions of 
classical virtue ethics see a strong conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, though 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Servais Pinckaers, trans. Mary Thomas Noble, The Sources of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995), 331. 
94 Pinckaers, ‘Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions’, 278. 
95 Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 331-332. 
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the nature of the link differs in particular accounts. The virtues themselves, at least in their 
classical interpretation, are dispositional and attend to the agents as practical reasoners. 
The virtues are habits of excellent (areteic) moral being and not merely skilled performance 
that make the agent a good person. Good action thus cannot be notionally separated from 
the good actor, and good action is that which a truly virtuous person might choose to pursue 
as a potential course of action in a contingent circumstance. 
Virtues become part of an agent’s character by habit and acquisition through repeated 
successful performance (what Aquinas later classified as the ‘acquired virtues’). For Julia 
Annas: 
“This is because the centrality of practical reasoning in the classical version links a 
virtue as a disposition to the agent's reflective reasoning and thus to her character; 
virtue is not just a disposition in the sense of a reliable habit productive of something, 
but is the way the agent is, constitutive of the way she is living her life as a result of 
her own decisions.”96  
Thus in classical virtue ethics (which includes Aquinas in this reading), the fully virtuous 
person will thus “do the virtuous thing not only for the right reason but also gladly”, whereas 
“a merely self controlled person has to fight down contrary inclinations.”97 
Despite the focus on the natural law in many of his writings, Martin Rhonheimer sees 
Aquinas’s philosophical ethics as being fundamentally a classical virtue ethic where the 
moral task is to lead a virtuous life, pursuing the vita activa to achieve (imperfect) 
eudaimonia/beatitude (E1). Using the Aristotelian doctrine which considers practical reason 
as a process or “practical syllogism” in which practical and speculative reason are closely 
interlinked, Rhonheimer gives an account of the mirror or speculum (an element of 
contemplative knowledge) which is intrinsically embedded within practical knowledge. For 
Rhonheimer the moral virtues establish practical truth in concrete personal choices. 
Imperfect eudaimonia/beatitude is impossible to achieve without the natural law, which 
through its practical precepts or principles helps to rationally underpin moral virtue. In this 
sense Rhonheimer also sees Aquinas as completing the work of Aristotle, with natural law 
being a complement to Aristotle’s teleological ethics. 98 This interpretation of Aquinas is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Annas, ‘Virtue Ethics’, at 529. 
97 Julia Annas, “Reply to Commentators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LV (1995), 929-937, at 
929. 
98 End seeking action and ‘rule following’ have often been viewed as playing roles in Aristotelian ethics that 
should be “contrasted” rather than seen as in harmony. See for example: Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: a 
Study in Moral Theory, second edition (South Bend, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), at 232 and 
150ff. For Rhonheimer’s comments about Aquinas’s completion of Aristotle’s ethics see: Martin Rhonheimer, 
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shared by other theorists, many of whom see a disjunction between Aquinas’s 
understanding of natural law and his understanding of the operation of the natural virtues.99 
Whether a virtue ethic can generate normative imperatives or ‘deontic constraints’ is a 
matter of considerable academic dispute.100 Indeed, whether Aquinas’s ethical outlook is 
fundamentally deontological is, as we have discussed, a contested matter. Rhonheimer for 
his part understands natural law precepts as working cognitively and spontaneously within 
the acting person as deontic constraints in the very operation of agent’s practical reason 
(necessarily so for Rhonheimer, as the natural law is not a promulgated form of law in 
Aquinas’s understanding).101 Therefore the self-experience of the moral agent is centred on 
the striving to be a good or virtuous person - seeking ‘the good life’ - more than as being a 
‘rule follower’. 
 
Rhonheimer wishes to reject the clear normative/eudaemonic distinction between right and 
good respectively: “what is right to do is precisely the action that is “morally good”, and what 
must always be abstained from is “morally evil.””102 Moral good and evil is directly connected 
to the question of whether the person becomes, as a result of her actions, a good or evil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Review Article ‘Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law’’, Studies in Christian Ethics, 19 
(2006), 357-378, at 371. 
99	  Edward Goerner makes such an interpretation in two notable articles on Thomistic ethics and politics. Taking 
the view that natural law and natural right in Aquinas’s oeuvre are in some ways contrasting concepts, he holds 
that natural law precepts in Aquinas generate only external negative constraints on the ‘bad man’ to avoid 
manifest evils, but that the putative ‘good man’ is guided towards the truly good life and perfection through 
natural right (which “transcends” mere natural law restraints), involving the intrinsic action of the virtues, 
particularly the virtue of prudence. We concur, however, with Pamela Hall’s critique of Goerner’s 
understanding of the role of prudence vis-a-vis natural law principles when she writes that Goerner’s 
interpretation of Aquinas “divorces his bad men's minimal obedience to the law from practical wisdom. 
[Separating]… observance of the law from an understanding of its point and purpose. On my view, this 
separation produces an incoherence in his account. I want to argue that effective discovery and use of the natural 
law requires the operation of prudentia (practical wisdom). Moreover, I assert that prudence continually requires 
the active presence of the natural law. This law is never, as Goerner claims, "transcended”.” See Pamela Hall, 
‘Goerner on Thomistic Natural Law’ Political Theory 18:4 (1990) 638-655, at 644. Goerner’s articles are: E.A. 
Goerner, ‘On Thomistic Natural Law: The Bad Man’s View of Thomistic Natural Right’, Political Theory 1 
(1979), 101–122, and E.A. Goerner, ‘Thomistic Natural Right: The Good Man’s View of Thomistic Natural 
Law’, Political Theory 3 (1983), 393–418. 
100	  This dispute is well surveyed in Mark LeBar’s ‘Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints’, Ethics 119 (2009), 
642-671. 
101	  As Rhonheimer writes:	  “This is how moral reasoning proceeds: when we come to know that something is 
against justice...[or another virtue depending on the action considered], we also know that it is against the moral 
law—both natural and evangelical—and thus also against God as the origin of this law. But from the Eternal 
Law as it is in the mind of God, we cannot deduce anything, because we simply do not know it. Even if the 
Eternal Law is the foundation and origin of another moral standard, we cannot refer to it in a moral argument 
because, as Aquinas emphasizes, we know it only as far as it manifests itself through natural human reason or 
supernatural revelation [citing ST I-II, q. 19, a. 4, ad 3]”. See Martin Rhonheimer, Letter to Editor in ‘Colloquy’, 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 11:4 (2011), 627-629, at 629.	  
102 Rhonheimer, ‘Norm Ethics, Moral Rationality and the Virtues’, at 35. 
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person.103 Moral norms in this conception are “not in their fundamental meanings, “rules” 
serving the regulation of human behaviour….[but] are a linguistic expression of something 
much deeper, something rooted in what we call ‘human nature’...”,104 thus one will 
“understand what a norm is through the concept of virtue, instead of… understanding virtue 
as an internalised norm or as the habitual fulfilment of a norm.”105 This is the key to 
understanding Rhonheimer’s understanding of the nexus between the eudaimonistic and 
deontological (rule following) elements present in Aquinas’s natural law theory.106 Rules 
(including natural law precepts), though present in the process of practical reasoning, cannot 
directly generate prescriptive (linguistic) moral norms according to this view. Normativity is 
thus always linked to the moral virtues and what the (perfectly) prudent person may do. 
For Rhonheimer, natural inclinations internally direct the acting person toward human goods 
- but the inclinations themselves cannot be morally prescriptive without the use of human 
reason and the attainment of virtue.107 Following Aquinas, Rhonheimer (and Finnis) argue 
that the ends of the natural inclinations, which are the goods apprehended by the practical 
reason, are the ‘seeds of the virtues’ as the Stoics argued.108 The virtues in turn make a 
constitutive contribution to the person’s (imperfect) eudaemonic end of the vita activa (H1). 
Rhonheimer particularly stresses this point, arguing that the moral virtues are the habit of 
choosing what is a true good (bonum honestum) for the acting person, especially through 
the virtue of prudence. Without the virtues, the goods apprehended by the practical intellect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 “The morally right which involves the rightness of the will and therefore purity of heart. This precisely is the 
work of moral virtue”, see Rhonheimer, ‘Norm Ethics, Moral Rationality and the Virtues’ at 36. This does not 
mean that normative ethical discourse is no longer important, but that it is “no longer the real, foundational 
theme of ethics” in Martin Rhonheimer, ‘Practical Reason and the "Naturally Rational’”: On the Doctrine of the 
Natural Law as a Principle of Praxis in Thomas Aquinas’ in Martin Rhonheimer, William F. Murphy (Ed.) The 
Perspective of the Acting Person: Essays in the Renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy, (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 95-128, at 128. 
104 Rhonheimer, ‘Norm Ethics, Moral Rationality and the Virtues’ at 35. 
105 Rhonheimer immediately adds “To grasp the moral norm by way of the concept of moral virtue means 
explaining it through the concept of “intentional action.”” Rhonheimer, ‘Practical Reason and the "Naturally 
Rational" at 128. 
106	  I refer specifically here to Aquinas’s natural law theory rather than his moral theory generally as the latter 
includes moral specifications promulgated through scripture, i.e. in revealed divine law. Rhonheimer is critical 
of those interpreters of Aquinas and Aristotle, such as Daniel M. Nelson and Martha Nussbaum, who place so 
much emphasis on prudence in Aquinas’s and Aristotle’s ethics respectively, that the generation of clear moral 
norms is not possible because, in their understanding of Aristotle and Aquinas, practical reason can only deal 
with the contingent singular circumstance. See Rhonheimer, The Perspective of Morality, f.n.63 and f.n.64, 290-
291 and main text also at 290-291.	  
107	  As Thomas Hibbs helpfully sheds some light on how deontic constraints operate in Aquinas’s ethics when he 
writes:	  “Thomas's theory of obligation involves the natural inclinations and the judgment of reason. Both are 
operative in his discussion of the command (imperium) of practical reason. Given the close correlation of 
intellect and will in Thomas's philosophy, we should expect the command of practical reason to reflect this 
reciprocity. Thomas says, "to command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, by whose power 
reason moves through the command to the exercise of the act." (citing ST, I-II, q.7, a.1). See Thomas Hibbs, ‘A 
Rhetoric of Motives: Thomas on Obligation as Rational Persuasion, The Thomist, 54:2 (1990) 292-309, at 303. 
108 Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 85-
87. 
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may not translate into contingent actions that would be performed by a virtuous person - or 
may do so only sporadically. Vice may divert the person’s pursuit from true goods towards 
merely apparent goods. 
Prudence, the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (pertaining to acting in contingent 
circumstances), thus plays an architectonic role in the moral life in determining what is a 
wise course of action in concrete situations for Aquinas as well as Aristotle. Conscious of 
hermeneutic and MacIntyrean critiques of universal moralities, Rhonheimer affirms that 
“independently of culture and a societal environment, natural law is not sufficient to generate 
in a univocal manner – as a ‘universal morality’ – [a] concrete practical orientation”109 A 
‘concrete practical orientation’ is thus centrally dependent on prudential reasoning and not 
solely on the application of universal rules to the moral life. The particular moral act for 
Rhonheimer is a “concretization” of natural law principles not merely an accomplishment of, 
or derivation from, such universal principles where prudence is “carried out under the 
cognitive direction of practical principles whose meaning and importance are clarified for the 
unique situation and thereby become practical in the fullest sense.”110 
5). The ‘teleological’ or ‘naturalistic’ underpinning to virtue ethics 
What Martha Nussbaum in her initial threefold typology of virtue ethics omits is whether the 
teleological element of virtue theories relies on an explicit underpinning in a theory of human 
nature.111 This shall be understood as the fourth main element of a classical virtue ethic. The 
extent to which a contemporary reformulation of classical or Aristotelian ethics is necessarily 
based on a naturalistic teleology (including what Alasdair MacIntyre described in After Virtue 
as Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical biology’) is a matter of considerable contention.112 I shall briefly 
turn to the vexed question of the relationship between human nature, metaphysics and 
moral normativity as explored by contemporary philosophers who look to ancient and 
medieval theorists as key sources. The influence of modern science has made philosophers 
re-envisage the way in which agents move towards certain ends or goods by fulfilling certain 
capacities or potentialities. Metaphysics was seen to be a central element in ancient and 
medieval ethics, which had become at least partly redundant as a result of a scientific 
understanding of nature in the modern era. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Rhonheimer, ‘Review Article: Nature as Reason’, at 361. 
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  Rhonheimer, The Perspective of Morality, 291.	  
111 By teleological ethical theories I have referred not to various ethical theories that have subsequently become 
labelled consequentialist (including utilitarianism), but those theories that see human action and character as 
related to certain human purposes and ends, whether conceived in a traditionally naturalistic manner or not. 
112 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 162. 
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Julia Annas, questions this assumption by arguing that classical ethics always began its 
consideration of human fulfilment without recourse to metaphysics. She helpfully 
summarises her distinctive understanding of the relationship between classical virtue ethics, 
human nature and metaphysics, writing that: 
“virtue ethics is not by definition naturalistic, and those forms of it that are take their 
start from the actual state of knowledge in biology, ethology, and psychology rather 
than from metaphysics. Indeed, the growth of virtue ethics has provided one 
challenge to the idea that metaphysics is somehow privileged with regard to ethics; 
many workers in ethics are impatient of the idea that metaphysics is `first philosophy' 
that can lay down rules for ethics prior to any work in ethics. The rapid growth of 
modern virtue ethics has gone along with an explosion of interest in applied ethics 
that likewise takes it that our first task is to get the ethics right and then ask about 
metaphysical implications, rather than vice versa”.113  
Martha Nussbaum has interpreted Aristotle in an avowedly essentialistic way, albeit what 
she has called an ‘internalist essentialism’. Her approach eschews a strong metaphysical or 
religious underpinning in the sense that her interpretation of Aristotle’s moral theory does not 
“derive from any source external to the actual self-interpretations and self-evaluations of 
human beings in history”.114 For example, Nussbaum sees Aristotle’s claim that people are 
‘by nature’ political animals, not primarily as a speculative claim about the nature of human 
beings considered metaphysically but as a claim that natural social roles fulfil the person as 
“an activity of the soul in accordance with reason”, as they unfold in practical reasoning.115 
She outlines a “thick vague theory of the good” and a theory concerned with human ‘ends’ 
rather than all purpose ‘means’ to human ends, as she characterises Rawls contrasting ‘thin 
theory of the good’ with its ‘primary goods’.116 The contemporary neo-Aristotelian 
philosopher Douglas Rasmussen takes a similar approach, seeing the human good as an 
“aspect of reality in relation to the needs of living things” rather than a non-relational intrinsic 
feature of things, or as subjective states of consciousness.117  
One key way in which ethics has been seen as naturalistic has been the way in which 
Aristotelian and Thomistic ethicists have interpreted the ergon argument in Aristotle’s 
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114 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice’, Political Theory 20 (1992), 202-246, at 215. 
115 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics’ in J.E.J. Altham and Ross 
Harrison (Eds.), World, Mind and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 86-131, at 113 (see 
also 102-114). 
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Nicomachean Ethics (1097b22-1098a20) and Aquinas’s Commentary on the Ethics. This 
ergon argument posits that, like different crafts or different human organs, human beings 
might themselves (literally or analogously) have a distinctive or peculiar ‘function’ that can be 
established through scientific inquiry or through a philosophical anthropology. This in turn, 
for Aristotle, would help decide what constituted a life well lived. This functioning would 
require speculative reflection on what a human being is as a rational animal. 
For some Aristotelians and Thomists, this ergon argument structures and prefaces their 
discussion of human goods and ends, rendering the argument a naturalistic or essentialistic 
one. The contemporary Analytical Thomist John Haldane sees this as a viable ethical 
approach, and one where the good life is considered to be as much about “the integrated 
and balanced operation of various natural [human] functions, including physiological, 
psychological and social ones” as much as free floating objective ‘goods’ and ‘values’.118 
John Finnis, however, rejects an ergon based approach, arguing that Aquinas’s ethics are 
not naturalistic in this sort of way. Finnis clearly states that “the basic human goods and first 
practical principles pertain to human nature”.119 He makes this assertion for a number of 
reasons, not least because he writes that Aquinas consistently taught that: 
“coming to understand the nature of a dynamic reality such as human being, one 
must first understand its capacities, to understand which one must first understand its 
act(ivities), to understand which one must first come to understand those activities' 
objects. But the objects of human activities are intelligible opportunities such as 
coming to know, being alive and healthy, being in friendship with others, and so forth 
– objects whose attractiveness, fittingness, opportuneness, or appropriateness is in 
no way dependent upon, or even much enhanced by, the thought that they are 
distinctively characteristic of human beings as opposed to other animals.”120 
Capacities (or active potentialities) are fulfilled in the actions of the active life, which 
participates in human goods relating to those capacities as perfections or fulfilments of 
human persons. For Finnis, Aquinas’s discussion of natural inclinations should be seen in 
this light – as intelligible goods and thus reasons for action rather than as natural inclinations 
that we first recognise speculatively to be in accordance with our human functions. 
Traditionally naturalistic Thomists argue that the speculative reason grasps the objects of 
natural inclinations as something pertaining to what human nature ‘is’, thus allowing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 John Haldane, ‘Natural Law and Ethical Pluralism’ in Richard Madsen and Tracey B. Strong (Eds.), The 
Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World (Oxford: 
Princetown University Press, 2003), 89-114, at 97. 
119 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 90.	  
120 Finnis, ‘Aquinas’s Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy’, section 1.1 (v) 
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acting person to pursue the good related to that nature through the use of practical 
reason.121 Finnis here makes a distinction between the epistemological and ontological 
levels when thinking about Aquinas’ ethics. The metaphysician or philosophical 
anthropologist may rightly see human goods (such as friendship or health) as constituting an 
aspect of human nature at the ontological level of analysis, yet epistemologically they are 
understood by the practical reason as goods to be pursued or as reasons for action.122  
Martin Rhonheimer both agrees and disagrees with Finnis on this point. He shares with 
Finnis the view that human goods are not initially known cognitively through the operation of 
speculative reason, but are rendered intelligible to the acting person through the operation of 
the practical reason. Where he differs somewhat with Finnis is that he sees an important 
subsequent role for a philosophical and a metaphysical anthropology as the acting person 
reflects on her self-experience of human goods as apprehended through practical reason. In 
this sense, Rhonheimer seemingly does not wish to let go of the Aristotelian ergon argument 
that it is possible to build up a human function argument that develops from reflection on the 
apprehension and pursuit of human goods in praxis, in contradistinction to naturalistic 
Thomistic ethical understandings.123 But the ordering of knowledge has to be right: “First we 
are moral subjects, and only afterwards we are able to theoretically understand human 
nature, to recognize its place as foundation and guide toward moral perfection, and to 
elaborate a sound metaphysical anthropology upon it”.124 Rhonheimer especially 
emphasises that the experience of natural inclinations and the operation of practical reason 
should be seen as intrinsically intertwined because the Thomistic conception of the human 
person is that of a profound ontological unity between the body and the spiritual soul.125  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Stephen Brock has finessed this traditionally naturalistic viewpoint, viewing the natural inclinations as 
themselves the product of the work of practical reason - rather than the data upon which practical reason works 
to apprehend true human goods. Thus the natural inclinations (in ST II-I q. 94 a.2) are already the product of the 
practical reason’s apprehension of true human goods (bonum honestum), rather than, for example, concupiscible 
desires that leads the person to merely apparent goods. The crucial point for Brock in this understanding is that 
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122 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 91-92. 
123 Rhonheimer, ‘The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity’, 178, f.n.53. 
124 Martin Rhonheimer, ‘The Moral Siginificance of Pre-Rational Nature in Aquinas’, in Martin Rhonheimer, 
The Perspective of the Acting Person: Essays in the renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy, (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of American Press, 2008),129-157, at 129. 
125 He stresses this not least because some critics of this understanding of natural law theory have accused its 
proponents of a ‘rationalistic’ or quasi-Kantian understanding of the natural law, treating the natural inclinations 
as marginal or irrelevant to what is truly good for the person. 
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The difference between the traditionally naturalistic position and the New Natural Law theory 
has been characterised helpfully as being the difference between a form of “naturalist 
objectivism” (Finnis and Grisez) and “objectivist naturalism” (Porter, Brock) - though the 
difference between the positions has rightly been described as “overstated”.126 
6). Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly expounded an understanding of human fulfilment from a Thomistic 
perspective. My presentation has focussed on a first person ethic which begins with the 
fundamental question: “What constitutes good for one who acts?”127 I have found that Martin 
Rhonheimer’s interpretation of Aquinas’s moral theory is persuasive as an attempt to fully 
work through the implications of a virtue ethic in the classical tradition. I have used the work 
of other contemporary theorists, such as Julia Annas and Henry Richardson, to bolster our 
understanding of a eudaimonistic ethic and to fend off undue criticisms of it. Such an 
approach is helpful as the ethical basis upon which an understanding of political association 
can be developed. Rhonheimer weaves various elements of Aquinas’s thought into a 
coherent ethic of human fulfilment, yet his reading of Aquinas allows for the autonomy of 
practical reasoning in relation to certain human goods that may help explain how people 
may engage conscientiously in political association without necessarily subscribing to a 
theory of final ends. The openness to a theological completion of human ethics in 
Rhonheimer’s reading is also important as religious believers will wish to see their moral life 
as in some way participating in the ordering of divine wisdom. 
The theory I have presented also does not sideline or dismiss the importance of philosophy 
in ethics, as certain readings of Aquinas propounded by the Radical Orthodox and American 
Communio schools tend to. In this regard the understanding of ethics advanced here begins 
with the striving of the moral subject, using her autonomous practical reason to fulfil her 
good(s) as ends. In this sense I have put forward a view of an inclinationalist (rather than 
derivationalist) understanding of the apprehension of certain fundamental human goods, 
while stressing the potential of a subsequent philosophical anthropology in deepening the 
understanding of the goods that fulfil persons. However, this inclinational and spontaneous 
apprehension of human goods through the first principles of practical reason (the natural 
law) will not give each agent a determinate understanding of their final end(s). Each person 
adopts a plan of life, by design or default, in which certain final ends may be attained. 
In summary, I have presented an approach to moral theory that is neither deontological or 
constructivist, yet is one that is consistent with an understanding of political association in 
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which overlapping consensus on intermediate goods or ends can be achieved without the 
necessity of agreement on final ends. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CIVIL ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE AND NATURAL RIGHT 
1). Introduction 
This chapter aims to outline and justify certain positions in relation to natural right and 
human rights. I take as my point of departure key debates between Thomist philosophers 
and theologians, while at key points comparing Thomist perspectives with those of analytic 
political and legal theorists. In comparing contemporary understandings of Aquinas’s work 
with philosophical positions from other traditions, I hope to demonstrate shortcomings in 
representative analytical accounts of human rights. I will propound an approach to justice, 
the political common good and human rights based on contemporary expressions of a 
Thomist position that can, in my judgement, address such some of those shortcomings. 
The first position outlined is that of the fundamental conceptual continuity of Aquinas’s legal 
theory within the classical natural right tradition embodied in Greek philosophy and Roman 
jurisprudence and at the same time with Hebrew and New Testament understandings of 
justice. Differences in the understanding of natural right over the ages are acknowledged but 
a core conceptual continuity is deemed more important than historical changes, significant 
though these are. 
The second position relates to Aquinas original development of the virtue of justice and its 
enactment through positive law to fulfil the political common good. In doing so I will help 
demonstrate that the autonomy of positive law is not an invention of modern legal theory but 
was first asserted in the West by scholastic jurists and theologians, and is thus “at least 
consistent with, and perhaps promotes genuine theological commitments”.1 I will discuss 
whether the political common good is wholly instrumental to the person, or is a distinct 
human good in its own right. 
I will then outline and propound the conceptual continuities between natural right (ius 
naturale) outlined in Aquinas and the philosophical notion of subjective natural rights, 
conceding that while Aquinas did not explicitly articulate a subjective natural rights theory, he 
possessed the conceptual apparatus from which rights could be seen as a subjective 
reflection of objective natural right. At the same time I will note the inconsistencies between 
a development of subjective natural rights from a Thomistic framework, with certain 
conceptions of subjective natural right (for example by Ockham and Hobbes) whose genesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jean Porter, Ministers of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal Authority (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 
2010), xiv. 
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was influenced directly or indirectly by a voluntarism inconsistent with Aquinas’s moral and 
legal theory. I will examine, and ultimately reject as too simplistic, more recent claims that 
natural rights and human rights are conceptually very different and that the ultimately theistic 
basis of natural right renders it unhelpful in articulating a contemporary human rights theory. 
I will conclude the chapter with an assessment of the importance of human rights theory in 
advancing human rights practice, defending the potential of a natural law based 
underpinning to human rights theory against conventionalist or sentimentalist accounts of 
human rights. 
2). Natural right and virtue of justice 
The centrality of natural right and justice in political philosophy dates from classical times. 
Leo Strauss dates the emergence of the natural right tradition to the emergence of the 
philosophic age of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Strauss held that “[t]he distinction between 
physis [nature] and nomos [law] is therefore coeval with the discovery of nature and hence 
with philosophy”2 and this “fundamental distinction was the necessary connection for the 
emergence of natural right”.3 For Strauss the pre-Socratics - typically Heraclitus - the 
distinction between just and unjust was merely human supposition or ancestral convention, 
as reported by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (1178b7-22). In Plato’s dialogues and in 
the Laws we also observe a dialectical confrontation at points between skepticism and 
discussion of the ‘law of nature’ (Laws, bk X, 889). 
The notion of natural right was thus founded on an understanding of human nature and the 
requisite standards of conduct that attend to such an understanding. In Strauss’s reading 
justice is thus in some sense at least related to philosophical anthropology for the first time, 
whether or not this philosophical anthropology should be understood as being naturalistic in 
the traditional sense. This conception of natural right was in contrast to the sophists and pre-
Socratics for whom justice was conventional and particular to cultures. Natural right thinking 
did not necessarily presume that each polis had exactly the same social or moral practices, 
only that a core sense of justice was universal to all societies on account of a shared human 
nature, even if some local conventions militated against their unfailing implementation in 
every polis or tribe. 
Whether Aristotle propounded such a conception of natural right or was even the founder of 
natural law theorising remains a controversial question. Some interpreters go far as to state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Leo Strauss, ‘The Origin of the Idea of Natural Right’, Social Research, 19, 1/4 (1952), 23-60, at 32. 
3 Strauss, ‘The Origin of the Idea of Natural Right’, 34. 
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that Aristotle put forward a natural law theory of sorts,4 or at least “laid the foundation”5 of 
natural law thinking in later Roman and Christian thinkers, a position I consider more 
convincing. Much interpretative ink is spilled on, for instance, interpreting passages in On 
Rhetoric which at least superficially refer to an unchanging “law based on nature” (On 
Rhetoric, I.1373b)6 and what can drawn from such language. Being also an art or craft, 
politics is at least partly contingent for Aristotle (NE 1140a10-13) and thus be thought of as 
philosophically distinguishable from metaphysics or natural philosophy. Humans are political 
animals for Aristotle (Politics 1253a; NE 1097b9-12) in the sense that without civil friendship 
(political association) no one could reasonably attain their final and self-sufficient fulfilment 
(Politics 1253a26-29). Aristotle also argues that human animals, with their unique capacity 
for speech and moral judgement, are intrinsically social beings (Politics 1253a9-18). 
The polis is not the only association that contributes to the eudaimonia of persons for 
Aristotle. The domestic society (economia) also fulfils a human good in Aristotle’s account. 
For Aristotle, Aquinas and in medieval corporate philosophy, the family is not simply a 
partnership of two persons, but a distinct society (a household). As such it has a status and 
value that is not merely instrumental, but constitutes a distinct aspect of the human good. In 
this sense Aristotle can be seen as the philosophical originator of what in the twentieth 
century came to be known as the principle of subsidiarity. 
Justice itself is a virtue that governs right or just relationships between persons in the many 
domains of life (be they domestic, economic, or wider social relations). Justinian’s classic 
definition of justice “the constant and perpetual will to render to each one that which is his 
due” is still a useful one. The nature of justice will differ depending on the context of human 
association. The justice owed to children in a domestic context is, for Aristotle, clearly 
different in kind to the type of justice owed to one’s fellow citizen. Some interpreters of 
Aristotle have argued that, though friendship it is not named as a virtue in classical ethics, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Tony Burns points to Aristotle’s notion of equity and the attendant understanding of human equality 
underpinning it as indicating a nascent (but conservative) natural law theory: see Tony Burns,‘Aristotle and 
Natural Law Theory’ History of Political Thought, 19 (1998), 142-166. Bernard Yack disagrees with 
interpreting Aristotle as a natural law thinker on the basis, among others, that the term ‘natural’ in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics does not necessarily infer universal moral standards or benchmarks against 
which positive law can be measured, but simply refers to the fullest ‘natural’ development of citizens practical 
capacities through moral virtue and prudence: Bernard Yack, ‘Natural Right and Aristotle’s Understanding of 
Justice’ Political Theory, 18 (1990), 216-237. 
5 As Paul E. Sigmund argues in his Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1971), 12. 
6 Quoted in Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought, at 18-19. 
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does indicate a form of moral perfection that transcends the cardinal virtue of justice.7 Robert 
Sokolowski argues: “justice can be seen as a participation in friendship”.8 
This development of natural right was also present in a theological form in the development 
of the Judaic religion. The Jewish philosopher Leo Strauss, however, seemingly denies that 
the notion of natural right was present in the Hebrew Scriptures, on the basis that there was 
no distinctly articulated philosophical notion of nature in the Old Testament.9 Strauss may be 
correct in writing of the lack of a developed philosophic concept of nature in the Hebrew 
Scriptures, but recent Christian10 and Jewish thinkers see in the teachings of the Torah - 
such as the commandment to “love your neighbour as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18) – a 
manifestation of a underlying understanding of universal justice. According to the 
contemporary Jewish philosopher and theologian David Novak, certain moral aspects of 
Mosaic Law presuppose and represent a universally binding natural law.11 This law of nature 
doubtless has a transcendent origin in the Hebrew Scriptures, but in Novak’s reading it 
nonetheless constituted an objective and binding basis of justice as it applies to all human 
beings. 
3). Aquinas’s development of justice and natural right 
Thomas Aquinas developed his understanding of natural right from both philosophical and 
theological sources. Though natural law is not a pronounced theme in Augustine’s writings, 
he refers to St Paul’s early observation in his Letter to the Romans (1:18ff; 2:14-15) that the 
Gentiles without the Law were still, in principle, able to recognise God’s authority, reject 
‘unnatural’ forms of conduct as a certain moral code was “written on their heart”. Augustine 
follows this Pauline view in his De Trinitate when he writes that: 
“Where then are these rules written, if not in the book of that light we call the truth? In 
it is written every just law; from it the law passes into the heart of the man who does 
justice, not that it migrates into it, but that it places its imprint on it, like a seal on a 
ring that passes onto wax, without leaving the ring.”12 
An acceptance of natural law was not confined to the Latin Fathers. The Greek Ante-Nicene 
Fathers, especially John Chrysostom, speak of a law of nature providing guidance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Robert Sokolowski, ‘The Christian Difference in Personal Relationships’, in Christian Faith and Human 
Understanding (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 199-213, at 206. 
8 Sokolowski, ‘The Christian Difference in Personal Relationships’, 207. 
9 Strauss, ‘The Origin of the Idea of Natural Right’, 23. 
10 E. Clinton Gardner, Justice and Christian Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 40-53. 
11 David Novak, Natural Law and Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
12 De Trinitate, 14, 15, 21. quoted in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, definitive edition, (London:; Burns 
and Oates, 2000), para.1955. Though it is worth noting that Augustine frequently did not explicitly distinguish 
natural law from the ‘eternal law’.  
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universally in relation to action.13 The Greek Fathers again lay emphasis on the theocentric 
aspects of natural law, but it is clear that they understand the natural moral law as universal 
and action guiding, and accessible not only to those who accept the revealed Mosaic law or 
the New Law. This theological understanding of natural law is thus transmitted through the 
scriptures to the Church Fathers (such as Augustine and Irenaeus), to the early Scholastics 
such as Albert the Great and his student Thomas Aquinas. 
The philosophical sources of natural right in Aquinas are also significant. In writing of the 
precepts of the natural law, Aquinas sees “living in society” as a natural inclination of human 
beings (in ST I-II q. 94, a.2). Servais Pinckaers observes that Aquinas’s treatment of the 
natural inclinations bears a striking resemblance to a passage in Cicero’s De officiis (I.4) in 
which the inclination to self preservation, reproduction, truth, and common forms of speech 
and life are listed.14 This dual understanding is a typical methodological move for Aquinas, 
who held that in order “to throw some light on many [theological] doctrines one must 
necessarily refer to the natural order” by means of certain analogies (similitudines).15 
Aquinas appears to concur with Aristotle that political association is a weaker form of 
friendship than the strongest type (NE 1160a11-15) and is in some sense based on mutual 
advantage. This mutual advantage can be rationalised for Aristotle as the common good or 
common interest of the polis (Politics 1279a 18-22).  
Justice for Aquinas is a practical rather than intellectual virtue. It is the virtue pertaining to 
right relations with other persons (ST I-II q.60. a.2, 3c; II-II q. 58. a.8). The object of the 
virtue of justice is ‘the right’ or ‘the just thing’ - that which is owed to others (ST II-I q.57. a.1). 
The definition of justice employed in his oeuvre is subject to three interchangeable terms, 
namely “one’s own” (suum) or “due” (debitum) or “right” (ius)” - ius being the key term for 
‘right’ taken in the ancient Roman legal tradition.16 We can thus state that say that natural 
right (ius naturale) for Aquinas refers to that which is just in relation to oneself (in due self-
love) and others - and its content or object is precisely what (thing, action, forbearance) is 
due to persons under the virtue of justice.17 Unlike the other practical cardinal virtues 
(temperance and fortitude), justice is a virtue of the will and not the passions; and it is only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Stanley S. Harakas, ‘Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on Natural Law’, American Journal of Jurisprudence, 24, 
(1979), 86-113.  
14 Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics trans. M.T. Noble (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 405-
407. 
15 Leo J. Elders, ‘Faith and Reason: The Synthesis of St Thomas Aquinas’ Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 8 
(2010), 527-552, at 539, (citing ST I-I, q.99, a.1.) 
16 See Thomas D. Williams, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Pre-Hobbsian Roots of Natural Rights Theory’, Alpha 
Omega, 7 (2004), 47-59, at 51. 
17 Here I draw heavily on John Finnis’s definition of ius in Aquinas in: John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political 
and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), at 135 (which draws on ST II-II, q. 57 a.1). 
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justice and its associated virtues are the only virtues of the will that can be obtained without 
grace. 
Natural law and the virtue of justice are directly connected because the order of the virtues, 
as Aquinas states, is the end of the natural law (ST I-II, q. 94, a.3). As Martin Rhonheimer 
notes “the natural law contains within itself the ordo virtutis, in this case the order of 
justice”.18 Natural right for Aquinas according to Rhonheimer is “the expression of the part of 
the natural law that is related to the virtue of justice”,19 or more broadly “the realisation of the 
natural law or application of natural law to the human social order”.20 
Thomas Williams argues that natural right presupposes a moral relation which is based on 
what Aquinas describes as the ‘becomingness’ (convenientiam) of the thing: “from which 
becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: 
for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that man give another his due”.21 As we have seen, in the 
Thomistic framework, a living thing has capacities or potentialities, which if moved by the 
appropriate goods, can attain its proper end(s) constituting the fulfilment or perfection of the 
being in question. Aquinas further remarks “that which is required for a thing’s perfection is 
necessarily due to it”.22  
The object of ius in this understanding is thus the due promotion of human goods of persons 
(whether individual or common goods) - which one renders to oneself and others in order to 
appropriately assist the fulfilment or perfection of oneself and others. Natural human 
perfection or fulfilment in this reading is that of the imperfect eudaimonia/beatitude of the 
‘felicitas civilis’ (E3, as described in chapter 2). The notion of natural imperfect beatitude 
affirmed by Aquinas and taken from Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia as a virtuous life (NE. 
1.7. 1098a15-18) is also cited a key underpinning of the basis of political authority by some 
Thomists. As Wayne Hankey notes: 
“His [Aquinas’s] notion of an imperfect philosophical and moral happiness that 
humans can achieve by natural reason and the moral virtues in this present life is the 
“secular humanism” that I think his thought contains. This notion of an imperfect 
philosophical felicity is essential to Thomas’s thought and is part of what made it 
revolutionary in the thirteenth century. It has, in fact, the potential to give an integrity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Martin Rhonheimer, trans. G. Malsbary, Natural Law and Practical Reason (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2000), 498-499. 
19 Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, 532, f.n. 25. 
20 Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, 522. 
21 Williams, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Pre-Hobbsian Roots of Natural Rights Theory’, 51-52, citing ST I-II, 
q.60, a.3. 
22 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 28, cited in Williams, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Pre-Hobbesian 
Roots of Natural Rights Theory’, at 52. 
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to secular political authority. Bellarmine used it 350 years later to limit papal authority, 
maintaining that the pope had only indirect, not direct, power in temporal matters.”23 
The ultimate ground of justice and thus natural right in Aquinas’s conception is the twofold 
foundation of the fundamental equality of human persons, and the freedom of the person. 
Aquinas appears to follow Aristotle in posting these two principles as important for moral and 
social theory. Unlike in John Rawls recent ‘political conception of the person’24 - which is 
similarly founded on positing the equality and freedom of persons - Aquinas’s conception is 
not simply a freestanding political postulate but has an ethical and metaphysical 
underpinning. Classical and Thomistic natural right fundamentally originates, as Rawls 
correctly observed, in the “pre-political domain” which is “ontologically prior…. to political 
values”.25  
John Finnis’s influential presentation of Aquinas’s ethical and political thought also gives a 
central role to Aquinas’s understanding of freedom and equality. In his reading of Aquinas, 
“justice is between equals”, citing texts (such as ST II-II, q.104, a.5c) stating that all humans 
are, by nature, fundamentally equal.26  
Equality in this Thomistic perspective is underpinned by the notion of a certain basic equality 
in personal dignity. Personal dignity, at least in its fundamental sense, “is not a distinct 
property or quality, like a body’s color”, or based on the exercise of capacities, but is based 
on an entity’s natural capacities, that is “the kind of substantial entity one is, [and in the case 
of a human person] a substantial entity of a rational nature”.27 In this reading, having a 
substantial rational human nature – whether rationality is actually exercised or not (in the 
case of infants or the disabled), is the basic ground for moral worth and respect. Persons, by 
virtue of this moral worth, are to be rendered their due. This Thomistic perspective, as 
interpreted here, is not so far from a certain interpretations of Kant’s ethics in relation to 
human dignity in the ‘formula of humanity’ (such as in the interpretation put forward by Allen 
Wood against Christine Korsgaard).28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Wayne J. Hankey, ‘Aquinas at the Origins of Secular Humanism? Sources and Innovation in Summa 
theologiae I, Question 1, Article 1’, Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 5 (2007), 17–40, at 20. 
24 See §3 and especially §5 of Lecture I in: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, revised edition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996). 
25 Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’, Lecture XI in, Rawls, Political Liberalism, at 407. This clearly contravenes the 
strictures of Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ as it is not a completely freestanding conception, as I shall see in 
chapter 4. 
26 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, at v.7, 170ff.  
27 See the contemporary Thomistic formulation of personal dignity and rights which attend to human dignity 
outlined in Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, ‘The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity’ Ratio Juris, 21 (2008), 
173-193, at 174. 
28 “Kant’s claim, as I understand it, is that we necessarily regard rational nature as an end in itself objectively 
and unconditionally. Its being an end in itself could therefore not be contingent on any act of ours through which 
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In relation to the foundation of freedom in Aquinas’s theological and philosophical 
anthropology, theorists cite Aquinas’s view that a human person was considered created in 
the image of God (with the attendant dignity conferred by this status), and thus an 
“intellectual [being], endowed with free choice, and having dominium over his own self (per 
se potestativum sui)”.29 This self-dominium, as found later in John Locke’s approach, is often 
claimed to be the foundation of modern subjective natural rights, but as Brian Tierney points 
out, moral self-direction and free choice is clearly a scholastic inheritance present in 
Aquinas30 and Vitoria among others.31 The concept has even been traced back to the 
Hebrew scriptures.32 
While the modern reaction against divine command ethics and towards the notion of moral 
autonomy exemplified in Kant may be seen as an understandable reaction to the 
voluntarism of Ockham and his successors (Gerson, de Novo Castro, and more latterly in 
Descartes), the early scholastic understanding of moral self-dominium is compatible with 
certain notions of moral autonomy. Brian Tierney specifically points to Rhonheimer’s 
epistemologically (though not ontologically) autonomous understanding of natural law 
practical reasoning as a specific example of this.33 
The virtue of justice for Aquinas is founded, paradoxically for some, on the notion of self 
love. Jean Porter interprets the passages in the Summa Theologiae as indicating that 
persons should, after prioritising the love of God, place love of self next.34 Self-love is 
prevented from veering into a sinful egotism by the fact that it is ordered first to the love of 
God - and to God as the ultimate end of the person – and secondly, that people are attracted 
to the universal good. As we saw in chapter 2, in the work of classical theorists, it is through 
virtue that the good of others becomes the part of the good of the acting person. Hence the 
inclination to the universal good does not require that others’ good is actually placed before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that value might be conferred”. [i.e. through a procedure of construction as, according to Wood, Korsgaard 
interprets Kant]. See Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 91-92. 
Wood later suggests that Kant holds “that humanity and personality are necessarily coextensive” in terms of 
dignity, and that Kant’s ethics rest on “the single fundamental value…[of the] the absolute worth” of a “rational 
nature in a person” (95). Emphasis in original.  
29 Prologue to ST I-II, as quoted in W. Norris Clarke, ‘Freedom, Equality, Dignity of the Human Person: The 
Roots of Liberal Democracy’ Catholic Social Science Review, 9 (2004), 61-66, at 63ff. 
30 Brian Tierney also points to Aquinas’s De perfection, 560 and to ST I-II, q.1 a.1, in his ‘Dominium of Self 
and Natural Rights before Locke and After’, in V. Makinen and P. Korkmann (Eds.), Transformations in 
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31 See Tierney, ‘Dominium of Self and Natural Rights before Locke and After’ 176-194. 
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ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html accessed 4 January 2011. 
33 See Tierney, ‘Dominium of Self and Natural Rights before Locke and After’ at 180. 
34 Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Cambridge: Wm B. Eerdmans, 2005), 
at 205ff. 
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the good of the acting person.35 As Jean Porter points out, the attraction of the person to the 
universal good in a Thomistic framework means that more universal and communal goods 
can be thought of a being ‘higher’ than the goods experienced solely by the person.36 The 
case of a doctor of teacher who forgoes more lucrative or easy work in a prosperous 
suburban area to work in an inner city area, where there was a shortage of staff and the 
social benefit of her work would be greater, could be seen as a contemporary example of the 
how a fully just person would act in accordance with the common good of a society. 
Justice, or specifically legal justice, for Aristotle is the virtue that promotes the common good 
(NE 1129b 15-18). This is echoed by Aquinas who views legal justice as a being ordered to 
the political common good of a civitas. Aquinas is clear that political association is founded 
particularly on the virtue of general justice which in the political sphere, following Aristotle, is 
the virtue of civil friendship. This civil friendship between citizens is regulated by legal justice 
which is a key function of the positive law, as outlined in Aquinas’s Treatise of Law. The 
political common good is a pivotal concept in Thomistic theory for, according to one 
interpreter, the “central claim of natural law political philosophy is that [positive] law has this 
reason giving force through the common good of the political community”.37  
Legal justice is the general aspect of the virtue of justice which has several elements: 
‘particular’ (rendering to others their due bilaterally), ‘commutative’, ‘distributive’ or 
‘retributive’. These distinctions were neatly summarised by Thomas Gilby who wrote: 
“Justice is an analogical value pitched at various levels according as it renders what is due 
for the common good of the political community (justitia generalis), to one private person 
from another (justitia commutativa), and to one person from the political group (justitia 
distributiva).”38 
General justice, according to Aquinas, directs all the virtues and external human acts to the 
common good by the use of law (ST II-II q.58, a.5).39 By writing in places specifically of the 
duties of justice (such as in ST I-II q.100 a.2. ad.2. and q.100 a.3, ad.3), Aquinas appears to 
hold that that deontological right and the teleological good - though directly connected in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The kenotic (self emptying) aspect of Christian ethics (exemplified by Christ’s incarnation and Passion), is 
thus to be interpreted in Aquinas’s thought as a radical superordination of the love of God over love of self - 
rather than as an abnegation of the self. 
36 Porter, Nature as Reason, 208. 
37 Mark Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 
1. 
38 Thomas Gilby, ‘Introduction,’ Summa Theologiae, New Blackfriars Edition, vol. 37: “Justice” (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1975), xv. 
39 Though I note the disagreement (which I think Finnis gets the better of) between Finnis and Michel Villey on 
whether natural right is derived from lex (Finnis and Rhonheimer’s position) or “the just portion due between 
individuals” which is Villey’s view, cited in Annabelle S. Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 1997), at 94-95. 
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virtuous life aimed at beatitude - are distinguishable moral concepts. This presumably leads 
a Thomist, such as Martin Rhonheimer, to declare that there is “some truth” in John Rawls’s 
distinction between the “two moral powers” of a sense of political justice and the power of a 
person to pursue a conception of her ethical good.40 This is apt as Rawls himself describes 
the complete separation of the political ‘right’ from the ethical/teleological ‘good’ as 
“impossible”.41 
Matthias Lutz-Bachmann considers Aquinas’s understanding of justice as a significant 
development of Aristotle’s understanding, holding that it is the genuine ‘discovery’ of a 
normative theory of justice. Lutz-Bachmann cites questio 57. a.1 (from ST II-II) where 
Aquinas that states that justice has a regulative role in ensuring “some kind of equality 
(aequalitas quaedam) between the agents”42 involved in a social exchange. Using this and 
other passages he contrasts Aquinas’s normative understanding of the “fundamental 
provisions of the legal system” proceeding from “the requisite human habit of justice and 
practical reason” with Aristotle’s view of justice which is “already given [descriptively] on the 
basis of the respective form of rule or political constitution”.43 This allows the impulse 
towards justice in Aquinas’s theory to operate as a force for social critique. 
In her study of political association in Aristotle and Aquinas, Mary Keys writes that Aquinas’s 
treatment of legal justice is “indebted to” Aristotle but “is not identical”44 with the latter 
philosophers’ treatment of the subject. For Keys, Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae 
enhances the concept of legal justice with an “enlarged emphasis on the common good, and 
by incorporating his novel natural law theory and an explicit account of the will into the 
dialectic concerning justice.”45 Keys concludes by arguing that Aquinas’s understanding of 
legal or general justice “comprises a significant resource for political theorists today”.46 
Justice in this Aristotelian-Thomistic outlook is understood in the first instance as a personal 
virtue, though one that has a wider application in the concept of legal or general justice. John 
Rawls understood justice in a focal sense as fair general principles applied to a framework 
for social and political institutions. David Wiggins reads this early Rawlsian conception as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Martin Rhonheimer, ‘Rawlsian Public Reason, Natural Law, and the Foundation of Justice: A Response 
to David Crawford’, Communio, 34 (2007) 138-167, at 166. 
41 Rawls, Political Liberalism, at 203. 
42 Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, ‘The Discovery of a Normative Theory of Justice in Medieval Philosophy: On the 
Reception and Further Development of Aristotle’s Theory of Justice by St Thomas Aquinas’, Medieval 
Philosophy and Theology, 9 (2000), 1-14, at 7. 
43 Lutz-Bachmann, ‘The Discovery of a Normative Theory of Justice in Medieval Philosophy’, 7-8. 
44 Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle and the Promise of the Common Good, 174. 
45 Ibid., 174. 
46 Ibid., 174. 
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different conception of justice to the Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian conception.47 From this 
perspective justice can have a legal-juridical element, but only after it is founded on the 
practice of just acts by citizens who possess a disposition towards justice. Wiggins describes 
this shift from a pre-modern to a modern conception of justice as one involving “a distrust 
about practical reason”.48 John Finnis echoes this point by arguing that the ‘modern’ natural 
right tradition (including Kant, a clear philosophical forebear of the early Rawls) is founded 
on an increasing scepticism about practical reason where human goods are no longer 
intelligible to moral actors.49 The modern natural law theory of Locke and others is 
essentially voluntaristic according to Finnis and based on God’s assertion of “superior will” 
which generates human law and obligation.50 
4). Distinguishing the political and ethical domains 
The relationship between natural right and legal justice by definition involves enactment in 
human (positive) law. Contrary to what one might assume about a theocentric thinker such 
as Aquinas he does not seek to derive positive law (which he subdivides between civil law 
and the ius gentium) from divinely revealed law or directly from the eternal law. Instead, 
following Cicero, Aquinas derives positive law from natural law. Natural law, as we have 
seen, is unrevealed law apprehended by the person without the requirement for religious 
texts or mediating institutions (though its precepts overlap with the moral precepts of the 
Decalogue). 
Following Aristotle’s conception of natural right, positive law in Aquinas is metaphysically 
understood as ‘craft’, a product in large part of human culture. Aquinas considered all forms 
of human law in a polity to be positive law, and was the first theorist to do so.51 For 
contemporary natural law jurisprudents, positive law is worthy of study and description as a 
social fact and positive law should never be seen as a simple transposition from the moral 
law. Even legal theorists not categorised as natural law philosophers consider that 
contemporary natural law theorists offer “the best accounts of the nature and importance of 
positive law”.52 In these accounts, though law and morality can and should be connected to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 David Wiggins, ‘Neo-Aristotelian Reflections on Justice’, Mind, 113 (2004), 477-512. Wiggins here cites 
Bertrand de Jouvenel as an Aristotelian in this respect. 
48 Wiggins, ‘Neo-Aristotelian Reflections on Justice’, 500. 
49 John Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’, in Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro (Eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 3. 
50 Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’, 5-6. 
51 John Finnis, ‘The Truth in Legal Positivism’ in Robert P. George (Ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 195-214, at 195-196ff. 
52 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Torture, Suicide and Determinatio’, American Journal of Jurisprudence, 55 (2010), 1-29, 
at 1. 
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an appropriate degree by natural lawyers, they are methodologically distinct so that positive 
law cannot be reduced without remainder to morality. 
Thus for the natural lawyer “the central claim of natural law jurisprudence is that there is a 
positive connection between [positive] law and decisive reasons for action: law is backed by 
decisive reasons for action”.53 In this conception, legal philosophy is about how the 
enactment of a positive law in a jurisdiction can create moral obligations that did not exist 
prior to the enactment of the positive law. Natural lawyers thus maintain that all genuine 
‘internal’ reasons for action can be viewed as moral reasons in that they relate in some way 
to the well being or flourishing of persons. Legal authority and positive law can be seen as 
generating internal reasons for action which advance opportunities for human coordination 
towards a common good. Contemporary natural lawyers reject the claim of pure legal 
positivists that there can be no connection between law and morality whilst at the same 
asserting there is no necessary connection between every positive enactment and 
morality,54 as the former has extensive aspects that are technical, not moral. 
The formulation of positive law from natural law reasoning (and the human goods it makes 
intelligible) according to Aquinas proceeds by way of certain determinatio “whereby, in the 
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine 
the general form of a house to some particular shape” (ST I-II q.95, a.2). Thus a statute may 
be presented by the practical reason of a legislator as having a certain outline form and 
basic content but there may be a wide variety of reasonable ways technically by which this 
form may be enacted - traffic laws being a classic example. 
The question of the binding (or non-binding) nature of an unjust law is important here. 
Augustine and Aquinas both held that in some sense an ‘unjust law is no law’. Legal 
positivists have seen this axiom as betraying all that is wrong in natural law theory: that it 
ignores the central importance of the social reality (law as ‘rules of recognition’ in H.L.A 
Hart’s language) and the technical or cultural nature of law. However, contemporary natural 
lawyers interpret this Augustinian axiom to mean only that law and morality are connected in 
some irreducible ways, and that grossly unjust laws (such as apartheid laws) do not by 
necessity command obedience because they can in no way be rendered compatible with the 
public or common good and therefore cannot provide ‘reasons for action’ for agents to obey 
them. 
In Aquinas’s ethics, moral law – which has natural law within its ambit – is the light of natural 
reason helping to order the person to her ultimate end. Unlike divine law, which directs the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics, 1 
54 Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’, at 14. 
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person’s inner dispositions to achieve their ultimate end, Aquinas views the civil law (deriving 
from natural law) as regulating people’s external acts. While the divine law leads people to 
God, Aquinas states that: 
(1):“human law’s purpose is the temporal tranquillity of the state, a purpose which the 
law attains by coercively prohibiting external acts to the extent that those are evils 
which can disturb the state’s peaceful condition” (STh I-II q.98 a.1c); 
(2) that “human law is directed to civil community which is a matter of relating to one 
another”;55 and, 
(3) that “people are related to each other by external acts in which people 
communicate…this sort of communication/dealing is a matter of justice…..so human 
law does not put forward precepts about anything other than acts of justice”.56 
Inversely, Aquinas furthermore states that positive law should not fully suppress personal 
vice but should address “above all…those [vices] that harm others, without which the 
prohibition of which the preservation of society would not be possible, just as human law 
forbids murder, theft and similar things” (ST I-II, q.96, a.2). In the case of justice considered 
here, morality may require a virtuously just person to act in a perfectly just way, but the civil 
law is not tasked with the promotion of the perfect virtue (including justice). The civil law is 
distinguished by its aim in relation to the attainment and maintenance of social relationships 
between persons in order to achieve the common good. There may be cases where even 
ethically unjust actions do not threaten the common good of a political community and 
therefore do not require formal legal regulation. However, when a personal vice of injustice, 
such as in the case of lying, comes in the form of impersonation or fraud, there is a logic for 
legal intervention in order to maintain justice between persons. As in such a case, only when 
such ethically unjust actions impact adversely on the just order of a political community or 
the maintenance of peace should they be considered liable for regulation in civil law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Aquinas quoted from a deleted draft of Summa contra Gentiles III, cited in John Finnis’s essay ‘Public Good: 
The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas’ in Natural Law and Moral Inquiry (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1998), 174-209, at 177 f.n.29. 
56 Ibid., also at 177, f.n. 29. For those who rightly raise Aquinas ‘illiberal’ position on religious freedom, John 
Finnis points to a major aporia in Aquinas relating to his position towards the status of so called ‘heretics’ in a 
civitas. For Aquinas paradoxically holds, on the one hand, that faith itself is a freely willed interior act (ST II-II 
q.1a c, q.10 a.8c) and thus is an act that cannot be compelled by law (ST II-II, q. 104 a.5c) and also that one’s 
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clear subjective human right to religious freedom, in which the state is not authorised to impose religious 
adherence on a citizenry, and cannot restrict religious practice on anything other than strict public order 
grounds. See Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, note B, at 292-293. 
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Civil law, according to Martin Rhonheimer, is therefore “not subject to the same practical 
logic” as matters relating to the moral law alone and is thus “saturated with a specific ethical-
practical rationality” different to that relating to the natural moral law. Rhonheimer 
accordingly refers to “political goods”57 in a way that distinguishes them from purely ethical 
goods. John Finnis appears to makes less of a clear distinction between the ethical and 
political domains. He states, in contrast to Rhonheimer, that ethical philosophy and political 
philosophy are subject to the same essential “normative… purpose and method”, though 
Finnis of course acknowledges that legal philosophy involves a wider technical aspects. 
Finnis’s characterisation of politics as a “specialised extension”58 of ethics does not seem to 
fully capture the proper distinction between ethics and politics, and we may more helpfully 
say that politics is a domain of practical philosophy with a distinct but related purpose and 
method. 
This perhaps reflects Finnis’s view that political association does not constitute an intrinsic 
human good. John Finnis and Mark Murphy,59 see the political common good as 
instrumentally (Finnis) or aggregatively (Murphy)60 fulfilling the natural goods of persons. 
Finnis, while acknowledging the complexity of the question,61 concludes that “the common 
good.…is not basic but, rather, instrumental to securing human goods which are basic [such 
as health, play, knowledge, friendship etc.]....and none of which is in itself specifically 
political”62 citing the fact that Thomas lists ‘living in society’ as a natural inclination of 
practical reason rather than political association (ST I-II, q.94, a.2). The role of the political 
community for Finnis is to facilitate these basic human goods such as sociality and family 
life, and Finnis cites several texts from across Aquinas writings in defence of his position. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See Rhonheimer, ‘Rawlsian Public Reason, Natural Law, and the Foundation of Justice: A Response to David 
Crawford’, 151 and, 157-158. Rhonheimer also writes: “To be apt for public justification [and thus considered 
as political goods], natural law reasons must first be converted into public reasons. They are becoming [sic] 
public reasons only insofar as they can be justified in terms of referring to the common good of political 
society”, Martin Rhonheimer, “The Political Ethos of Constitutional Democracy and the Place of Natural Law in 
Public Reason: Rawls’s ‘Political Liberalism’ Revisited,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (2005), 1–70, 
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58 Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’, at 19.  
59 It is worth making clear that Mark Murphy should not be seen as a member of the New Natural Law School 
as such, and holds some positions at variance from John Finnis and Germain Grisez. 
60 Murphy makes no claim as to whether this is actually Thomas’s teaching but Finnis sees this as essentially 
Aquinas’ view. Mark Murphy seems to argue that all apparently ‘irreducibly social goods’ such as the political 
common good must in a methodological sense be experienced by persons if they are to be true goods at all. He 
therefore suggests that such social goods including the political common good are not truly distinctive or 
substantive but are best understood as ‘aggregative’ goods. See Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and 
Politics, 72-80. 
61 Finnis openly wrestles with the conflicting nuances of various texts on the political good in Finnis, ‘Public 
Good: The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas’ at 180 and 185. 
62 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 247. Finnis hedges this point somewhat by leaving as an 
open question whether the retributive punishment of criminals is an intrinsic public good proper to the political 
community. 
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Accusations of an anachronistic ‘Whig Thomism’ are a frequent accusation against the 
picture painted by figures such as Finnis. Other traditionalist Thomist scholars point to 
passages within Thomas’s oeuvre that infer that he believed that the purpose of political 
leadership was to bring the King’s subjects to all round virtue, to their beatitudo imperfecta. 
Passages in the early De Regno seem to support such an interpretation,63 as do passages 
which emphasise that aspects of political life are ‘higher’ in the metaphysical ‘Chain of Being’ 
and thus more important than personal or domestic goods. These passages indicate to 
interpreters such as Steven Long64 and Lawrence Dewan65 that the political common good is 
very much an intrinsic human good. 
Finnis is not wrong to say there is an instrumental aspect to political community as it is clear 
that a well ordered political association can advance natural human goods such as family life 
or friendship. The key point is whether the political common good is also in some way 
substantive. Such a position was held by the neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain, who thought 
that the political common good (as well as pre-political familial goods) were important 
“infravalent ends” and “practical goods”. Maritain thought that the common good of the 
civitas is: 
“neither the mere collection of private goods, the proper good of a whole which, like 
the species with respect to its individuals or the hive with respect to its bees, relates 
the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the good human life of the 
multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. It is 
therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, 
in turn must benefit from them”.66 
Common goods in his understanding are higher than individually experienced human goods 
as ‘wholes are great than their parts’ in Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics. Therefore 
political goods are both instrumental and substantive. Maritain denies that his understanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Where St Thomas states that the King should “establish a virtuous life in the multitude subject to him; second, 
to preserve it once established; and third, having preserved it, to promote its greater perfection” ‘On Kingship’ 
(De Regno) 4(1.15), in Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan (Eds.) From Irenaeus to Grotius: A 
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65 Lawrence Dewan O.P, ‘Aquinas, Finnis and the Political Good’, The Thomist, 64 (2000), 337-374. 
66 Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (Notre Dame, IND. University of Notre Dame Press, 
1966 [1946]), 50-51, original emphasis. 
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of the common good is susceptible to totalitarian leanings as he accords people human 
rights and that he holds, with Aquinas, that there is a greater loyalty than to the political 
community, that of loyalty to God.67 
This substantive view of the political common good is expounded by the Thomistic theorist 
Jean Porter who maintains that “the [political] community, in and through, the distinctive 
configuration of meaning and value that it instantiates, offers its individual members 
possibilities and capacities for flourishing as rational creatures which they could not develop 
or enjoy in other ways. At the same time, the distinctive values of the community can only be 
realized in and through their attainment by individuals singly, and in relation to one 
another”.68 This intrinsic conception of the political common good is implicitly supported by 
Charles Taylor’s arguments in favour of what he calls ‘irreducibly social goods’.69 Such 
goods for Taylor are not wholly ‘decomposable’ down to the experience of the individual. 
Such a perspective for Taylor indicates a ‘methodological individualism’ and an ‘atomism’ 
that are undermined in their philosophical credibility by the post-Wittgensteinian 
understanding of the intrinsically social aspects of language and cultural forms.  
This point about the substantive nature of the common good is closely linked to the issue of 
whether Aquinas believes that the role of the political community is to promote virtue 
generally (or the ‘integral good’ as Finnis calls it) or merely to promote the goods of justice 
and peace as Finnis and Murphy suggest.70 This interpretation is important because on 
Finnis’s reading Aquinas could be seen to be arguing for something approaching state 
neutrality, as a modern liberal might conceive it. I argue that the focal purpose of the political 
common good is the achievement of peace and justice – a position that can be traced to 
Augustine in The City of God (Bk. XIX). But I maintain that Aquinas’s view of beatitudo 
imperfecta as civil felicity means that political association may in some way aim to inculcate 
virtue in citizens in a more comprehensive manner. This is consistent with Aquinas strictures 
regarding not coercively regulating interior acts or the legal suppression of private vice, as 
political association can involve political action that falls short of legal sanction. Political 
office holders have influential positions as moral leaders and can use their status as a bully 
pulpit for a ‘good society’ considered in all its aspects. Governments may non-coercively 
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69 Charles Taylor, ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, Philosophical Arguments (London: Harvard University Press, 
1995), 127-145. 
70 Murphy writes “as I understand him, for Aquinas the common good consists of ‘justice and peace’….where 
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Politics, 73. 
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promote or discourage virtue/vice without legal sanction through education, public 
information campaigns or the structured choices of ‘libertarian paternalism’.71 
Some figures in the analytic tradition have begun to rediscover the notion of the common 
good. The key consideration on the common good for Philip Pettit, following Brian Barry, is 
that it “should be identified with the common interests that people have as citizens – with 
public interests – not with the [all encompassing] avowable net interests that they have in 
common”.72 Pettit limits the role of the common good to the public interest of citizens rather 
than the holistic (i.e. public and private) interests of persons in all their social dimensions 
because of pluralism in conceptions of the full human good. For Pettit “[t]he fact that people 
differ in their capacities and circumstances, their tastes and commitments”73 means that it 
would be nigh impossible for a single set of policies to match the all round net interests of all 
people in a political community. Pettit’s argument here is consistent within the contemporary 
Thomistic framework considered here; for as Michael Oakeshott recognised Aquinas did not 
hold that individuals were “mere role performers in a bonum commune”, but participated as 
persons in human goods which were capable of being distinguished from public or common 
goods.74 
5). Objective natural right and subjective human rights 
The natural right of the ancient Greeks (diakon) and the ius naturale of Stoic and scholastic 
thought have long thought to have been directly linked, though the nature of the link is 
somewhat disputed as we have seen. Disputation escalates, however, when the question of 
the link between objective natural right, subjective natural rights and human rights is raised. 
With, and since, the publication of Natural Law and Natural Rights in 1980 (commissioned by 
his colleague H.L.A. Hart), John Finnis has elaborated more fully than any other theorist an 
understanding of human rights founded on Aquinas’s political and social theory.75 A similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 This is the view of the libertarian paternalist theorists of ‘Nudge’, such as Cass Sunstein, See Richard H 
Thayler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health wealth and happiness (London: 
Penguin, 2009). I may also cite as an example public health campaigns, which are state sponsored activities that 
encourage healthy eating or safe sexual activity in a way that goes beyond the strict necessities of the ‘harm 
principle’. 
72 Philip Pettit, ‘The Common Good’ in Keith Dowling (Ed.), Justice and Democracy: Essay for Brian Barry 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 150-169, at 169, italics added. 
73 Pettit, ‘The Common Good’, 153-154. 
74 Oakeshott quotes Aquinas (Summa contra Gentiles, III, ch. 80) stating that there is a “human good which does 
not consist in a community but pertains to each individual as a self” quoted in ‘On the Character of a Modern 
European State’ in Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 223. 
75 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 133-140, where Finnis comprehensively considers the 
question of Aquinas on natural right(s). 
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method has been used by Fred Miller (who cites Natural Law and Natural Rights) to develop 
a notion of rights from Aristotle’s political and ethical theory.76 
Acknowledging that Aquinas uses ius to denote the objective order of justice, Finnis 
concedes that Aquinas “never uses a term translatable as human rights, [yet] Aquinas 
clearly has the concept” of human rights.77 He argues that certain precepts of justice are 
“owed to everyone in common” and their inverse violations listed by Aquinas: 
“implicitly [constitute] a list of rights to which one is entitled simply by virtue of one’s 
being a person. Aquinas would have welcomed the flexibility of modern languages 
which invite us to articulate the list not merely as forms of right-violation (in-jur-iae) 
common to all, but straightforwardly as rights common to all: human rights”.78 
The intellectual historian Brian Tierney, in contesting Finnis’s apparent claim that Aquinas 
had a theory of subjective rights, argues that that such a conceptual-linguistic apparatus was 
available to Aquinas as canonistic contemporaries were referring to ius as a personal faculty 
(facultas) or moral power (potenstas) - yet Aquinas did not use these terms. The relevant 
aspect of Tierney’s work in this discussion is the argument that the concept of explicitly 
subjective natural rights extended back to the 1180s where English canonists were referring 
to a concept of a ‘permissive natural law’ based on a subject’s faculty for choice in situations 
where actions “are neither commanded nor forbidden by the Lord or by any Statute”.79 
Tierney argues that the scholastics and early modern theorist then pick up on the ‘rights’ 
flowing from permissive natural law and further develop them. 
For Finnis, the normative foundation of subjective rights is the “principle of neighbour-as-self 
love, and the primary principles of the practical reason….[b]ut the ultimate ontological (first 
order) foundation of natural rights is the radical equality of human beings, as all members of 
a species of beings of a rational nature and thus all persons”.80 In his constructive 
presentation of a natural law jurisprudence (in Natural Law and Natural Rights), he 
characterises the maintenance of subjective rights as being “a fundamental component of 
the common good”81 rather than a deontological constraint or trump to the common good, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 For a reference to Finnis’s Natural Law and Natural Rights see: Fred D. Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in 
Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), f.n. 224 at 107, and 87-139 for Miller’s treatment 
of ‘Aristotle on rights’. 
77 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 136. 
78 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 136-137. 
79 Quoting the English canonist author of Summa, In Nomine, in Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights 
(Grand Rapids, MI.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2001 [1997]), at 67. Tierney’s research on the development of natural 
rights is widely recognised as original and revisionist, superseding the previous work of Richard Tuck and 
Michel Villey in some significant ways, though his substantive historical conclusions are not uncontested. 
80 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, 136. 
81 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 214-218, at 218. 
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Ronald Dworkin suggests they should be viewed.82 Richard Bellamy, writing from a (non-
Thomist) republican perspective echoes this approach claiming that “[r]ights do not trump 
notions of collective good because they only make sense in so far as they contribute to that 
good and provide a suitable range of individual opportunities for all members of the 
community.”83 
Finnis does not deny the advantages of ‘liberty’ rights84 as they emerged in the later 
scholastics (such as Suarez) and early modern theorists as long as certain rights were 
based not only on ‘choice’ or ‘will’ rights but on “basic or fundamental [human] needs” (in 
H.L.A. Hart’s expression).85 Jean Porter agrees that such ‘liberty’ or ‘choice’ rights have to 
supplement more fundamental ‘right order’ natural rights and that these are based on the 
faculty or moral power of the person, itself a reflection of a moral agents’ self-dominium and 
free will.86 
The conception of rights outlined by Finnis here is coherent and attractive - filling in gaps left 
by Jacques Maritain’s mid twentieth century natural rights theory - and is a view of human 
rights acceptable to other Thomist theorists not aligned to the Finnis/Grisez New Natural 
Law school.87 One can take the view of the historian (Tierney) that Aquinas did not explicitly 
articulate a subjective rights theory, with the  argument of the philosopher (Finnis) that to 
render someone her right (ius suum) can be seen from the recipients’ perspective as 
subjective ius. I believe that both Tierney and Finnis are both correct within their respective 
methodological domains.88 
The justification of natural rights presented here is similar in its underlying rationale to that of 
the neo-Aristotelian theory of human rights propounded by Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum 
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University Press, 1985), at 153ff. 
83 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31. Much of 
chapter one, especially 29-31 echoes a common good oriented political philosophy, and Finnis’s Natural Law 
and Natural Rights is cited at f.n. 36, at 30. 
84 Although by 2002 Finnis held that his earlier interest in the difference between ius based subjective rights and 
liberty rights is now less important than he thought in his Natural Law and Natural Rights. John Finnis, 
‘Aquinas on ius and Hart on Rights: A Response to Tierney’, The Review of Politics, 64 (2002), 407-410, at 
410, f.n. 7. Finnis’s article is a response to: Brian Tierney ‘Natural Law and Natural Rights Old Problems and 
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that the ‘choice’ and ‘liberty’ rights outlined in his earlier works do not preclude basing the “core notion of 
rights” on a more fundamental basis, such as the right to life and other fundamental developmental aspects of 
life. 
86 Jean Porter, ‘Natural Right, ‘Authority, and Power: The Theological Trajectory of Human Rights’, Journal of 
Law, Philosophy and Culture, 3 (2009), 299-314. 
87 See for example, V. Bradley Lewis, ‘Theory and Practice of Human Rights: Ancient and Modern’, Journal of 
Law, Philosophy and Culture, 3 (2009), 277-296. 
88 See the exchange between Finnis and Tierney where Finnis says he advances philosophical arguments 
whereas Tierney puts forward [historical-textual] exegesis. Finnis, ‘Aquinas on ius and Hart on Rights: A 
Response to Tierney’, at 408. 
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notes that natural rights arguments usually proceed “by pointing to some capability-like 
feature of a person (rationality, language) that they actually have…. And I actually think that 
without such a justification, the appeal to rights is quite mysterious”.89 Nussbaum 
acknowledges the similarities between her theory and “Catholic Thomist Aristotelianism” but 
rejects this perspective partly on the grounds that some of its forms are illiberal and “do not 
emphasise liberty in the way my [capabilities] approach does”.90 Nussbaum holds this on the 
basis that New Natural Law theory does not distinguish clearly enough between the ethical 
and the political domains91 – a point I have made from a Thomist position. She believes that 
her approach by emphasising capabilities rather than functionings (or goods in the Thomist 
lexicon) preserves a pluralistic degree of choice on how human functions or human goods 
can be actualised by moral agents. She views her capabilities theory as a “freestanding 
moral idea” in Rawlsian parlance;92 that is, an essentially political understanding (that has a 
moral basis) but one that can be asserted independently of a pre-political and 
‘comprehensive’ moral theory involving, say, a definite teleology or metaphysical 
anthropology. 
The philosopher James Griffin criticises Finnis’s ‘right order’ basis to subjective rights on the 
grounds that this is more of a theory of justice than a helpful theory of human rights.93 
According to Griffin, Finnis’s rights theory is a fully congruent general moral-political 
understanding of justice and not specifically distinctive human rights theory that can helpfully 
be applied to contemporary human rights practice. The need for a theory of human rights 
that can aid the practical application of those rights is a central concern for theorists such as 
Charles Beitz, and, for other reasons, Joseph Raz94- though importantly neither Raz nor 
Griffin deny that contemporary human rights practice can ‘overlap’ with fundamental matters 
of justice broadly conceived.95 
Charles Beitz attacks pre-political natural rights claiming that to identify them with modern 
human rights (as Finnis does) as in the Universal Declaration is “a form unwitting 
dogmatism…..[leading] to a damaging misconception of the legitimate scope of international 
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90  Nussbaum, ‘In Defence of Universal Values’, 439, 
91  Nussbaum, ‘In Defence of Universal Values’, 428. 
92  Nussbaum, ‘In Defence of Universal Values’, 432. 
93 James Griffin, On Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) f.n. 3, at 278. 
94 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’, University of Oxford Faculty of Law Research Paper: 
Working Paper No. 14/2007 (2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999874 (accessed 1 November 2010). 
Here Raz worries that natural right based or personhood based accounts of human rights do not address the 
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95 See Raz, ‘Human Rights without Foundations’, 16. 
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human rights and of their potential for remediating injustice”.96 Yet Beitz examines only 
Locke when considering ‘classical natural rights’ theorists and Nozick as a contemporary 
natural rights exponent. His objection relates to the fact that these classical liberal theorists 
see natural rights as merely negative restraints on potentially oppressive government action 
and not to the establishment of “social conditions conducive to the living of dignified human 
lives” taken in a global context.97 Yet as we have seen, the Thomistic conception of natural 
right (and its subjective reflection in natural rights) is fundamentally a key component of the 
common good: which is itself precisely that people should, in a political context, be acted 
towards with respect to their human capacities, through the promotion of certain fulfilling 
goods, towards their proper human ends.  
The nature of rights as ‘pre-political’ should equally not be misunderstood, as they might 
have been by Beitz and others in relation to Aquinas. ‘Pre-political’ or ‘natural’ in this 
nomenclature does not mean that they are wholly abstract rights postulated in a hypothetical 
state of nature where humans are viewed as monads. For the Thomistic framework itself 
philosophically presupposes the natural sociability of humans, following Aristotle and the 
Stoics, so that when we speak of natural right we are clearly referring to a state of justice in 
relation to social or political life (rather than simply as an abstract metaphysical idea) and 
one that is not wholly derived from convention alone.98 
The specific criticism of Finnis that his ‘right order’ human rights theory is not sufficiently 
distinguished from his wider theory of just moral action is fair and I hold that this relates to 
his reluctance to use constructively the notion of the ius gentium (‘the law of nations’) in 
Natural Law and Natural Rights as bridging concept between subjective human rights as 
they reflect the objective order of justice. As we shall see in chapter 4 the ius gentium 
provides, not without difficulty, a way of understanding that part of the objective order of 
justice that has universal or global scope in positive law and thus can be used as a way of 
conceiving (and evaluating) human rights practice. 
One of the foremost contemporary critics of liberalism has been the self described ‘post 
modern Augustinian Thomist’, John Milbank. His view of natural right and human rights has 
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evolved since the publication of Milbank’s study Theology and Social Theory in 1990, partly 
as a result of Brian Tierney’s research on rights. Milbank, who previously viewed subjective 
rights (through a radically theological lens) as a bastard child of modernity, has tempered his 
opposition to them. Milbank still decries subjective rights understood as ‘liberty’ or ‘choice’ 
rights, but appears to partly accept their usage strictly when connected with an objective 
‘right order’ conception of justice. His position is distinct from that put forward by Leo Strauss 
(and his school) or C.B. Macpherson, even though some of the language he uses to 
describe the deterioration of natural right theory is similar. Milbank is still, however, critical of 
subjective rights as founded on voluntarist or nominalist metaphysics, as in Ockham or 
Hobbes. He sees the Franciscan poverty debate in the twelfth century as the key turning 
point towards a voluntaristic understanding of dominium and property rights.  
While Tierney emphasises consistent continuities between objective natural right theorists 
(such as Aquinas) and the first subjective rights canonists and later scholastic thinkers such 
as Suarez and Ockham, Milbank sees the break from a ‘participation’ metaphysics (held by 
Augustine and Aquinas) to a ‘voluntarist-nominalist’ metaphysics (such as in Ockham) as 
shattering any coherent connection between objective ius and subjective rights.99 Milbank 
concedes Tierney’s point that that “something like ‘claim rights’ are well rooted in medieval 
corporate law and independently of voluntarism-nominalism” 100 yet he still holds that natural 
rights in the later nominalist and modern era becomes an impoverished and ‘possessive(ly) 
individualist’, emphasising property rights over oneself and the ownership of land. This is in 
contrast to pre-modern Christian thinkers, who largely opposed absolute property rights and 
emphasised the common destination of created resources.101 
Yet in the final analysis Milbank implicitly sees some sense in speaking of subjective claim 
rights if these are part of a fully relational framework of justice in which duties and ‘claim 
rights’ are directly and reciprocally related.102 He holds out at least some hope that “we can 
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100 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, second edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), f.n.56, at xxxi. 
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revive doctrines of objective ius that will better protect and also help to interrelate and 
mediate those various good causes which we now try to protect through incoherent notions 
of ‘human rights.’”103 
From a historical perspective Cary Nederman also believes that in modernity metaphysical 
and political assumptions about the world “shifted, so did the political lexicon, with the result 
that the same or similar words and their attendant conceptual structures took on different 
meanings and transformations occurred in discursive spheres”.104 Nederman brands Tierney 
a ‘neo-Figgisite’, and claims that medieval concepts of natural right derived from natural law 
provide “merely one element of a large and multidimensional story”105 which Tierney 
oversimplifies. Two responses can be made to Nederman’s criticism. Firstly, one can defend 
and elaborate the historical claims made - as Tierney does in his later research.106 Secondly, 
one can defend the universality of natural right in wholly philosophical terms arguing, as 
Finnis and Rhonheimer do, that even the myriad historical ambiguities of ius naturale as a 
doctrine cannot methodologically obscure the actual existence of certain universal principles 
of practical reasonableness.107 This being the case Finnis argues strikingly that “of natural 
law itself there could, strictly speaking, be no history”.108 
I acknowledge that the shift in metaphysical frameworks that occurred in the scholastic 
period affected the philosophical and theological coherence of natural law and natural right 
theory. Even Tierney sees in Hobbes (like Strauss) a version of natural right and natural 
rights that is far removed from his scholastic forebears and one that is barely coherent. One 
can grant that “modernity in general wrought profound and permanent changes upon which 
authors thought and wrote about politics”109 without letting go of the claim that there is a 
certain fundamental continuity between ancient and medieval natural right thinking and the 
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109 Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought, 48. 
79	  
	  
emergence of modern human rights theories: namely that there are some universal ethical 
standards against which human social and political practices and conventions can critiqued 
and evaluated. Such a critique and evaluation thus informs subsequent efforts at the 
remediation of injustices when they are located. John Milbank’s insistence on a fundamental 
rupture at the point at which voluntarism and nominalism arrives on the philosophical scene 
does not seem credible. As Milbank’s himself notes Michel Villey, a key historical authority 
for Milbank, sees the Second Scholastic School of Vitoria, de Soto and Las Casas as 
developing natural right in a way that was “inherently in keeping with the thought of Thomas 
himself who had further Christianised the Aristotelian and Roman legacy in the wake of 
Gratian.”110 
It is in these later scholastics that the shape of modern human rights becomes much clearer. 
Vitoria undermines Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slavery (without disowning all forms of 
slavery in principle), while Las Casas upholds the natural right of liberty of all human beings 
based on the Thomistic ius naturale and canonistic sources. Both rely in significant measure 
on the idea that natural rights attend to all people in possession of a human nature, and 
denied the prevalent claim at the time that some human beings (i.e. the American Indians) 
did not have a rational human nature and were thus not deserving of natural rights.111 
6). Natural/human rights and God 
A further thesis positing a rupture between natural rights and human rights has been put 
forward. Some political theorists such as David Boucher hold that natural rights and human 
rights should be seen as very clearly distinct. The common ground between natural and 
human rights is undercut for Boucher because natural rights are based on (i) 
foundationalism; and, (ii) on moral obligation grounded on belief in God, whereas 
contemporary human rights theories are generally post-metaphysical and eschew 
foundationalism.112  
Boucher’s account of Aquinas’s moral and legal theory is thorough and nuanced, rightly 
pointing out the rational element of his ethics. However, he lays too much stress on the 
theonomic aspects of early Christian ethics in general and St Thomas in particular,113 though 
he is not alone in this.114 Law does indeed have a divine source in the eternal law (and thus 
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113 Though Boucher does mention that one interpreter of Aquinas “does not consider natural law to be an 
imposition” and stresses the importance of empirical experience in the moral life. Boucher, The Limits of Ethics 
in International Relations, 50. 
114 Michael Zuckert sees a strongly theistic and foundationalist element to Aquinas’s natural law theory, though 
he does so only by not examining (only summarily dismissing) Finnis’s interpretation and not considering 
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the natural law) but Aquinas argues that humans, having a rational nature, are “provident” in 
their own moral life and in their relations with others - what Rhonheimer calls a “participated 
autonomy”.115 Thus to treat the pre-modern / modern ethical divide as implicitly one of 
heteronomy (theistic) versus autonomy (modern) may be an oversimplification, as Tierney 
contends in relation to Knud Haakonssen’s history of natural law.116 
Boucher argues, as I do, that natural law and natural rights are closely related, and he is 
justified in insisting that some early modern theories are based on notions of natural rights 
grounded in obligations to God and therefore it is anachronistic to call them secular theories 
(as Arthur Nussbaum and others had described them). Speaking of the natural rights 
thinkers generally, Boucher contends that “[r]eason, for the most part, could not in itself 
create obligation [a foundation provided by God….but] enables us to come to know what our 
rights and duties are”.117 This diagnosis might apply to some late scholastic and early 
modern natural rights thinkers but it is here argued that this is not the position of Aquinas in 
that law generally is an ordinance of reason and is thus binding as law on the basis of its 
rationality.118 Natural law “is something pertaining to reason, namely reason that is natural, 
that is, which in itself in a way belongs to the order of nature”.119 
As a result of this fundamental shift towards autonomy in modernity and away from 
foundationalism, Boucher claims that “[a]ny element of Christianity or deism, of course, is in 
contemporary discussion of human rights an embarrassment, especially when one wants to 
emphasise their universality”.120 On one level he is correct to point to difficulties in agreeing 
human rights or remediating action based on human rights if the substantive conception of 
rights is formulated and expressed in an exclusively theological or metaphysical form. But 
this does not preclude certain conceptions of natural rights (with their ultimate theistic origin), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rhonheimer’s similar stance. Michael Zuckert, ‘The Fullness of Being: Thomas Aquinas and the Modern 
Critique of Natural Law’ The Review of Politics 69 (2007), 28-47. 
115 Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, at 142 and 248. 
116 Tierney, ‘Dominion of Self and Natural Rights before Locke and after’, 194-195. 
117 Boucher, The Limits of Ethics in International Relations, 3. 
118	  Though, as we have noted, Rhonheimer’s understanding is that the natural law is a participated theonomy 
and that natural reason (‘created’ reason understood theologically) derives from the key Patristic and 
Augustinian notions of participation and divine illumination respectively. Rhonheimer therefore does not see 
Aquinas as a rationalist in the modern sense of the term.  
119 See Rhonheimer, ‘Natural Law as a “Work of Reason”, at 42, and also very clearly at 67-68. Or as 
Rhonheimer adds in the same article: “At least Thomistically speaking, in order to understand that what natural 
reason commands as good to be pursued, actually "ought" to be pursued (and its opposite avoided), no explicit 
reference to God as the source of this "ought" is needed (even though, in some circumstance and as a an 
additional motive to do what reason commands, the explicit reference to God as the source of human reason's 
authority can be helpful and even decisive). What explains the origin of the moral ought and obligation, 
however, is precisely the auto-possession of God's providence through the naturally and spontaneously 
preceptive acts of practical reason.” (at 62). 
120 Boucher, The Limits of Ethics in International Relations, 142. 
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such as the one presented here, from being formulated as human rights and for common 
action to remedy injustices to be taken on that basis. 
Jacques Maritain, who played an important role in the formulation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, subtitled a lecture on ‘The Rights of Man’: “Men mutually 
opposed in their theoretical conceptions can come to a merely practical agreement regarding 
a list of human rights”.121 Maritain recalls a discussion in UNESCO in 1947-48 at the time 
when a draft list of rights were discussed. When participants were asked about the list of 
rights they had considered their response was: “Yes…we agree on these rights, provided we 
are not asked why. With the ‘why’, the dispute begins.”122 Maritain thought the reasons 
behind the different justifications of rights are “essentially important” and not incidental, but 
nonetheless rejoiced that diverse groups can “formulate together common principles of 
action”.123 At the same time Maritain believed that the answer to the question of justice in 
diverse and pluralistic societies is not “a theoretic common minimum, it is..the effectuation of 
a practical common task”.124 
In Maritain’s position, as Martha Nussbaum suggests, I see the beginnings of the idea of 
political liberalism later developed by John Rawls and Charles Larmore.125 On this reading, 
arguments from a natural law doctrine to the development of human rights are 
distinguishable from that doctrine’s theological or metaphysical grounding. For Maritain this 
was possible because the natural law has a twofold aspect, the gnoseological 
(epistemological) element and the ontological element.126 The former for Maritain meant that 
the moral agent had a spontaneous inclination toward acting in accord with the natural moral 
law, whereas the latter ontological element was based on a “conceptual” understanding of 
human functioning (or “normality of functioning” as he put it).127 
7). Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how contemporary understandings of Aquinas’s social and 
moral theory can contribute to some of the theoretical problems addressed in recent debates 
within political theory. These debates are especially important in relation to contemporary 
discussions of human rights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998 [1951]), 
76. 
122 Maritain, Man and the State, 77. 
123 Maritain, Man and the State, 78-79. 
124 Jacques Maritain, Integral Humanism, (Notre Dame, IND., University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 206.  
125 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Political Liberalism and Respect: A Response to Linda Barclay’, Sats – Nordic 
Journal of Philosophy, 4 (2003), 25-44 at 27. 
126 Maritain, Man and the State, 85-94. 
127 Maritain, Man and the State, 86. 
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On the matter of the deterioration of natural right thinking I see a greater break in early 
modernity when (as in Locke and Kant) natural inclinations are seen primarily as distortive of 
sound practical reasoning and Hume’s scepticism about the basic truth attaining capacity of 
practical or speculative reasoning. With Finnis, I view this as undermining the basis of the 
natural right theorising as it develops in modernity. That being stated, I hold that that much of 
the useful work in developing subjective rights theory had occurred prior to this point with the 
canonists and the Second Scholastics. Thus we can resist Milbank’s fears and the claims of 
Straussians that human rights are necessarily tainted by the philosophical or theological 
failures of modernity, as they would see them. I therefore view subjective human rights as a 
genuine linguistic and conceptual advance in that they help clarify how objective ius naturale 
might apply to subjects, by naming injustices in their concrete application to the persons who 
actually experience them. This cannot be a retrograde development in itself.128 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other early declarations in the post-war 
period perhaps provide evidence of the ability of natural rights thinking to operate as a 
human rights theory. In the Universal Declaration rights are founded on the notion of the 
“inherent dignity” of human beings129 - though the source of that dignity deliberately remains 
unspecified philosophically or theologically in the text itself. The relatively shallow 
justification of human rights (‘practical agreement’ as Maritain called it) in twentieth century 
human rights declarations, helps to galvanise coalitions around human rights practices 
focussed on the attainment of human goods (and, more likely, the resistance of human 
evils). Scholars have rightly pointed out that the metaphysically underdetermined 
understanding of human rights and human dignity in the Universal Declaration and 
subsequent charters of rights have an important heuristic use and, as such, can positively 
contribute to human rights practice.130 
Human rights founded on human dignity can be used appropriately to help name specific 
injustices against subjects, helping to start or assist a properly political process whereby an 
objective injustice (the act of violating rights) can be addressed. Non-Governmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Referring to the task of politics in the classical era as securing progress towards an ideal - much as outlined 
in chapter 1 - I concur with V. Bradley Lewis when he writes that “The key task of political philosophy that is 
properly connected to practice, then, is to (a) interpret existing political institutions in light of the true principles 
and (b) recommend improvements in them that are realistic and not potentially disruptive of the fabric of 
practical life. It is in that spirit that one should consider human rights as a kind of political institution or practice 
from the classical perspective.” See Bradley, ‘Theory and Practice of Human Rights: Ancient and Modern’, 
277-296, at 283. 
129 Preamble, UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html , accessed 12 August 2011. 
130 Glenn Hughes, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, Journal of 
Religious Ethics, 39 (2011), 1-24, at 11-13. Hughes defines “an intrinsically heuristic concept [as] an intelligible 
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remain to some degree, unknown to us” at 8, emphasis in original. 
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Organisations and governments can then begin the task of positive action to remedy these 
injustices. Equally, when ‘rights talk’ is abused, such as when it is used as a polemical trump 
or as a way of stopping conversation in relation to fundamental matters of justice or the 
common good, the usefulness of the concept is somewhat undermined.131 
Without a degree of implicit or explicit agreement on what the ‘just thing’ in the objective 
order of justice may consist in, the helpfulness of subjective human rights is circumscribed. 
This is no intrinsic flaw in itself as moral pluralism cannot be expected to have been 
overcome by the development or use of rights language. Rights, at a certain point, can only 
refer us back (or forward) to more fundamental questions about the content of the human 
good and a philosophical anthropology. As such rights cannot be separated from the political 
common good. 
The challenge for Charles Beitz and Joseph Raz is how a foundationless human rights 
theory can genuinely critique pervasive social or cultural practices without some form of 
underpinning moral realism. For the contemporary natural lawyer an important basis of 
critique can occur through the goods and evils apprehended by practical reasoning through 
the operation of natural law. A lack of speculative agreement on the origin of moral obligation 
and human rights detracts little from their basic role in this way.132 
In the case of Las Casas and the American Indians, moral outrage was married to a 
theoretical analysis of human rights that extended someway into a philosophical 
anthropology. The less directly engaged Vitoria and his scholastic and canonistic forebears 
provided the basis of Las Casas’s compelling and passionate arguments.133 I am not 
persuaded that human rights practice based on a conventionalism or sentimentalism alone - 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free 
Press, 1991) for an account of how rights talk can be distorted in this way, though I do not agree with all the 
positions outlined by her. 
132 Michael Walzer sees natural right arguments as exemplifying a moral philosophy of ‘discovery’ or 
‘invention’, in which one either externally receives or goes out of oneself to discover moral truths against which 
social practices are critiqued, see: Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993). Walzer himself prefers a morality of ‘interpretation’ where existing social 
understandings are internally reinterpreted by prophet-like figures who are capable of renarrating the story of a 
society in a way that social criticism is not seen as an external or alien imposition. There is much sense in this 
interpretative ethic as a effective means of social criticism and this understanding is compatible in large part 
with the understanding of natural right expounded here as natural law reasoning is seen, in the first instance, as 
the acting person’s ‘internal’ self experience of practical goods through the light of natural reason. Subsequent 
theoretical understandings of the human good that may be developed (in a philosophical anthropology) flow 
from this original experience of the acting person and is not, as Walzer characterises natural law, an exercise of 
discovering moral truths “de novo” (at 16 and 20). 
133 Walzer seems to think that Vitoria’s application of natural law to the American Indians was “ideological” 
and was designed to justify the conquest of the American Indians rather than as a (highly imperfect) critique of 
the worst abuses of the Spanish conquest and the basis upon which subjective natural rights may be conceived. 
See his Interpretation and Social Criticism , f.n. 6, at 45. 
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as in Richard Rorty’s approach134 - can lead to fundamental critique of existing social 
practices. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See Richard Rorty ‘Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality’, in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (Eds.) 
On Human Rights: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 112-134. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICAL COMMON GOOD 
1). Introduction 
This chapter will set out an outline justification for universal human rights and aspects of 
what has become known as political liberalism. This will be done principally by way of a 
process of conversation and critique with two of political liberalism’s most influential 
exponents, John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum. Their respective theories will be appreciated 
and improved by using some of the key insights of the Thomistic moral and political theory 
expounded in previous chapters. My own species of political liberalism will emerge from this 
process. 
I will firstly outline the origin and usefulness of the concept of the universal common good 
(section 2) in the justification of human rights (section 3) and in approaching matters of 
national and global allegiance. As I argued initially in the previous chapter, the ius gentium 
(law of nations) which the Second Scholastics saw as a part of the universal common good, 
remains an important way of understanding that part of the objective order of justice that has 
universal or global scope in positive law, and thus can be used as a way of conceiving (and 
evaluating) human rights theory and practice. 
In section 4 I outline the usefulness of political liberalism, through a constructive critique of 
Rawls’s own interpretation of this important idea. I see the advantages in Martha 
Nussbaum’s somewhat looser model of political liberalism, which itself follows the example 
of Jacques Maritain. Such a political liberalism is underpinned by the idea of equal respect 
for persons which is turn is grounded in the notion of human dignity or worth discussed in 
chapter 3. In section 5 I further adapt Nussbaum’s approach along the lines suggested by 
some contemporary political theorists to develop a notion of ‘permissive political liberalism’ 
which in principle permits a greater admissibility of metaphysical and religious views in public 
reasoning while preserving the primacy of a political conception of justice including basic 
liberties and human rights. 
2). The Universal / Global Common Good in natural law theory 
The development of the notion of the universal or global common good is one that has 
developed and evolved since the scholastic period. The concept originates with ideas 
propounded by the Church Fathers, and was taken forward by Aquinas and later scholastic 
thinkers before being received into the social teaching of the Catholic Church in the twentieth 
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century.1 Aquinas’s role in this for some interpreters is very important. In his Commentary on 
the “Ethics”, he echoes Aristotle’s notion that humans are ‘political animals’. In Aquinas’s 
own constructive works, Jean Pierre Torrell notes that his preferred usage is that of ‘animale 
politcum et sociale’. This is significant for Torrell as “sociale is a translation of koinonikon, a 
term used by the Stoics to mean that man is the citizen not merely of some city, but of the 
oikoumene, the entire inhabited world of his time. We might translate this today as ‘citizen of 
the world’”.2 Whether this is simply a reflection of the influence of Stoic cosmopolitanism, 
and/or an analogy in nature for a theological anthropology is matter of speculation. 
This is echoed in other writings by Aquinas, where he refers to the fundamental unity of the 
human race as ‘one community’ (quasi unum collegium).3 Consequently for John Finnis and 
other contemporary natural law thinkers the concept of general justice for Aquinas can, in 
principle, be seen as universal and not confined to relations among citizens in a civitas. This 
would be consistent with Aquinas’s fundamental claim that justice is based on the basic 
equality between human beings.4 
From these Thomistic (and Stoic) roots scholastic philosophers and theologians began to 
consider what has become known in Catholic social doctrine as the universal common good. 
For some contemporary natural law theorists such as Robert George, the universal common 
good can be used to justify envisaging “something like a world government” which “would 
attend to the common good of mankind”.5 This would address international “coordination 
problems” (recalling the ‘salient coordinator’ account of legal authority) that are encountered 
at a global level in relation to, for example, war and environmental pollution. For such 
reasons John Finnis denies Aristotle’s position that the polis is the autarchic ‘complete 
community’ where all (natural) goods are fulfilled. Such a description better fits the global or 
international community for Finnis,6 even though he notes that when Aquinas usually writes 
of the complete or perfect (earthly) community he does so, following Aristotle, in relation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Paolo G. Carozza, ‘The Universal Common Good and the Authority of International Law’, Logos: A 
Journal of Catholic Thought And Culture, 8 (2006), 28-55, for an overview of the development of the universal 
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‘Beyond the Nations: The Expansion of the Common Good in Catholic Social Thought’, The Review of Politics 
63 (2001), 723-754. 
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University of America Press, 2003 [1996]), 279-280. 
3 Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputataed et Malo q. 4, a. lc: "The whole multitude of human beings is to be 
considered as like one community", cited in John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), at 115, f.n. 60. 
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6 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon: 1980), 147-150. 
87	  
	  
the political community rather than the whole world.7 In their positions outlined here both 
Finnis and George follow arguments pursued by their natural law forebear Jacques Maritain. 
In his Walgreen Lectures at Chicago University in 1949 (published as Man and the State) 
Martiain identifies the earthly perfect or complete community with the entire world and 
argued for the establishment of a world government.8 
Such an emphasis on the global common good is not the same position as some purer 
forms of Kantian cosmopolitanism, whereby membership of communities (be they political, 
academic or familial) are substantially irrelevant to one’s obligations in terms of social or 
distributive justice. The proper role and function of incomplete or imperfect communities 
(such as the political community for George and Finnis) is to be respected as a result of the 
principle of subsidiarity (from the Latin subsidium: to help, assist) which was defined 
classically by Pius XI as: 
“That most weighty principle [which]... remains fixed and unshaken in social 
philosophy: Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it 
is an injustice…. to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to 
furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.” 
9 
This concept of subsidiarity can be traced back to Aristotle, and through him to Aquinas and 
the scholastics, with their recognition of the natural function of communities in promoting 
human goods (the family or household paradigmatically, as shown in Book I of Aristotle’s 
The Politics). The concept has a positive and a negative aspect – that higher entities should 
rightfully assist those lower communities with their proper social functions, but that the higher 
authority should take care not to usurp those functions in doing so.  
For the purposes of this thesis this principle requires that the universal or global common 
good does not become a dominant or exclusive end (in terminology used in relation to 
personal eudaimonic goods). This means that nation states will still have crucial and 
enduring functions in relation to political goods that cannot be taken over by a higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, 122-123.  
8 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998 [1951]). 
Chapter VII, 188ff. Though Finnis and George, however, do not refer to Maritain’s work in relation to this 
matter. 
9 Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo Anno, promulgated 15 May 1931 
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anno_en.html §79, accessed on 10 May 2011. 
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authority. I would also argue that this principle helps justify a moderate allegiance to such a 
nation state as morally acceptable. As we recall from Aquinas’s exposition of licit self-love 
from the last chapter, political or national self-love (patriotism) can analogously be legitimate 
as long as it is proportionate and consistent with the duties of justice to lower and higher 
associations – including to the ‘complete community’ of all humankind itself. 
Martha Nussbaum frames this question well in some of her more recent philosophical 
writings, emphasising that there should be a reflective equilibrium within ourselves, as we 
accept “the constraints of some strong duties to humanity, and then ask ourselves how far 
we are entitled to devote ourselves to the particular people and places that we love”.10 
Nussbaum’s stance on the legitimacy of patriotism is not far from that of the natural law 
perspective. Speaking on the relationship between nations and global considerations (in the 
same period – 1993 - that John Rawls was delivering his Amnesty lecture ‘The Law of 
Peoples’), Pope John Paul II refers to nations as indispensible natural societies,11 though 
societies founded on culture rather than racial or kin identity. He states that: 
 “Whereas nationalism involves recognizing and pursuing the good of one’s own 
nation alone, without regard for the rights of others, patriotism, on the other hand, is a 
love for one’s native land that accords rights to all other nations equal to those 
claimed for one’s own. Patriotism, in other words, leads to a properly ordered social 
love.”12 
In this respect I conclude that persons rightfully have bounded responsibilities between 
different forms of social groups that range from licit love of self, through to various different 
kinds of associations (including the family) all the way up to universal obligations based on 
natural right to all members of the human race regardless of their proximity or national 
membership.  
3). Universal human rights as an expression of the global common good – the ius 
gentium 
The development of the ius gentium derives from Roman Law and was transmitted to 
modernity via the scholastics, though its significance was manifest with the Second 
Scholastics and early modern theorists such as Grotius and Pufendorf. The brief treatment I 
offer here will focus on the development of the ius gentium firstly by Aquinas himself, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Toward a globally sensitive patriotism’, Daedalus, 137 (Summer 2008), 78–93. 
11 John Paul II stated: “The term ‘nation’ designates a community based in a given territory and distinguished 
from other nations by its culture. Catholic social doctrine holds that the family and the nation are both natural 
societies, not the product of mere convention. Therefore, in human history, they cannot be replaced by anything 
else.” John Paul II, Memory and Identity, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 77-78. 
12 John Paul II, Memory and Identity, 75. 
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then by the Second Scholastics on the basis that these figures broadly founded their 
understandings of the ius gentium on a natural law theory consonant with Aquinas’s own. 
The ius gentium as civil law originated with the problem faced by the ancient Romans when 
applying laws to foreigners within their boundaries who were not subject to Roman civil law. 
For legal philosophers the ius gentium is essentially positive or natural law, with Jeremy 
Waldron concluding that “at various times and for various purposes it has been both, as well 
as the product of a sort of reflective equilibrium between the two.”13 
The brevity of Aquinas’s writings on the ius gentium is a challenge for interpreters and those 
who wish to creatively retrieve some of his key moral and political ideas. It is clear that the 
presentation of the ius gentium in the Summa theologiae is underdeveloped and somewhat 
opaque while the distinction between natural law, civil law and the ‘law of nations’ is not 
precisely distinguised. That said we can still understand and define the jus gentium in 
Aquinas’s theory as the law which derives from the application of natural law principles by 
way of conclusions or deductions “not very remote” from those principles”14 (rather than by 
determinatio) to the enactment of positive law as it relates between peoples or polities rather 
than the relationship between citizens within a polity. It is that aspect of the natural moral law 
enshrined by peoples generally in their separate codes of civil law in individual polities. It can 
thus be distinguished from the general body of civil law of a state per se and distinguished 
from ius naturale (natural right) generically, which guides individual human actions towards 
others. Aquinas himself cites theft and breach of contract as examples of breaches of the 
law of nations. 
Like all elements of the broader ius naturale, the law of nations is a work of reason ordered 
to the human good. The uniqueness of the law of nations, in contrast to other aspects of the 
natural right referring to justice between persons at a moral level (which is not necessarily 
regulated by civil law) and political justice (regulated by the civil law), is its universal scope in 
terms of its application between nations and their application regardless of their location. 
This is not to say that other aspects of natural right are not in their own way universal, only 
that it is universally binding in a different way to natural right as expressed in the civil law of 
a polity, or the narrower sense of the moral law. 
The transformation of the ius gentium as customary international law (for instance in the law 
of the seas, mercantile law or on diplomatic law) into the Second Scholastic and early 
modern understanding of the ius gentium as the basis of international human rights law is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and Modern Ius Gentium’, Harvard Law Review, 119 (2005), 129-147, at 
136. 
14 ST I-II, q 95 a.4c. 
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subtle and complex. The Second Scholastics originated this trend, seeing the action of the 
Spanish conquistadors in South America as being contrary to the ius gentium. Though 
Vitoria saw the ius gentium as being, strictly speaking, conceptually anterior to international 
law (ius inter gentes), he conceived its scope as including the protection certain fundamental 
human interests, as it flowed from the ius naturale (natural right). 
For Vitoria, the manner of the Spanish conquest of the American Indians transgressed the 
law of nations. The murder and subjugation of the American Indians was not defensible 
under natural right as expressed in the ius gentium. Vitoria wrote: 
 “And, indeed, there are many things in this connection which issue from the law of 
nations, which, because it has sufficient derivation from natural law, is clearly 
capable of conferring rights and creating obligations. And even if we grant that it is 
not always derived from natural law, yet there exists clearly enough a consensus of 
the greater part of the whole world, especially in behalf of the common good of all.”15 
This landmark argument by Vitoria (followed by the Second Scholastics and Suarez) that the 
ius gentium was not simply that positive law which empirically existed to govern 
transnational activities but one that had a normative element, helped to prepare the 
philosophical ground for the development of international law in relation to human rights. 
Vitoria also, as indicated in the passage above, crucially linked or incorporated the ius 
gentium into the universal or global common good in a way not explicitly elaborated by 
Aquinas, but is consistent with his social and moral theory. 
Some significant contemporary Thomist theorists, however, give little emphasis to the role of 
the ius gentium in Aquinas’s legal and political theory. John Finnis makes very little of the ius 
gentium in his extensive presentation of Aquinas’s social philosophy and refers to the ius 
gentium only in a footnote in Natural Law and Natural Rights.16 Equally, the Georgetown 
natural lawyer Mark Murphy, in an article on the prospects of a ‘uniform planetary ethic’,17 
avoids all mention of the ius gentium. 
Finnis’ relative neglect of the ius gentium in his normative theory is perhaps related to the 
fact that he holds that natural right can be immediately legislated into civil law. His basic 
goods theory propounds the view that moral norms on all important matters of basic justice 
are immediately transparent to people not blinded by partiality, bias or ignorance. Jeremy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et lure Belli Reflectiones, quoted in Bernard V. Bradley ‘An Analysis of the 
use of Rights language in pre-modern Catholic social thought’, The Thomist, 57 (1993), 97-121, at 114. 
16 Finnis devotes but a scattered few sentences in Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, and a foot note 
on page 296 of his Natural Law and Natural Rights. 
17 See Mark C. Murphy, ‘Natural Law, Common Morality, and Particularity’ in William M. Sullivan and Will 
Kymlicka (Eds.), The Globalisation of Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2007), 134-150. 
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Waldron rightly identifies this point as a key issue arising from modern natural law theories: 
as individuals have immediate access to universal moral truths on a wide range of important 
norms, the relevance or importance of a body of internationally recognised positive laws is 
reduced. As Waldron writes “if true law is independently discoverable, why would one defer 
to other people’s answers to these moral questions [via the ius gentium]....? Why not just ask 
and answer the questions oneself?”18 This is perhaps Finnis’s unspoken underlying issue 
with the ius gentium – it can play no significant role within his own theory, as the work of 
establishing a universal ethic and human rights is done straightforwardly by practical 
reasoning. 
Natural right in its widest sense is, in the context of a political community, legislated for 
through statute and case law by judges, via determinatio. Natural right is legislated with 
broad scope and, as we have seen, includes in its enactment in human law much that is 
contingent and technical as well as purely practical-moral. Though the ius gentium also 
springs from the human natural inclination to sociality and justice it is, however, formulated 
not principally through determinatio, but due to its ‘thinness’ and universality is encapsulated 
through broad understandings of just conduct shared across cultures and national 
boundaries.19 Actual attempts to codify the ius gentum into international law through treaties, 
international legal conventions and human rights declarations inevitably involve some 
degree of determinatio but the ius gentium itself can be conceived as that aspect of the ius 
naturale (natural right) expressed in its highest degree of universality. 
I hold that the concept of the ius gentium retains its particular importance and should remain 
a crucial aspect of natural right theory. This is because the ius gentium specifically refers to 
that part of natural right that has an application and relevance across the boundaries of 
nation states, in the modern era developed through international law. This does not mean, of 
course, that the general norms embodied in the ius gentium should not be enacted into the 
positive law of states, only that the ius gentium relates to that which can be expected to be 
common among decent nation states. 
This understanding has some commonalities with the view of the ius gentium espoused by 
John Rawls in his work The Law of Peoples - though Rawls is clearly inspired by Kant’s 
political theory rather than the approaches of Grotius or Pufendorf. For Rawls, the Law of 
Peoples is a theory of the “particular political principles for regulating the mutual political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and Modern Ius Gentium’, 129-147, at 137. 
19 Here the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ ethical concerns is of course drawn from: Michael Walzer, 
Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1994). 
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relations between peoples”.20 I credit Rawls with emphasising once again the importance of 
the ius gentium (albeit renamed and reformulated as a ‘Law of Peoples’) and with the 
important project of bringing international relations and political theory once again into a 
closer relation - a trend that has continued since his Amnesty lecture in 1993. 
I find especially attractive Rawls’ position in relation to human rights in The Law of Peoples. 
These rights are not the constitutional or civil rights of a liberal polity (such as those 
established by the first principle of justice in Political Liberalism) but are a “special class of 
urgent rights such as freedom from slavery, and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of 
conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”21 Their violation 
for Rawls is condemned by all international actors other than outlaw states that routinely 
abuse such human rights. I share this minimal scheme of universal human rights as that 
which is protected by the ius gentium as an expression of the universal common good, and 
which can be protected by other states by proportionate and lawful action in line with 
traditional just war criteria. This conception of human rights is similar to the understanding 
outlined in chapter 3 of this thesis – truly universal rights, which are in turn based on the idea 
of human dignity, without which the attainment of any range of substantive human goods 
cannot be attained. They are rightly distinguished by Rawls from civil or liberal rights, which 
are those ‘choice’ rights that are the subjective reflection of a well ordered polity. 
Martha Nussbaum develops some aspects of Rawls’ theory of global justice in her 
monograph Frontiers of Justice, but goes as far as to say that her own theory has roots in 
“exponents of the natural law tradition”, including Grotius himself.22 Despite this reference to 
the natural law tradition, the concept of the ius gentium appears to do little or no work in 
Nussbaum’s theory of human rights. I judge this to be a weakness in her theory as 
expounded – as she seems only to have one overall category of ‘rights’ that does not seem 
to distinguish between fundamental human rights (concerning, say, genocide) and certain 
‘softer’ civil or political rights.23 The language of capabilities is in one way attractive in that it 
leaves a range of ways in which persons may wish to fulfil their innate human capacities. But 
using the full range of capabilities to draw up absolutely universal human rights is more 
difficult to justify and, importantly, place in a sensible hierarchy or scheme of priorities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (London, Harvard University Press; 1999), at 3. 
21 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 79. 
22 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, Belknap Press: 2006), 227. 
23 Samuel Freeman also sees this as a weakness in Nussbaum’s theory. See Samuel Freeman, ‘Frontiers of 
Justice: The Capabilities Approach vs. Contractarianism’, Texas Law Review 85 (2006-2007): 385-430, at 425-
426. 
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In my own variation on the concept of political liberalism, I prefer to distinguish between 
fundamental human rights (of the sort outlined by Rawls in The Law of Peoples) linked to the 
ius gentium and retain the distinct notion of intrinsic political goods (fulfilled in persons) 
through the attainment of a community’s political common good. Respect for fundamental 
human rights is, for sure, a political good, but human rights and personal political goods are 
not coextensive in the way that they sometimes appear to be in the capabilities approach. 
4). Overlapping Consensus and the Political Common Good – the promise of political 
liberalism 
This section proceeds by examining how aspects of a virtue politics born of natural law virtue 
ethic can contribute to the establishment of a well ordered political regime, an ideal 
constitution if you will. On a methodological note I concur with Finnis’s caution at the outset 
that it would be: 
“a mistake of method to frame one’s political theory in terms of its ‘liberal’ or ‘non-
liberal’….character. Fruitful inquiry in political theory asks and debates whether 
specified principles, norms, institutions, laws, and practices are ‘sound’, ‘true’, ‘good’, 
‘reasonable’, ‘decent’, ‘just’, fair’, ‘compatible with proper freedom’ and the like”. 24 
While Finnis is right that the primary task of political philosophy should be the consideration 
of the good or best regime rather than the consideration of particular theories of politics, the 
social conditions of modernity make some sort of consideration of political liberalism25 
important for a political theorist, including those with comprehensive ethical views. The need 
to address the issue of liberalism in political theory is important because ‘liberalism’s 
problem’ is one that social philosophers can scarcely ignore: “how can the universalism of 
political/legal structural principles [which apply to all persons equally] square with the 
pluralism and self-direction required by human flourishing?”26  
Two opposing but ultimately unconvincing tendencies can be seen in the attempt to resolve 
this central problem. First, the Scylla of ‘discourse ethicists’ who altogether disavow classical 
‘first-person’ ethics altogether, seeking instead to use strict procedures of public reason to 
universalise personal moral perspectives in ways that seem more appropriate for the legal-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 John Finnis. ‘Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?’, Robert P. George, (ed.) Natural 
Law, Liberalism, and Morality. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), 1-26, at 9. 
25 I refer here not to the many and varied forms of philosophical or theological liberalism but to liberalism as a 
set of ideas relating to the right ordering of a political community. Though through history there has doubtless 
been some overlap between these types of liberalism, I hold that they are distinguishable from each other. 
26 The relationship between ethical goodness and political goodness and the challenges this poses to political 
theory are well explored throughout this work: Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Norms of 
Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2005): 284-285. 
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political domain than to ethics itself.27 Second, it is seen in the (inverse) Charybdis of some 
quasi-Aristotelian or communitarian perspectives - such as that proposed by Alasdair 
MacIntyre - which implicitly fuses the ethical and political domains.28  
Against such contemporary forms of communitarian Aristotelianism I would wish to direct 
attention, as I did in the previous chapters, to Aquinas’s development of certain practical 
principles (in the lex naturalis) that help develop and take forward the classical first-person 
conception of ethics in a way which is helpful in dealing with intersubjective matters in the 
political domain. These insights help avoid some of problems of accommodating legitimate 
pluralism within political societies. Indeed, natural law theory in its traditional formulation 
offers some clear constraints on the proper functions of governments in political 
communities. It has done so, as we saw in the last chapter, through natural rights and the 
maintenance of ‘right order’ in social relations. Michael Pakaluk helpfully summarises some 
of these in a maximalist (and metaphysical) interpretation of what he calls the ‘limits of 
government in Aristotelian-Thomistic theory’. These limits include: 
[1] “The view that positive law is derived from or based upon a natural law, which is 
furthermore well-expressed in an actual legal code of a particular nation, that is, the 
Ten Commandments and the Law of Moses. 
[2] That rulers need to be virtuous, so that, in particular, procedures for the selection 
of public officials must aim at this.  
[3] That human nature is real; that it has an actual character; and that good 
government must be based upon an adequate understanding of it. 
[4] That there are real "forms," or natures in things, which imply a difference in kind 
and not merely degree in levels of authority, that, generally, no higher authority 
commands all of the actions of a lower, but simply corrects and directs.  
[5] That there are natural differences in authority (for example, the knowledgeable 
have a natural claim to direct the ignorant…)…of which political authority is a 
development or rationalization. Political authority…. is simply the highest instance of 
something common and widespread…([and thus is not] an artificial and unjustifiable 
constraint imposed upon sovereign individuals.) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Martin Rhonheimer elaborates this point in: Martin Rhonheimer, trans. G Malsbary, The Perspective of 
Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2011), 11-12. 
28 Thomas Hibbs diagnoses clearly the problem with MacIntyre’s approach to politics: “In his reaction against 
the modern separation of ethics from politics, Maclntyre seems at times to go to the other extreme, to fuse his 
politics to an ethical conception of the good life. How Aristotelian is such a fusion? While closely related, 
politics for Aristotle is not simply an elaboration or expansion of ethics. The Ethics depicts the model of the 
good man, whereas the Politics operates with the distinction between the good man and the good citizen. No 
such distinction seems to be operative in Maclntyre's political thought.” Thomas S. Hibbs, ‘MacIntyre, Aquinas 
and Politics’, The Review of Politics, 66 (2004), 357-383, at 375. 
95	  
	  
[6] That, since the role of any sort of governance is to inculcate virtue, and virtue 
itself implies authority and power, the role of governance is to increase the power 
and ability to govern of those subject to it…. 
[7] That every association involves some sort of exchange or reciprocity (a kind of 
amity), so that the political community as well must be arranged so that the 
reasonable consent of the governed is gained”.29 
These are clearly significant constraints on the role of the state which would project some 
features of human flourishing. The picture painted above by Pakaluk is somewhat akin to a 
form of comprehensive liberalism - classical liberalism - with its references to hierarchies, the 
moral law and an ahistoric notion of essential human nature. Citizens or theorists not 
persuaded by such a basis to liberalism, such as those who advocate a constitutive version 
of rational autonomy,30 will not be able to subscribe to Pakaluk’s particular metaphysical 
vision of social life. Achieving agreement on such metaphysical matters, even as they relate 
to social life, is a much harder task as this involves agreement on aspects of human nature 
considered speculatively. Much contemporary political theory is propounded on the basis of 
a bracketing of substantive ethical and metaphysical considerations. John Rawls is the most 
prominent advocate of something like this approach, though other theorists have chosen 
similar paths independently, or as a result of, Rawls’s work.  
An acknowledged key question for political theorists in modernity is how a citizens’ 
comprehensive moral doctrines, through a process of public/political reasoning, can become 
politically relevant and can serve as the basis of lawmaking and the determination of a 
political conception of justice. For Rawls religious and ethical understandings of the good 
may be advanced in the public domain by persons but will only become public reasoning 
(and thus politically relevant) to the extent that such arguments are capable of being 
recognised as reasonable by those who do not necessarily share those ethical or religious 
doctrines. Rawls includes within comprehensive moral/ethical doctrines secular or Kantian 
conceptions of ethics that do not purport to be forms of moral realism. In this sense Rawls’s 
late political theory (as exhibited in his The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, the ‘Reply to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This is an edited and renumbered list of the ‘limits to government’ from Michael Pakaluk. ‘Is the Common 
Good of political society something limited and instrumental?’ The Review of Metaphysics, 55 (2001), 57-94 at 
86-87. 
30 See Martin Rhonheimer’s discussion of ‘constitutive’ autonomy in his Natural Law and Practical Reason, 
trans. G. Malsbary, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 195-213. Rhonheimer contrasts constitutive 
autonomy (absolute moral independence) with personal autonomy (which is defined as self dominium) or 
functional automomy. The latter two he sees as consistent with a natural law ethic while the former is 
characteristic of Kant’s ethics for Rhonheimer. 
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Habermas’ and in the ‘Commonweal interview’) cannot be described as arbitrarily 
antireligious or akin to radical doctrine of laïcité.31 
One aspect of Rawls’s theory that has proved controversial and has been disputed is his 
view that the legitimacy of the political order should be ‘political not metaphysical’ in order to 
ensure its ongoing stability.32 He feared that an overlapping consensus on matters of basic 
justice and constitutional essentials constructed by reasons that were metaphysical or 
substantively ethical by their nature, or directly as a by-product of such views, would ensure 
only a modus vivendi that would be unstable and transient.33 Instead Rawls thought that an 
overlapping consensus must be based on freestanding political conception of justice, which 
may be fitted like a ‘module’34 within one’s wider comprehensive ethical or metaphysical 
weltanschauung.  
Such a ‘module’ must have its own internal principles and reasons which may be consonant 
with the wider metaphysical or moral comprehensive doctrine but not simply be a simple 
extension of, or be directly derived from, the comprehensive doctrine. A political conception 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Though I do not agree with Rawls’s particular form of political liberalism (‘Justice as Fairness’), I view 
Finnis’s trenchant critique of Rawls’s political liberalism on this specific point as being unduly severe. Finnis 
founds his rather outspoken written comments on Political Liberalism on the basis of Rawls’s conclusion that 
positions stating that abortion should not be lawful in the first trimester are not in accordance with public reason 
as he viewed it (John Rawls, Political Liberalism, second edition, [New York, Columbia University Press: 
1996], f.n. 32, at 243). Rawls’s comments on abortion was in fact his own applied political opinion on the 
question rather than as an intrinsic expression of  political liberalism as a metatheory – indeed this was Rawls’s 
own view (Rawls, Political Liberalism, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, lvii). Rawls’s initial comments in 
the first edition footnote mislead some readers - including Finnis and other Catholic critics - that his 
metatheoretical notion of public reason is was narrower than it actually is. Rawls himself later wrote that certain 
Catholic and natural law arguments advanced about the political (in)justice of abortion might well be admissible 
as public reasoning even if there are also non-public reasons why a Catholic would wish to oppose legalised 
procured abortion (Rawls, Political Liberalism, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, at f.n.32, lvi). See John 
Finnis’s article directed against Rawls: ‘Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning’, Valpariso University Law 
Review, 32 (1998), 361-382. Finnis is in fact closer to the mark on evaluating Rawls’s theory when he says that 
Habermas’s and Rawls’s positions are, in some ways “so close to [Finnis’s interpretation of] natural law theory 
in intention, and in some respect, results”, John Finnis, ‘Natural Law and the Ethics of Discourse’, American 
Journal of Jurisprudence, 43 (1998), 53-73, at 72. 
32 Rawls sets out the linaege of his theory in the historical context of the emergence of liberalism resulting from 
(a particular reading) of the problems encountered in medieval Christianity and the Wars of Religion (see 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, Introduction, at xxiii-xxx). This history is itself contested by some Radical 
Orthodox theologians, and though I do not concur with some of the exaggerated aspects of this historical and 
theoretical critique, such thinkers are right to question this particular historical narrative. See William T. 
Cavanaugh, ‘“A fire strong enough to consume the house”: the Wars of Religion and the rise of the State’, 
Modern Theology, 11 (1995), 397-420. 
33 Though I doubt, with the Analytical Thomist John Haldane, that a modus vivendi would necessarily be as 
unstable as Rawls feared. Haldane points to the British constitution, with its important and overt historical and 
religious elements (such as an Established Church in England), and writes: “This [British] order exists, and (to 
the extent that it offers any justification) justifies itself independently of a theory of the right. Even if it 
originates in and is maintained by a series of pragmatic resolutions, these quickly come to be the object of civic 
allegiance, particularly as they are given the protection of law. If this is a modus vivendi writ large, it certainly 
seems no less stable than an overlapping consensus”. See John Haldane, ‘The Individual, the State, and the 
Common Good’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 13 (1996), 59-79 at 78. 
34 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 145. 
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of justice would be freestanding in the sense that it includes “no specific religious, 
metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception 
itself”35 though it should be seen openly as a partial “moral conception” as it necessarily 
includes certain primary goods, which are essentially goods of persons in relation to their 
role as citizens.36	  Following criticism of the first edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls clarified 
his position somewhat in his ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ when he outlines a 
‘Proviso’: that “comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be introduced into 
public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons.... 
are presented” in relation to the matter under discussion.37 
The freestanding nature of the political conception of justice has been disputed from two 
opposing directions. From Jurgen Habermas’s more rigorously Kantian perspective, political 
liberalism unduly limits the universalising normativity of practical reason to the legal-political 
domain.38 Other theorists criticise the ‘freestanding’ theory for illegitimately negating or 
disguising the proper role of either ethics or metaphysics in politics. Finnis, for instance, 
faults Rawls’s theory for negating the relevance of moral truth in matters legal and political. 
Disputing what Rawls sees as the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ specifically in the domain of 
ethics (though not contesting the existence of actual pluralism in moral choices or cultural 
difference), he refuses to concede that certain moral truths about human goods cannot be 
known, in principle, through the light of natural human reason. On such matters Finnis infers 
that disagreement on matters of moral truth (and not in contingent situations where prudence 
determines rightful actions) results from ignorance, uncontrolled passions, or arbitrary 
partiality or self interest.39 At the same time Finnis, for some reason, fails to recognise the 
‘Proviso’ in relation to public reason that Rawls introduces in his later writings and this brings 
in question whether a tendentious interpretation of Political Liberalism is being advanced. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 144. 
36 Rawls writes that notwithstanding the priority of the right over the good this “does not mean that ideas of the 
good need to be avoided: that is impossible”: Rawls, Political Liberalism, 203. 
37 See John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ University of Chicago Law Review, 64 (1997), 765-
807 at 783-784. Rawls, was also later asked if Political Liberalism is a veiled argument for secularism, and 
responded: “I emphatically deny it. Suppose I said that it is not a veiled argument for secularism any more than 
it is a veiled argument for religion. Consider: there are two kinds of comprehensive doctrines, religious and 
secular. Those of religious faith will say I give a veiled argument for secularism, and the latter will say I give a 
veiled argument for religion. I deny both. Each side presumes the basic ideas of constitutional democracy, so my 
suggestion is that I can make our political arguments in terms of public reason”. Quoted in chapter 27 
(‘Commonweal interview with John Rawls’) in John Rawls, in Samuel Freeman (Ed.), Collected Papers 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 616-622, at 619-620. 
38 Habermas writes “[f]or my part [implicitly contrasting himself with the Rawls of Political Liberalism], I 
follow Kant in assuming that, with the concept of autonomy, the practical reason shared by all persons offers a 
reliable guide both for morally justifying individual actions and for the rational construction of a legitimate 
political constitution for society. Kant understands "autonomy" as the ability of persons to bind their will to 
universal norms that they give themselves in the light of reason.” Jurgen Habermas, ‘Reply to my Critics’, in 
Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political, (New York: Routledge, 2011), at 284. 
39 Finnis, ‘Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning’, 369-370. 
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I judge that Finnis is correct to object to the notion that any aspect of practical truth should 
be absent from a normative political theory of liberalism. Although a relatively wide scope 
pluralism (or “normative openness”)40resulting from divergent practical situations (governed 
by prudence) and cultural difference (which can be easily mistaken for moral difference) is 
fully consistent with natural law theory, some core moral truths are clearly advanced, 
typically in the form of exceptionless moral norms (for example, the slaying of innocent 
human beings).  
This raises the question of why Rawls did not link his theory more explicitly to a natural law 
position. Rawls at times says that his theory is consistent with certain Catholic political 
perspectives41 whilst at the same time contrasting ‘justice as fairness’ at other points with 
natural law theory.42 This may be because Rawls associated natural law theory with the ‘old’ 
late scholastic or early modern perspective (with its ‘upfront’ metaphysical anthropology) 
rather than the reinterpretation of Aquinas’s theory presented by the New Natural Law 
school. 
The lack of admissibility of any form of moral truth in Rawls’s political conception of justice 
does raise questions in relation to the extent to which some physical harms to the person 
(according to many people’s understanding of moral truth) that fall short of breaches of core 
universal human rights (in The Law of Peoples) may be permitted within polities operating on 
the basis of Rawls’s understanding of political liberalism. Andrew Koppleman, for example 
has provocatively argued that there is nothing in Rawls’s schema of political constructivism 
that could definitively ensure that practices such as female genital mutilation could not be 
legally permitted in states where this practice has popular support. Koppleman argues that 
species of political liberalism that are not based on political constructivism, such as the 
capabilities approach, would be in a position to prohibit such practices in principle.43 
Martha Nussbaum’s reformulation of political liberalism in many ways takes Rawls’s theory 
as its point of departure. In elaborating her understanding of justice she helpfully corrects 
some questionable aspects of Rawls’s theory, not least by removing some unconvincing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Mark Murphy, ‘Natural Law, Common Morality, and Particularity’, 138-145 where Murphy, a natural 
law philosopher, lays out a least four broad reasons why there is much “normative openness” to a natural law 
ethic despite natural law’s  moral realism, including its commitment to certain core moral absolutes. 
41 See for example Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ at 774-775 when he says that “political 
liberalism also admits …Catholic views of the common good and solidarity when they are expressed in terms of 
political values”. 
42 See John Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’ in Rawls, Political Liberalism, 405, where he describes natural law as a 
comprehensive doctrine establishing moral truths in the pre-political domain, and thus it “is not part of justice as 
fairness”. 
43 See Andrew Koppelman, ‘The Limits of Constructivism: Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?’, 
The Review of Politics, 71 (2009), 459-482, and at 480-481 for Koppleman’s reference to Nussbaum’s version 
of political liberalism. 
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aspects regarding the priority of the right and some elements of the basic structure.44 Like 
Nussbaum, I retain the genus type of ‘political liberalism’ without Rawls’ specifically 
elaborated example of political liberalism, justice as fairness.45 As we have seen in previous 
chapters, Nussbaum, developing positions first put forward by Amartya Sen, addresses the 
question of a ‘thin theory of the good’ not by means of all purpose primary goods, but by 
outlining certain key human capabilities, such as bodily health, life, affiliation and so on. 
These capabilities are fundamentally meant to reflect a respect for human dignity in the 
political domain, as without them it is difficult to see how the worth or value of a person is 
maintained in a society. In this approach a well ordered liberal society will aim to attain a 
threshold level of capabilities for its citizens. 
These human capabilities are arrived at not through a heuristic device such as the Original 
Position, but simply by citizens deliberating and philosophising ethically (not metaphysically) 
on what a human person’s basic capacities and potentialities are, and then developing these 
insights into what capabilities a political society ought to secure for its citizenry. In this 
theory, Nussbaum prioritises the good over the right, though acknowledges that both “are 
thoroughly intertwined”.46 This aspect of her approach is welcome, as it clears up some of 
the unhelpful ambiguities in Rawls’ later understanding of primary goods. Therefore her 
theory is therefore not really a constructivist theory, as Rawls’ theory is.47 Citizens pointedly 
do not, in the capabilities approach, seek to agree the summum bonum of human life, as this 
is not deemed directly relevant to political association. Thus Nussbaum draws the line at the 
inclusion of some metaphysical arguments in the public domain as politically relevant. Like 
Rawls (and Habermas in more recent lectures), Nussbaum has no issue with religious 
doctrines having a full airing in the discourse of the ‘background culture’, but she holds that 
only arguments about human fulfilment that eschew metaphysical aspects are strictly 
admissible as good reasons when considering matters of basic justice and constitutional 
essentials. 
In the capabilities approach the exercise of these capacities are left to individuals to choose 
to exercise (or not to exercise) each capability, according to their particular plan of life. She 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 I do not here endorse communitarian critiques of liberal theory that hold that the self is prior to the ends 
affirmed by it, as I maintain that persons theoretically and empirically have the freedom to rationally revise their 
‘plans of life’ (their chosen path to eudaimonia) in terms of their religion or comprehensive moral viewpoints. 
Holding this view, however, should not be interpreted as a denial of the fact that human beings have a 
teleological nature (see chapter 3 of this thesis) from a metaphysical or theological perspective, only that the 
exercise of human freedom is compatible with different (and changing) specifications of the good life.  
45 Rawls apparently held that genus of ‘political liberalism’ is not conterminous with his own species of political 
liberalism: Justice as Fairness. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lecture I, especially at 15. 
46 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 162. 
47 Although Rawls’s later theory is a species of what he calls ‘political constructivism’. See Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, Lecture III, 89-130. 
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therefore maintains that the capabilities approach is sensitive to conditions of moral 
pluralism. In the central capabilities list Nussbaum outlines, political rights such as freedom 
of association mingle alongside capabilities such as bodily health and emotional 
development. Nussbaum sees each item in the list as being equally fundamental and are not 
to be given either a structural ranking in political liberalism, though individuals will rank and 
prioritise which capabilities to exercise through their own free choices. 
The capabilities approach is often contrasted with Rawls’s notion of primary social goods, 
which originated in Rawls’ discussion of a ‘thin theory of the good’ in A Theory of Justice.48 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls is right to focus on social primary goods as goods for citizens 
rather than as goods for persons holistically. His explanation of the social primary goods 
themselves - as goods that anyone would want regardless of whatever else they wanted - 
are of a very broad scope and include political rights (including the right to hold all public 
offices), the “social bases of self respect” and “income and wealth”. The advantages of the 
capabilities approach over the social primary goods are clear for us. The social bases of self 
respect seem so conceptually broad to us as to be potentially indeterminate in terms of their 
concrete content. “Income and wealth” as an index of primary goods appears as if it is more 
of a particular societal outcome measure or an index of positional goods than a name for an 
actual human good (or citizen-good). Rawls’s wrote at times of his own sympathies with the 
idea of capabilities (as outlined by Amaryta Sen) when he affirmed that that “basic 
capabilities are of first importance and that the use of primary goods is always to be 
assessed in the light of those assumptions”, though in this passage he appears to have held 
that the capabilities should come into play as a constructivist throughput from, rather than an 
ethical input into, the Original Position.49 
Rawls apparent scepticism of the ability of practical reason make ethical value intelligible to 
persons - one of the original criticisms of The Theory of Justice among natural law critics50- 
appears still to be a background philosophical operating assumption in Political Liberalism. 
Thus his political theory needed a form of constructivism (now political rather than ethical) to 
do the work that natural practical reasoning does for Finnis and Nussbaum in specifying 
human goods or capabilities.51 Rawls’s eschewal of attempts to specify a somewhat more 
determinate range of primary goods is outlined on the basis that it would constitute a 
comprehensive ethical conception of the good. However, this criticism is blunted by the fact 
that Nussbaum’s capabilities (and my notion of ‘political goods’) build in an element of choice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge:, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971), 395ff. 
49 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 183. 
50 See, for example, Finnis’s critique in Natural Law and Natural Rights, at 108-109 and 130-131. 
51 See ‘Lecture III, Political Constructivism’ in Rawls, Political Liberalism, 89-129. 
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for persons in exercising capabilities in order to allow for a degree of pluralism. I would 
contend that Rawls constrained his conception of primary goods so much that it ceases to 
do any helpful work in relation to the actual goods of persons in their role as citizens. 
Nussbaum also significantly adapts the basic structure of Rawls’s theory. Two aspects of 
this I see as useful and would seek to adopt.52 Firstly, Nussbaum’s shift away from the 
problematic aspects of Rawls’s ‘burdens of judgement’ as a criterion of political 
‘reasonableness’, which she implicitly sees as a weak form of scepticism and thus an 
encroachment from a comprehensive doctrine into the political structure.53 She rightly shifts 
the central underlying basis of political liberalism from controversial distinctions in relation to 
human rationality (in ‘Lecture II, the Powers of Citizens…’) to the notion of respect for human 
worth or dignity,54 though she at the same time contends that equal respect, based on the 
inviolability of the human person, is actually one of two core ideas advanced in Rawls 
understanding of political liberalism (along with the ‘fair terms of cooperation’).55 Focussing 
on equal respect (based on human dignity) has many advantages from the philosophical 
perspective presented here, and it is a focus that other notable political liberals such as 
Charles Larmore have placed at the centre of their own conception of political liberalism.56 
It is worth quoting Nussbaum here at length as the passage concisely summarises the key 
differences in the way she philosophically anchors her version of political liberalism: 
“Equal respect is a political, not a comprehensive, value; thus one might in principle 
accept it while continuing to use the idea of respect, respect for persons is not a 
subjective emotional state, such as a feeling of admiration. It is a way of regarding 
and treating persons, closely related to the Kantian idea of treating humanity as an 
end and never as a mere means. Respect is thus closely linked to the idea of dignity, 
to the idea that humanity has worth and not merely a price. Equal respect would then 
be respect that appropriately acknowledges the equal dignity and worth that persons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 I remain to be convinced that Nussbaum’s critique of the ‘mutual advantage’ aspect of Rawls theory 
necessarily hits the mark, and recognise Samuel Freeman’s proxy defence of the late Rawls on this aspect of 
Political Liberalism. See Freeman, ‘Frontiers of Justice: The Capabilities Approach vs. Contractarianism’. 
53 See Martha C. Nussbaum., ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
39 (2011), 3-45, at 30-33. 
54 As Nussbaum puts it: “I am not denying that a Catholic might also accept the burdens of judgment, if he or 
she thought that authority pronounced only some matters, that is, that the scope of papal infallibility is narrow 
enough that it doesn’t answer many of life’s questions. What I want to emphasize is that one can get to political 
liberalism through respect alone, without alluding to the special difficulties of judgment.” Nussbaum, 
‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism', at 19. 
55 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Rawls’s Political Liberalism. A Reassessment’, Ratio Juris, 24 (2011), 1-24, at 1-2, 
quoting John Rawls comment “each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override” in Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 3. 
56 Nussbaum indeed credits Larmore with convincing her of the centrality of the notion of respect in liberalism. 
See Charles Larmore, ‘The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism’, Journal of Philosophy, 96 (1999): 599-625. 
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have as ends. Although this idea has a definite ethical content, it has long been 
recognized (for example, in the framing of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights) that one may endorse it for political purposes without thereby endorsing a 
comprehensive Kantian doctrine or any other specific comprehensive doctrine: thus 
one may endorse it while believing a form of religious doctrine that Kant would not 
accept, or while holding a view about freedom of the will that is not Kant’s.” 57  
This minimalist basis for political liberalism on the grounds of human dignity presents fewer 
philosophical hostages to fortune (an important point when considering the irenic purpose of 
political liberalism) than Rawls’s more expansive justification. It is true, as Nussbaum admits, 
that different conceptions of human dignity have a widely divergent basis leading to different 
kinds of valuation on human worth, but is also true that few agents would wish to reject the 
position that persons have a baseline worth or value simply by virtue of them being a 
member of the human race.  
In the natural law or Catholic tradition the notion of liberal freedoms or rights founded on 
human dignity and its correlate, equal respect, remains a contested one. This comes through 
clearly on one side of the argument when John Paul II spoke of the Enlightenment ideals of 
liberty, equality and fraternity as “the positive fruits of the Enlightenment”58 and commented 
that “it is striking how often the logic of Enlightenment thought led to a profound discovery of 
the truths contained in the Gospel”.59 In this vein we can see something in Kant’s second 
categorical imperative - to treat persons as an end, and never merely as a means to an end - 
that represents a fruitful philosophical development of the Golden (or Silver) Rule found in 
the revealed doctrines and philosophical traditions of many of the world’s religions and 
cultures. Others, including the Communio school and Radical Orthodox thinkers, are far less 
sanguine about taking emphases from the Enlightenment into the Thomist or Catholic 
philosophical tradition as if they were ‘spoils of the Egyptians’. For example, Tracey Rowland 
cautions Thomists that borrowing from what she sees as a radically incompatible 
philosophical tradition (“the Liberal tradition”)60 has profound long term philosophical dangers 
because if the “conceptual forms of the Liberal natural right tradition are adopted, then this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Nussbaum, ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism', at 18. 
58 See John Paul II, Memory and Identity, chapter 18: ‘The Positive Fruits of the Enlightenment’, 121-129. 
Though at the same time John Paul II speaks of the negative legacy of modernity when he points to the rise of 
Cartesianism and its successor philosophies that marginalise or eliminate the role of God in social life (at 8-9). 
59 Ibid., at 123. Charles Taylor makes some similar points in his lecture ‘A Catholic Modernity?’, in James .L. 
Heft (Ed.), A Catholic Modernity? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 13-38. 
60 Rowland uses Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of ‘liberalism as a tradition’ (following from his notion of 
‘tradition constituted rationality’) throughout her monograph, in which political ideas of human rights and 
freedoms are intrinsically tied to a substantive Enlightenment philosophy and anthropology.  
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an instance of ‘taking a garland’ [i.e. the mechanical adoption of alien chains of thought], and 
its alleged merit can only be rhetorical, that is political rather than philosophical.”61 
Because this capabilities approach allows a significant role for ‘the good’ it has been 
accused of being a form of comprehensive liberalism by some62 - an accusation that could 
also be levelled at the particular ‘variation on the theme’ of political liberalism presented 
here. I disagree with this judgement on the basis that Nussbaum’s abstention from making 
metaphysical reasoning part of the basis for developing the capabilities allows a shallow or 
thin notion of the ethical good to contribute directly to the conception of political justice via an 
overlapping consensus. In fact, I see this thin ethical element as an important part of any 
theory of political liberalism, as constructing matters of political justice solely from ‘the right’ 
is not philosophically tenable within the ethical-political approach set out in this and previous 
chapters. 
In this context the capabilities approach is a useful allied approach to the virtue ethic and 
natural law approach we have set out. Nussbaum’s theory is a helpful internal critique of 
Political Liberalism that helps improve several aspects of Rawls’s schema.63 As we have 
already observed, the approach bears many similarities with the Finnis/Grisez basic goods 
theory, and this is not surprising given the common Aristotelian underpinning to their theory. 
The capabilities approach may therefore be useful in helping citizens understand how the 
political common good should be pursued in the legislature and in the background culture of 
civil society. Nonetheless the position outlined here on the optimal form of political liberalism 
is one step further along the continuum from Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian theory.  
5). Natural Law theory, ‘Permissive Political Liberalism’ and secondary political 
constructivism 
I hold that in core matters of political justice, such as the upholding of universal human rights 
and constitutional essentials, political reasoning (ordered to just relations between free and 
equal citizens, that is, natural right) should be based on fundamental human goods 
apprehended by practical reasoning (a thin theory of the good), but can in certain prescribed 
circumstances also include the outcome of speculative reasoning on a philosophical 
anthropology, or on the origins of ethical obligation. Such matters of basic justice will clearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Tracey Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition, (London: Routledge, 2003), 155. Rowland uses her 
definition of ‘taking a garland’ from a different philosophical system (‘the mechanical adoption of alien chains 
of thought’) from the Catholic theologian Hans Von Balthasar, at f.n. 83, 154. 
62 See Linda Barclay, ‘What Kind of Liberal is Martha Nussbaum?’, Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 4 
(2003), 5-24. 
63 Though I agree with some of Eric Nelson’s sympathetic critique of Nussbaum’s approach in: Eric Nelson, 
‘From Primary Goods to Capabilities: Distributive Justice and the Problem of Neutrality’, Political Theory, 36 
(2008), 93-122, at 96-103.  
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include matters such as; that governmental and private power be constrained by the Rule of 
Law (i.e. be non-arbitrary), that citizens are treated equally before the law, that access to key 
public offices be on the basis of non-discrimination, and that those who are subject to the 
law participate in the setting of the laws by one means or another (either through 
participatory or representative democracy). Though such approaches can be found in 
contemporary natural law theories, they are also familiar aspects of Rawls’s first Principle of 
Justice (especially the ‘political liberties’). Rawls’s insistence that such basic liberties are not 
traded off for other social goods would also be shared by the strongly anti-consequentialist 
position taken by most contemporary natural law theorists and neo-classical virtue ethicists. 
I would argue political liberalism would be strengthened further were the strictures on 
consensus building relaxed further. With Ryan Davis I would say “that justice can be political 
and not metaphysical” but reject the position “that justice must be political and not 
metaphysical”.64 Though this sentence is, strictly speaking, consistent with Rawls’ final view 
as expressed in his Proviso, it places a different emphasis on the tenor of public reasoning. 
Such a view fits well with the idea that natural law as a theory of practical reason, gives 
cognitive access to knowledge of fundamental human goods without an immediate 
(metaphysical) knowledge of the ultimate origin of the moral law, without necessarily closing 
off the relevance and importance of the metaphysical and theistic basis of the natural law. 
This would be important as for some moral agents who accept this ultimate grounding 
(through revelation or metaphysical reasoning) the love of neighbour derives from, and is 
inseparable from, the love of God. 
Kyla Ebels-Duggan has coined the expression ‘permissive political liberalism’ to describe a 
form of liberalism in which an overlapping consensus on a conception of political justice is 
centrally built on a non-metaphysical and religious basis, but where citizens’ positions on 
political justice that are expressed only in metaphysical or religious language are not ipso 
facto barred from the overlapping consensus building deliberation process.65 This says 
nothing, of course, about the likely persuasiveness of such exclusive metaphysical or 
religious argumentation to other citizens who do not share their position.  
Such a ‘permissive political liberalism’ would be more than a modus vivendi in that it would 
be an overlapping consensus that would still focally revolve around citizens providing good 
reasons (in this case in relation to specifically political goods) to each other and thus an 
overlapping consensus in this context would be more than just a random coincidence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ryan W. Davis, ‘Justice, Metaphysical after all?’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 14 (2011), 207-222, at 
208. Emphasis in original. 
65 Kyla Ebels-Duggan, ‘The beginning of community: politics in the face of disagreement’, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 60 (2010), 50-71 at 51.  
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varying opinions or a regime founded on toleration.66 In this permissive political liberalism 
citizens may ultimately choose how to express their views on the content and nature of basic 
justice and constitutional essentials. Should citizens give what they see as the whole truth 
about justice in political domain, and not just in the background culture? Rawls’s position, as 
we have seen, is that an exclusive “zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible 
with an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship”67 but that advancing 
arguments in the public political domain alongside comprehensive doctrine simultaneously, 
or near simultaneously, is acceptable as civil behaviour (the ‘Proviso’). John Haldane sees 
the profession of the ‘full truth’ in public political forums as not being problematic and, 
following Maritain, sees fanaticism primarily as a facet of bad people rather than a feature of 
philosophical ideas. Wishing to uphold the intellectual integrity of citizens, Haldane fears the 
restriction of public political debate to matters upon which everyone might agree. He thus 
views political liberalism as more of a humane “sensibility” than a “set of principles”.68 
From my perspective the strictures of public reason may well not be problematic for many 
citizens of faith, including those for whom ‘faith’ and ‘reason’ (i.e. graced reason and natural 
reason) are held to be compatible when held in a close balance (following Aquinas). 
Terrence Irwin, for example, suggests that Aquinas’s understanding of the natural inclination 
to the good of sociability in Aquinas’s first precept of the natural law means that one is bound 
to “respect the judgement of others, since I regard their judgement as being possibly 
relevant to me about the ends it would be best for me to pursue. This kind of respect for 
others places us in a kind of “community of reason” with them”.69 Despite his hostility to 
Rawls’s own conception of public reason Finnis himself quotes Aquinas in a passage that 
would seem to indicate that, in disputations, an exchange of reasons that are publically 
accessible to all is fully in accordance with a position in which thicker metaphysical or 
theological arguments are also important for the participant. For as Aquinas writes: 
“Any activity is to be pursued in a way appropriate to its purpose.…Our sort of 
academic disputation is designed to remove doubts about whether such-and-such is 
so. In disputations of this sort you should above all use authorities acceptable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 This is where my account appears to differ from that of the Thomist John Haldane, who wishes “to settle for a 
modus vivendi” in which toleration plays a seemingly important  role, being dissatisfied with Rawls’s 
conception of public reason. I appreciate, with Haldane, that the prospect of a modus vivendi is not as 
problematically unstable as Rawls fears it may be, but I would also wish to affirm the realistic prospect that 
significant public goods are attainable through reasoning on political goods that are in principle accessible to all. 
See John Haldane ‘Public Reason, Truth, and Human Fellowship: Going Beyond Rawls’, Journal of Law, 
Philosophy and Culture, 1 (2007), 175-190, at 190. 
67 Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, 767. 
68 Haldane ‘Public Reason, Truth, and Human Fellowship: Going Beyond Rawls’. 190.  
69 See T. H. Irwin, ‘Aquinas, Natural Law, and Aristotelian Eudaimonism’, in Richard Kraut (Ed.), The 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 323- 341 at 334. 
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those with whom you are disputing… And if you are disputing with people who accept 
no authority, you must resort to natural reasons”.70 
Justice in the classical and Thomist tradition, as I have sought to demonstrate, is primarily a 
virtue of the person and not principally an abstract attribute of a set of social institutions. 
Natural right or political right (droit politique) is the expression of the virtue of justice in 
general social relations having an application in relation to positive law and the executive 
actions of governments. This is a substantive ethical view but it is one at the same time that 
affords some distinction between those virtues that more closely relate to personal goodness 
(perhaps chastity) and that of the virtue of justice which focuses directly on relations with 
others. That Aquinas writes of ‘duties of justice’ does indicate that intersubjective 
considerations were not neglected, though it is to be recalled that justice is to be linked to 
other personal virtues through the doctrine of the ‘unity of the virtues’ (deriving ultimately 
from Plato’s Republic). But it is difficult to see how a first person eudaimonistic ethic can be 
said to prioritise the right over the good, even within the limits of the political domain (as 
Rawls proposes). In the domain of political life, a classical virtue ethicist may speak of the 
‘duties of justice’, but this is always ultimately an aspect of the agent’s own eudaimonistic 
good.  
As we have seen in the case of Michael Pakaluk the philosophical and theological schools 
purporting to follow Aquinas’s overall lines of thought have traditionally emphasised the 
importance of metaphysics, including in political matters. Thomist philosophers have often 
had recourse to metaphysics early in the philosophical process, an assumption that proves a 
stumbling block in societies where there is a plurality of philosophical and religious views. 
For some such theorists any attempt to erect a wall within a philosophical anthropology at 
the point at which metaphysical issues arise is the archetypal move of many modern political 
philosophers, for whom human nature is not dynamically ordered (with a telos) but is static 
and inert. Thus, for example, James Schall boldly states that “[t]he struggle for politics 
remains at bottom a struggle about metaphysics and its openness to intelligibility”.71 The 
Catholic philosopher Robert Sokolowski in his own way concurs with this - citing Aristotle’s 
emphasis on the superiority of the theoretical life in the Politics (VII, 1325a31-b32) - in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Here Finnis quotes Aquinas in Quodlibetal Questions IV q.9 a. 3c. See John Finnis, ‘Abortion, Natural Law 
and Public Reason,’ in Robert P. George and Christopher Wolfe (Eds.), Natural Law and Public Reason, 
(Washington, D.C,: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 71–105, at 78. Emphasis in Finnis’s quotation. 
71 James V. Schall, ‘Nature and Finality in Aristotle’, Laval theologique and philosophique, 45 (1989): 73-85, at 
85. 
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arguing that the concept of teleology is essential, not only “in regard to human nature but in 
regard to things like life, politics, and religion”.72  
Other, more theological critiques of political liberalism, somewhat misrepresent Rawls’s later 
theory claiming that, despite his repeated and explicit protestations, political liberalism is 
essentially a species of Enlightenment liberalism based on an instrumental rationality, an 
asocial or monadic anthropology, and even a concealed ‘metaphysic of violence’. However, 
these authors typically err by failing to mention highly relevant aspects of Rawls’s later 
theory that would decisively go against such an interpretation, such as Rawls’s theory of 
primary goods, his emphasis on notions such as reciprocity and mutual respect, and Rawls 
refutation in the clearest possible terms in Political Liberalism that the Original Position is 
based on a metaphysical anthropology or a pre-social ‘state of nature’.73 
In the moral and social theory propounded here, however, this important metaphysical 
element is in one way distinguishable, in that the initial moral experience provided by the 
agent’s practical reason is distinct from theoretical reasoning that may come to subsequent 
metaphysical conclusions. This allows a two stage overlapping consensus building process. 
The first stage is a result of practical reasoning on ‘thin’ ethical goods (the human goods) 
and the second on matters of metaphysical importance, such as deeper notions of human 
personhood (philosophical/psychological anthropology), and the origin and fullness of moral 
obligation (in God or Nature, and in a theological completion of ethics). Such a two stage 
process does not imply that metaphysics is somehow subordinated to practical reasoning or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Robert Sokolowski, ‘The Human Person and Political Life’ in Christian Faith and Human Understanding, 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 179-198, at 197. 
73 Such interpretations of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism display a lack of interpretive attention to the texts, 
perhaps betraying an ideologically coloured reading. Typical of this is the work of the David L. Schindler, a 
leading member of the Roman Catholic American Communio school whose positions are similar to those of the 
Radical Orthodoxy school. Schindler’s somewhat polemical position in relation to political liberalism is well 
represented in David L. Schindler’s ‘Civil Community inside the Liberal State: Truth, Freedom, and Human 
Dignity’, Josephinum Journal of Theology, 16 (2009), 232-287. Though Schindler bases his theological critique 
of political liberalism on the theology of Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI, Benedict XVI himself has a nuanced 
and more accurate appreciation of Rawls’s work, when he wrote “that John Rawls, although denying to 
comprehensive religious doctrines the character of "public" reason, nevertheless sees at least in their 
"nonpublic" reason a reason that cannot, in the name of a secularly hardened rationality, simply be disregarded 
by those who support it. He sees a criterion for this reasonableness in, among other things, the fact that similar 
doctrines derive from a responsible and validly grounded tradition in which, over a long period of time, 
sufficiently good argumentation has developed to support the respective doctrine. What seems important to me 
in this affirmation is the recognition that experience and demonstration over the course of generations, the 
historical background of human wisdom, are also a sign of its reasonableness and its enduring significance.” See 
Benedict XVI, ‘The Truth Makes Us Good and Goodness Is True’, a planned lecture at La Sapienza University, 
Rome, (18 January 2007), trans J. G. Trabbic, available at http://www.zenit.org/article-21526?l=english 
accessed on 8 July 2011. 
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that the person in her innermost being can be conceived principally as an autonomous 
practical agent.74 
This is a particular issue when public reasoning over the role of religion in the public square 
is involved. Though not sharing John Rawls’s avoidance of ‘political truth’ or Jurgen 
Habermas’s more thoroughgoing post-metaphysical political theory, it is not necessary or 
helpful to build metaphysical questions into the deliberative democratic process at an 
unnecessarily early stage (i.e at the first stage of overlapping consensus building). This is 
not to say that fundamental questions on the nature of the human person should never be 
addressed in public reasoning or that they are somehow of secondary importance in 
philosophy or in human life integrally conceived. In relation to some relevant issues 
concerning basic justice, such as abortion, cloning, or capital punishment, it may well be 
appropriate at some stage of the public reasoning process to introduce arguments from a 
philosophical anthropology not easily understood through practical reasoning alone. It 
means only that the limited agreement on what can be agreed in a core political conception 
of justice should be sought before questions of a metaphysical nature are addressed, where 
agreement might be more difficult to attain. 
I do hold however, that once a polity has established or agreed such fundamental matters of 
justice and human rights, there should be no bar on political public reasoning (or democratic 
deliberation) going beyond these restrictions, as long as such reasoning respects and does 
not impinge upon the (prior) established tenets of natural right by citizens’ and legislators’ 
practical reasoning. I take something like this point from Jean Hampton’s important and 
nuanced position on the importance of not excluding metaphysics from political life.75 A more 
permissive form of political liberalism in principle allows laws and public policies to be 
promulgated in a way that would permit the promotion of civic virtues, liberal education and 
public morality - were they to have due democratic support.76 There is no pretence here that 
strict state neutrality is observed. This form of political liberalism therefore has parallels with 
‘moderate perfectionism’ in Peter de Marneffe’s fourfold typology of the 
neutrality/perfectionism spectrum, which he holds as being consistent with a form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 This is clearly a major concern of David L. Schindler who critiques political liberalism as necessarily (though 
often implicitly) denying “a metaphysical anthropology of being as gift”. Nothing I write here implicitly or 
explicitly denies such an anthropology, or else what Schindler calls the ‘anterior’ or ‘constitutive’ constitution 
of the human person as intrinsically related to God and other people. See David L. Schindler, ‘The Embodied 
Person as Gift and the Cultural Task in America: Status Quaestionis’, Communio 35 (2008): 397-431 at 399. 
75 Hampton writes “The public pursuit of the truth about these aspects of justice need not threaten the security of 
anyone in a pluralist society as long as there are universally shared (and enforced) guidelines for people’s 
argumentative interaction with one another that insist, as Socrates did.….on respect for everyone’s effort to 
construct his or her own belief system”. See Jean Hampton, ‘Should political philosophy be done without 
metaphysics?’ Ethics, 99 (1989), 791-814 at 811. 
76 As argued in chapter 3, section 4. 
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liberalism.77 The approach put forward here has clear parallels with Maritain’s own nascent 
schematics of a political liberalism to which Nussbaum often alludes to in her own 
constructive work on political liberalism.78  
The form of political liberalism advanced here replaces the human capabilities with a similar 
idea of ‘political goods’ or ‘political human goods’. These goods focally relate to persons in 
their roles as citizens, reflecting that which is consistent with natural right. They therefore 
differ somewhat from Finnis’s basic human goods79 in that they refer specifically to goods 
considered insofar as the political community may duly promote or advance them - in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Political goods are thus human goods relating 
to intersubjective life; that is; focally, goods relating to peace and justice and not in relation to 
the final ends of life or other substantive ends, as they might in a typical Enterprise 
Association. In this sense the political society I envisage remains a societas and not a 
universitas, where the latter is understood as aiming for comprehensive human ends of a 
substantive scope.80 This does not mean that political society is a night-watchman state as in 
libertarian thought, only that it should eschew the sort of ideological goals foisted on the 
state familiar from the history of the twentieth century, such as state socialism on the left or 
fascism on the right.81 
Political goods are for citizens to attain through political association via organs of 
government designated as the proper authority for the salient coordination of the civitas’s 
common good. An overlapping consensus on that which constitutes natural right within a 
political community thus relates to this political common good. As we saw in the last chapter, 
this common good conception contains within it an understanding of subjective human 
rights, and not only those basic universal rights that are part of the ius gentium, but certain 
‘liberty’ or ‘choice’ rights where these are appropriate. This compressed summary is one way 
of specifying the notion of a ‘political conception of justice’ from my perspective.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Here I would concur with de Marneffe’s judgment that “moderate perfectionism is compatible with the 
principles of acceptability and basic liberty” and that: “Moderate perfectionism is formally compatible with the 
priority of liberty since the priority of liberty allows the government to limit nonbasic liberties to discourage 
unworthy activities.” See Peter de Marneffe, ‘'Liberalism and Perfectionism’', American Journal of 
Jurisprudence ,43 (1998), 99–116, at 115. 
78 Also particularly helpful in situating Maritain’s proto-political liberal position in relation to Rawls is: Patrick 
Neal, ‘Three readings of political liberalism: Rawls, Maritain and Crick’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 5 
(2000), 225-246. 
79 As we have seen, Finnis’s human goods are integral human goods and the instrumental role of the political 
community is to promote them all in line with the political common good.  
80 I refer here to Michael Oakeshott’s conceptual distinction in his essay ‘On the Character of a Modern 
European State’, in On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 185-326. 
81 Though there is not a moral equivalence between these two ideologies. 
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That this kind of political conception of justice could be seen as consistent with a broad 
understanding of political liberalism is an important point to address. My answer is in the 
affirmative. Rawls himself refers to the political conception of justice as constituting a 
“common good conception” for liberal societies, though he also refers to ‘decent hierarchical 
people’ as propounding a more determinate and non-liberal ‘common good’ conception of 
justice.82 Also relevant to this assertion is the claim by Paul Weithman – a noted interpreter 
of Rawls - that the structure of political justifications offered by John Finnis in Natural Law 
and Natural Rights in relation to the political common good, would qualify as being 
consistent with a political conception of justice as outlined in Political Liberalism.83 
In what sense can this understanding of a ‘natural right’ political conception of justice be 
seen as a form of political liberalism, as Nussbaum or Rawls’s theories might be interpreted? 
Is does so first by limiting government by protecting minimal universal human rights 
(conceived as the ius gentium) across all states, and secondly by establishing certain 
political or liberal rights (in Rawls’s nomenclature) in the context of a political community. In 
more positive terms such a conception contributes to the eudaimonia of all citizens in a 
civitas by legislating and developing public policy that promotes the attainment of the political 
common good leading to the fuller flourishing of a citizens’ life. Though I refrain from 
asserting a Rawlsian lexical priority between the political liberties and the other political 
human goods, I hold that liberties and other goods cannot be directly traded off in a 
consequentialist fashion as they both ultimately derive from the political common good of the 
civitas and the citizens who make up the society. 
In this sense, contra John Haldane, liberalism is not just a spirit of liberality (though it 
certainly involves such political virtues) but is a set of political principles designed to resolve 
the aporia of the necessary universality of the political-legal order (in the Rule of Law for 
example), with the personal and variable nature of human flourishing - what Rasmussen and 
Den Uyl called ‘liberalism’s problem’. This does not infer a form of moral scepticism or 
relativism but only that eudaimonia, in the sense of the selection and pursuit of final ends, 
are always the free determination of persons and should not generally be subject to directive 
regulation in the political-legal order. What can be promoted universally, however, in the 
legal and political order of a political community is a thin theory of the good that in the 
schema presented here is the enactment of the political common good of citizens within the 
framework of a (common good) political conception of justice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, §9.1, f.n.10, at 71. 
83 See Paul Weithman, ‘John Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason: Two Questions’, Journal of Law, Philosophy and 
Culture, 1 (2007), 47-67, at 54-55. 
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Therefore it is possible to endorse the notion of constructivism in one limited respect. The 
approach to ethics outlined in chapter 3 is not a species of moral or primary constructivism 
insofar as agents, through the use of practical reason in a ‘naturally rational’ manner 
apprehend certain fundamental human goods including the urge for justice and the good of 
social cooperation (through the precepts of the ius naturale). However, the approach I have 
outlined in relation to the legal-political domain can be conceived as a form of political 
‘secondary’ constructivism (in Peri Roberts parlance), inasmuch as it allows the specification 
of political principles (i.e. principles of political justice) centrally on the basis of practical 
reasoning. Secondary political constructivism, in contrast to primary universal constructivism 
(which is constructivist ‘all the way down’ to a minimally bare conception of human rational 
agency), includes certain “grounding assumptions”84 which do not have to be formally 
constructed ‘from the ground up’ in a proceduralist manner as, in my view, they are capable 
of apprehension through practical reason.85 One of these grounding assumptions, as I have 
argued, is the inherent value of human dignity and the baseline equal respect that is inferred 
by the recognition of this human dignity, the starting point for many human rights 
declarations. And like Rawls’s version of political liberalism, ours is a secondary form of 
constructivism in that it rests on “prior assumptions of a [background] democratic culture”,86 
such as that civil association is between people who consider themselves free and equal as 
citizens and who see the general sense of some degree of social cooperation and civility. 
This political conception of justice as outlined above perhaps fulfils the idea of a “metanorm” 
which, unlike moral norms, are “directly tied to politics [not personal ethics] and concern 
principles that establish the political/legal conditions under which the full moral 
[eudaimonistic] conduct can take place”.87 This concept, advanced by Douglas Rasmussen 
and Douglas Den Uyl, is an attempt to formulate a minimal but perfectionist conception of 
political liberalism. Such a distinction is helpful in distinguishing the ethical from the political-
legal domains, but I cannot concur with Rasmussen’s and Den Uyl’s identification of such a 
metanorm solely with individual negative natural rights in what I see as a reductive and 
narrowly libertarian manner. Rasmussen’s and Den Uyl’s radically libertarian solution to 
liberalism’s problem is based on their contention that human flourishing is agent relative ‘all 
the way down’, so to speak. For these two philosophers there can be no determinate thin 
theory of the good (or ‘thick vague’ theory of the good, as Nussbaum argues) that is agent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Peri Roberts, Political Constructivism, (London: Routledge, 2007), 148. As we saw in chapter 3 of this thesis, 
this is similar to the understanding Allen W. Wood has advanced in relation to Kant’s own view of the ‘formula 
of humanity’. 
85 Though I would stress that this recognition or apprehension is far from unproblematic in its application to 
social or political situations as it can be distorted by uncontrolled passions (such as wilfulness), vice (such as 
selfishness), or fundamental ignorance of relevant facts. 
86 Roberts, Political Constructivism, 138. 
87 Rasmussen and Den Uyl, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics, 15. 
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neutral in this picture other than universal negative political rights that allow persons to 
pursue their own agent relative ends. I see this position as reductive as it is difficult to see 
how final ends/goods can be pursued with any coherence without the attainment of a 
variable mix of ‘lower’ intrinsic human goods such as health, education/knowledge, social 
association, or the stability and peace afforded by political association, and so on. 
The case of the public recognition of religion, or a specific religion, is a controversial 
question that divides many contemporary political and social theorists. How would a 
permissively political liberal regime approach the recognition of religion in the laws of a 
polity? Practices in liberal democratic states are widely divergent, from the strict laïcité laws 
in France and the non-establishment clause (as interpreted by the courts) in the USA88 to an 
established church in England and the constitutional affirmation of Christianity in the 
Republic of Ireland and more recently in Hungary.89 As the social theorist Veit Bader 
suggests: “Religious equality does not as such require disestablishment, if only because 
constitutional law has its limits and because all institutionally pluralist options may deliver on 
the promise of substantive religious equality”.90 According to a permissively politically liberal 
view, religious establishment would not be excluded as a possible legal arrangement as long 
as religious liberty and other basic freedoms were in place to prevent such an arrangement 
from unduly excluding other religious groups, or citizens without a religious allegiance. 
6). Conclusion 
I recognise fully the case for a form of political liberalism that includes a notion of public 
reasoning in relation to a political conception of justice. This would help citizens of a political 
community transform natural right into the political common good. I judge that the classical 
natural law position of negative limits to government’s role is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the good ordering of a polity. Fundamental universal human rights, of the kind 
described by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples, can be justified as being part of the 
universal common good and as part of a binding ius gentium. However, these principally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Though Bader notes that even after the passage of the federal non-establishment amendment in the US 
constitution “a number of states-New Hampshire (till 1817), Connecticut (till 1818), New Jersey, Georgia. 
North Carolina, South Carolina-and, depending on definitions. also Massachusetts (till 1833) had established 
churches.” Veit Bader, ‘Religious Pluralism and Democratic Institutional Pluralism’, Political Theory, 31 
(2003), 265-294 at 288, f.n. 4. 
89 See ‘Christianity enshrined in constitution’, The Tablet, 7 May 2011, at 29. The report states that the preamble 
to the 2011 Hungarian Constitution explicitly recognises the key role of Christianity in “the upholding of the 
nation” but in the same preamble also expresses appreciation for the “different religious traditions of our 
country”. 
90 Bader, ‘Religious Pluralism and Democratic Institutional Pluralism’, at 284. The distinguished legal 
philosopher Kent Greenwalt concurs “Can religious liberty exist with establishment? Of course. Many countries 
in Europe maintain established churches and afford religious freedom to their citizens.” in Kent Greenawalt, 
‘Secularism, religion, and liberal democracy in the United States’ Cardozo Law Review 30 (2009) 2383-2400 at 
2386-2387. 
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negative restraints may help advance a defensive ‘liberalism of fear’,91 but would not 
necessarily help establish a well ordered polity in its positive aspects. These negative limits 
can be advanced as important public political reasons for setting constitutional essentials 
and matters of basic justice, but further positive public reasoning about political goods is 
desirable.92 
This reasoned approach to the determination of the basic political structure is consistent with 
the strongly rational moral element in a natural law virtue ethics. The broad ‘normative 
openness’ of natural law theory in fact constitutes a form of (not unbounded) moral pluralism 
which, through the use of public reason, can help to form a conception of political justice via 
an overlapping consensus. Public reason in this conception would be focally and primarily 
based on practical reasoning in relation to specifically political goods, but would not bar 
substantively ethical or metaphysical argumentation in relation to those political goods. The 
exclusive reference in public reasoning about the basic structure to final ends alone is clearly 
not recommended, though there would be no bar on this (even a bar as weak as Rawls’s 
final Proviso). The use of reasons that all rational agents in democratic deliberation could 
reasonably accept would be the normative basis of public reasoning in this approach - 
though the simultaneous reference to final ends in these deliberations would not only be 
permitted (as in the Rawls proviso) but in some circumstances may be important in ensuring 
that public political reasoning is not mistaken for a form of pure proceduralism and only in 
relation to instrumental reason. In this way political communities can democratically decide 
to include reference to religious or metaphysical matters (as Britain and Ireland currently do 
in their different ways) in their political structures. 
This approach begins to help understand how a certain conception of political liberalism is 
consistent with a ‘virtue politics’ and a moderate political perfectionism. This may help 
persuade religiously inclined citizens, for example, to commit to a fair system of social 
cooperation in which justice and basic liberties are advanced without putting in place ‘rules 
of the game’ that may appear to force those citizens to unduly bifurcate their views on the 
nature of human flourishing and the role of political life in promoting it. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, such a conception of political liberalism is consistent with a form of 
democratic or political constitutionalism that emphasises important political freedoms within 
certain constitutional constraints. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Judith N. Shklar, ‘The Liberalism of Fear’ in Nancy Rosenblum (ed.) Liberalism and the Moral Life 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1989). Here Shklar emphasises the protective qualities of 
liberalism as against ‘great evils’, many of which scarred the philosophical imaginations of political theorists in 
the post-war period. 
92 I thus reject the agonistic contention made by Alasdair MacIntyre’s “modern politics is civil war carried on by 
other means.” After Virtue, second edition. (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 253. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RE-CONCEIVING POLITICAL LIBERALISM AS ‘CONSTITUTIONAL 
REPUBLICANISM’ 
1). Introduction 
Having established the outlines of a political conception of liberalism which includes a 
conception of public reason, I aim to specify how a ‘good’ and ‘just’ regime may come to its 
optimum constitutional form. My task in this chapter corresponds with the central question of 
classical political philosophy, what is the form of the best ‘regime’? 
The chapter addresses some controversial questions in political and legal philosophy. 
Through a discussion of neorepublicanism, in sections 2 and 3 look at how ‘political’ and 
‘liberty’ rights in a just regime (akin to Rawls’s first principle of justice) can conceived in 
relation to human freedom. Should the freedoms that such rights underpin be seen 
conceptually as the absence of coercive rule, or as the freedom to achieve ends worthy of 
human beings, or should they correspond to the specifically political freedoms 
commensurate with the status of persons as free and equal citizens in a constitutional 
regime? My response would be to favour this last approach, in a way similar to the traditions 
influenced by republican thought (including the traditions inspired by Augustine’s1 and 
Aquinas’s thought). 
Section 4 addresses the specific principles that should underpin the form of a just and 
politically liberal regime. Should government take a form emphasising the unitary goals of 
the organs of the state, or should it clearly demarcate a division of powers? Which branch of 
government should have the primary role in legislating for rights or the enactment of the 
political common good? Should constitutional limits principally take a ‘political’ or ‘legal’ form, 
and correspondingly, should laws agreed following democratic deliberation in the legislature 
be overruled by courts empowered to enforce political or human rights provisions (the issue 
of judicial review)? 
As in previous chapters I outline the possible contribution that theoretical orientations taken 
from Aquinas’s oeuvre can make to these debates. Several aspects of his thought are held 
to be pertinent in approaching constitutionalism. I conclude the chapter by synthesising the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Paul Cornish	  argues that Augustine follows Cicero’s republicanism on several key points: “First, civil rule 
differs from mastery over slaves. Second, political life is indeterminate, so a republic could be any regime 
suitable for governing free human beings. Third, the prudent man may not abstain from public service”. Paul J. 
Cornish, ‘Augustine’s Contribution to the Republican Tradition’, European Journal of Political Theory, 9 
(2010), 133–148 at 133.	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insights of political liberals and neorepublicans, taking key aspects from both theories into 
my own constructive approach. 
2) Republicanism revived and given a normative form 
The neorepublican revival has focussed on the prevailing understanding of freedom in 
political theory. This approach, however, originated in the work in the history of ideas 
pursued by Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock in the 1970’s and 1980’s in their studies of 
Renaissance and early modern political thinkers and the Roman influences in their work. In 
the 1990’s Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner began to bring a normative perspective to the 
discussion on republicanism, heralding what has become known as neorepublicanism. This 
viewpoint in political theory has quickly established itself it as a major school of political 
thought that has spawned its own “normative and institutional research programme” 2 and a 
political following (in the form of the former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Zapatero). 
The principal contribution that neorepublicans consider that they have made relates to the 
philosophical understanding of human freedom. Isaiah Berlin’s twofold categorisation of 
liberty as either negative or positive has dominated discussion among political theorists 
since it was raised by Berlin in the 1950’s. The tradition of negative liberty in this 
understanding is associated with the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, William Paley and, 
before them, Thomas Hobbes. Freedom in this sense is considered to be the absence of 
external interference or coercion in the life and choices of a person (freedom as non-
interference). Positive liberty by contrast is often defined as the conditions through which 
persons are enabled to achieve self-mastery or self-realisation of their chosen ends 
(freedom as self-mastery). The two conceptions are clearly quite different in their theoretical 
role and scope. 
The neorepublican conception of liberty, principally based on Roman and Renaissance 
understandings of freedom, conceives freedom through the prism of the classical question of 
the master-slave relationship. A slave is subject to the master’s whim, whether exercised in 
a benevolent or malevolent way, while a citizen as a full member of the polis or civitas, 
participated in some way in the formation of the laws he was expected to obey. The 
intellectual historian Annabelle Brett, following on from work by Quentin Skinner, helpfully 
recounts how the intellectualist view of human moral freedom established by Aquinas (from 
Aristotelian and scriptural sources) is altered by later Jesuit understandings of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit, ‘Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional Research Program’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 12 (2009), 11-29.	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freedom and more radically by Calvinist theologians, whose views are taken up and altered 
further by Hobbes.3  
Thus liberty in the republican conception is defined being not subject to public rule or private 
power that can be exercised arbitrarily and in a way that those who govern are in some way 
forced to track the interests of the governed. Pettit’s version of neorepublicanism includes a 
significant role for democratic deliberation, echoing understandings of citizen participation in 
the rule of the Roman Republic. Public or private interference or coercion in the lives of 
citizens that is not exercised arbitrarily and without regard to the interests of citizens is not 
an infringement of liberty, but may even be beneficial to, or constitutive of, personal liberty. 
This normative neorepublican view of freedom has been challenged by unsympathetic 
political theorists, and there are some unanswered questions about quite how much of the 
neorepublican view of liberty differs from Berlin’s conception of negative freedom. But I 
nonetheless hold that their view is useful because it helps it helps expound a political 
understanding of freedom that is complementary to the Thomistic understanding of moral or 
metaphysical freedom. Moral freedom in this perspective, as we have seen, is ‘freedom-for-
the good’: the freedom of the will (interplaying with the intellect) striving for the moral objects 
that fulfil human potentialities, leading to the agent’s eudaimonia. It is not a ‘freedom of 
indifference’ or of individual autonomy considered in an absolute or constitutive sense. This 
might have parallels with a conception of positive freedom as self-mastery but the difficulty 
here is that political freedom has a different scope or role to freedom considered from a 
metaphysical standpoint. A political conception of freedom must be consistent with this more 
fundamental view but it must, at the same time, pertain to the legitimate role of the state in 
the lives of citizens. 
This is where I see a difficulty with the conceptions of positive and negative liberty. The 
notion of negative freedom seems in some way to presuppose that political non-interference 
is an intrinsic good and that government intervention in citizens’ lives should, ipso facto, be 
suspected as being illiberal. While this may appeal to libertarians or anarchists it would not 
be conducive to a Thomistic conception of the role of political association which allows for a 
significant role for government in enabling the fulfilment of the political common good - which 
can properly be considered a true good of the citizen. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Annabelle S. Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law 
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2011), at chapter 2 on ‘Human Agency’, especially 37-59. Hobbes 
understood freedom as pure willing uninterrupted by any external agents, with the role of the intellect radically 
sidelined.	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At the same time adopting positive freedom as a political conception of freedom also seems 
to have its own problems. Though self-mastery or self-dominion may be one aspect of a 
flourishing life, it is but one element. Attempts by the state to comprehensively legislate or 
secure the means to each person’s full self-mastery or self-realisation appears too all 
encompassing and unrestricted to be the basis of political association. In the perspective I 
have outlined here, the role of the state is not fully comprehensive in promoting eudaimonia, 
as it is focally aimed at the attainment of political goods, leaving the onus for achieving key 
aspects of a person’s all round fulfilment to other intrinsically valuable human societies. 
Republican liberty, according to is proponents, addresses the key matters rightfully 
addressed by Berlin in his twofold typology. It takes on board the need for protection from 
the undue interference (domination) from the state, or from private persons, in areas of life 
that are outside the proper domain of state competence. Yet by permitting the exercise of 
state interventions, including directly coercive legal interventions, the role of government in 
fulfilling a range of political goods seems to have been taken on board. Government power 
can thus assist a citizen in the realisation of their ends as long as in doing so it does not lead 
to the domination of any other person. The notion of the common good or the public interest 
(a synonymous term) is clearly central in this conception, and this has emerged clearly in 
Pettit’s more recent writings.4 As Pettit puts it: 
“If there is a plausible conception of the public interest, and a feasible means of 
giving the public interest the required control over law-making, then there will be 
some hope of establishing a regime where the laws are not arbitrary and government 
does not represent a form of domination over individual citizens.”5 
Though the notion of republican liberty has not resolved the issue of the relationship 
between freedom from a metaphysical perspective and the proper role of specifically political 
liberties, it appears to offer an attractive - if partial - solution to some of the key political 
questions outlined here. 
3). Overlaps between neorepublicanism and political liberalism 
Neorepublican theorists have alluded to the “considerable overlap”6 between their approach 
to political association and the capabilities approach set out by Nussbaum and Sen. Other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Though Pettit does not explicitly link his discussion of the public interest or common good to Aquinas’s 
thought, the unique contribution of the Thomist tradition on the common good (following Aristotle’s and 
Cicero’s thoughts) must surely inform the background to Pettit’s discussion.	  
5	  Philip Pettit, ‘Law and Liberty’ in Samantha Besson and Jose Luis Marti, (Eds.), Law and Republicanism, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39-59.	  
6	  Lovett and Pettit, ‘Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional Research Program’, see section 
‘Nondomination as an aim’. 
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theorists see significant consonances between neorepublicanism and political liberalism. 
Some political liberals have acknowledged Pettit and Skinner’s revival of a helpful normative 
understanding of political freedom but have questioned whether it constitutes quite the 
breakthrough in political theory that its proponents hold it to be. Charles Larmore, for 
example, questions some of the historiographical assumptions Pettit employs and his 
characterisation of Rawls’s Political Liberalism as implicitly endorsing a Bethamite 
conception of freedom.7 More fundamentally Larmore claims that, despite Pettit’s 
protestations, an essentially liberal conception of fundamental respect for persons seems to 
be operating in an unspoken way in Pettit’s normative presentation of neorepublicanism.  
John Rawls’s remarks expressing a compatibility between aspects of republicanism and his 
view of political liberalism predates the normative theories expounded by Pettit and Skinner 
in the late 1990’s. Rawls himself writes that political liberalism is not necessarily inconsistent 
with all forms of republicanism, though he does claim that a perfectionist neo-Aristotelianism 
is inconsistent with his approach.8 The remark indicates an interesting potential overlap 
between the theories. Both theories have a form of deliberative democracy, both purport to 
establish and protect human and political rights, both justify representative and constitutional 
government. Henry Richardson for one concludes that “in short, there seems to be no 
fundamental incompatibility between Rawls’s liberalism and Pettit’s republicanism.”9 What 
Richardson does suggest, however, is that a pure republican view does not fully take on 
board the fair value of political liberties that can only be addressed by “supplementing it with 
distinctive liberal concerns with equality and procedural fairness” to create a form of ‘liberal’ 
republicanism.10 I consider that Larmore and Richardson’s critical but positive assessment is 
correct. I hold that neorepublicans, openly in some cases, operate with a notion of the value 
or persons in themselves and the basic respect owed to them on that basis. These 
distinctive concerns are not immediately explicit or philosophically elaborated in pure 
republican theory.  
I concur with this judgement and argue that mining the strengths and complementarities of 
the three theoretical approaches (neorepublican, neo-Aristotelian, political liberal) will assist 
in explicating some of the fundamental principles that may help develop an understanding 
the form of the best regime. We may see neorepublicanism as bearing a family resemblance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Charles Larmore, ‘Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom’, in Daniel M. Weinstock and, Christian 
Nadeau (eds.) Republicanism: history, theory, and practice (London: Frank Cass: 2004), 96-119, at 114-117. 
8	  Rawls says that a form of classical republicanism could be consistent with political liberalism but that an 
Aristotelian inspired ‘civic humanism’ would not be. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, revised edition, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), at 205-206.  
9 Henry S. Richardson, ‘Republicanism and Democratic Injustice’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 5 
(2006), 175-200, at 180.	  
10	  Richardson, ‘Republicanism and Democratic Injustice’, 195.	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to political liberalism, founded on a contemporary reading of republican sources, in contrast 
to a political liberalism based on a contemporary reading of Kant (as in Rawls or Onora 
O’Neil) or, as in the theory presented here, a form of political liberalism that borrows key 
elements from the contemporary reception of Thomas Aquinas’s social and political thought. 
Neorepublicanism may even be seen as an internal critique of forms of political liberalism 
that implicitly include, or at least do not distance themselves from, a reductively Bethamite or 
Hobbesian conception of freedom. 
The debate about political freedom, as opposed to the classical question of the freedom of 
the will (and its interplay with reason), should be set within a framework of what 
governmental (and private) actions lead to citizens’ lives being subject to domination or 
arbitrary rule. Thus democratically sanctioned government action designed to secure civic 
goals or goods that nonetheless do not trespass on citizens’ fundamental liberties or 
interests (i.e. that are consistent with a regime of non-domination regarding basic justice and 
constitutional essentials), should not be seen as an infringement of due political (or moral) 
freedoms and thus be deemed illicit (as they are by libertarians and anarchists). Libertarians 
and anarchists would claim that a positive role for government in promoting civic goods is 
indefensible and that any governmental understanding of the human good should be fully 
subject to each individual’s choice and consent. 
4). The form of the republic: the role of constitutionalism as a legal-political doctrine 
The rise of neorepublicanism in political theory has been accompanied by a revival in a 
range of normative understandings of constitutionalism.  
Normative treatments of constitutionalism by political theorists fell somewhat out of fashion 
in the field of political theory from the 1960’s (after the important works of on the subject by 
Carl J. Friedrich and others) as political science approaches and New Left theories gained 
influence in the academy. The United States was perhaps an exception to this, where the 
issue of judicial review of statue involving controversial political questions, such as abortion 
and school prayer, kept the issue of the nature of the constitution on the agenda, though 
mainly for legal philosophers (and politicians).11 
However, from the mid 1980’s onwards political theorists began to think anew about how 
constitutionalism could be considered to be an important element of political theory. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  John Hart Ely and Ronald Dworkin’s constitutional jurisprudence in the 1970’s and early 1980’s buck the 
trend of a lack of interest in constitutionalism. Dworkin’s prolific output during this period can be sampled in: 
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985). Many of the issues 
discussed in legal journals about the scope of judicial review in the US in this period were about historical and 
hermeneutical questions rather than about normative ones. The controversy about the doctrine known as 
‘originalism’, or the opposite view of a ‘living constitution’ would be an example of this. 
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revival has developed a clear and distinct normative aspect which has led constitutional 
theory and political philosophy back into a closer relationship. Much fruitful work has 
emerged from this dialogue between the fields of legal philosophy and political philosophy.12 
The revival of constitutionalism has arisen from within different traditions of political theory. 
In Kantian influenced political theory both John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas have in their 
own ways taken a ‘legal’ or ‘constitutional turn’,13 focussing their theories to a lesser or 
greater degree on the theoretical underpinnings and justification of a constitutional 
democracy. 
Hegelian influenced versions of constitutionalism have also emerged,14 as have explicitly 
leftist versions.15 Also noteworthy is an older neo-Thomist constitutionalism16 and some 
more recent attempts from Thomist perspectives that have come from engagement with 
analytic philosophy in the form of John Finnis’s oeuvre and in work by Martin Rhonheimer.17 
In keeping with the methodology already outlined I take Aquinas’s theory and that of his 
recent interpreters as being particularly important in helping to constitute a normative theory 
of constitutionalism. In doing so I clearly cannot but avoid some of the basic questions of 
classical political philosophy about what constitutes the best political regime. 
My approach is exemplified in applied political theory by examining the controversial 
question of the use of constitutions by the courts in the judicial review of statutes - the 
‘Counter majoritarian difficulty’ as it is named in the United States. This difficulty is 
expressed in the question: To what extent and on that basis - if at all - should the courts 
overrule the decisions of legislatures, especially in statutes, ostensibly to protect the 
fundamental principles of the political regime as expressed in the constitution? This is a 
particularly acute challenge in legal constitutionalist regimes where the courts have been 
assigned, or have assumed, a role as the final and decisive arbiter of the constitution. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For an example of this see Alan Brudner’s impressive work Constitutional Goods (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
13 Though this change in approach is not uncontested as some interpreters do not see a discontinuity in 
Habermas’s social theory in Between Facts and Norms and subsequent publications by Habermas. See Matthew 
Specter, ‘Habermas’s Political Thought, 1984-1996’, Modern Intellectual History, 6 (2009), 91-119, at 92-93.	  
14	  See part III of Alan Brudner’s Constitutional Goods for his use of Hegel’s social theory.	  
15	  See Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
Press 1999). Tushnet identifies himself as a socialist. 
16 See for example, Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1998 [1951]) and Yves R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago: Phoenix Books of 
the University of Chicago Press, 1961 [1951]). 
17	  See for example, John Finnis, ‘Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?’, in Robert P. 
George (Ed), Natural Law, Liberalism and Morality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1-26; John 
Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) especially 
chapters V, VII and VIII on justice and the role of the state in Aquinas’s theory; and Martin Rhonheimer, ‘The 
Political Ethos of Constitutional Democracy and the Place of Natural Law in Public Reason: Rawls "Political 
Liberalism" Revisited’, American Journal of Jurisprudence, 50 (2005), 1-70.	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brings into question philosophical ideas about the nature of democracy and its relationship 
with justice and political right. 
a). Defining a normative conception of constitutionalism 
The descriptive and comparative approach to constitutionalism which takes up the greater 
part of scholarship on constitutionalism is legitimate and should not necessarily be 
disparaged. Following the general methodology of this work I allow for the due role of 
descriptive and comparative approaches to politics as pursued by political scientists with the 
proviso that such approaches do not systematically and reductively marginalise the 
importance of normative questions. 
 
Often constitutionalism has been identified with a concern to protect the rights of persons 
from state power. Giovanni Sartori criticised those who take a largely descriptive approach to 
constitutionalism, or those whose conception of constitutionalism is closely linked to certain 
theoretical questions relating to modern constitutional practice (paradigmatically in the USA) 
such as ‘checks and balances’, the separation of powers and bills of rights. This form of 
modern legal constitutionalism has become particularly associated with classical liberalism 
and the work of John Locke and the American Founders, even though the roots of 
constitutional thought go back much further than the early modern period. 
 
I would argue with Sartori that the deepest root or underlying telos of constitutionalism is the 
painstakingly and dialectically determined answer to the question: “How can we be governed 
without being oppressed?” For Sartori a constitution is the “frame of political society, 
organized through and by the law, for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power.”18 I agree 
that the rights of the individual may be one issue relevant to the notion of constitutionalism, 
but the protection of negative individual rights does not centrally define the legal-political 
doctrine of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is not therefore intrinsically a species of 
classical liberalism or libertarianism. 
 
In pursuing the meaning of constitutionalism on a normative rather than descriptive level I 
would tentatively define constitutionalism as “the constraining of government in order to 
better effectuate the fundamental principles of the political regime”.19 Sartiori elaborates this 
normative approach by contending that the telos of both American and British 
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  Giovanni Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism: A preliminary discussion’, The American Political Science Review, 56 
(1962), 853-864, at 860.	  
19	  Keith E. Whittington, ‘Constitutionalism’, in Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Keleman and Gregory A. 
Caldeira,(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 281-299, 
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Constitutionalism was the same - despite the differing form of their political institutions – 
namely a “fundamental law, or a set of fundamental principles, and a correlative institutional 
arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a limited government”.20 In 
doing so normative constitutionalism seeks to prevent arbitrary rule where arbitrariness 
“consists in the capacity of rulers to govern wilfully – that is, with complete discretion - and to 
serve their own interests rather than those of the ruled. Constitutionalism attempts to avoid 
these dangers by designing mechanisms that determine who can rule, how and for what 
purposes.”21 The imprint of republican thought in these definitions is clear and recent work 
by neorepublicans such as Philip Pettit22 and Richard Bellamy23 bear this out very clearly. 
 
b). The reaction to absolutism: the development of constitutionalism in 
modernity 
Legal theorists argue that modern constitutionalism takes over understandings of 
fundamental law derived from understandings of natural right once the autonomy and 
positivity of law was established and processes of secularisation gained momentum. The 
original American constitutionalists used the term ‘fundamental law’ frequently in their 
discussions of the US Constitution.  
 
It is worth exploring how modern constitutionalism arose from this historical and theoretical 
background. Christian political theology developed apace in the Early Church. The most 
influential presentations included Augustine’s notion of the Two Cities (in The City of God); 
heavenly and earthly, the former being an eschatological destination to which Christian 
journey spiritually through the latter earthly City. The temporal state in this life cannot offer 
the true justice of the New Jerusalem in the world to come, yet Augustine sees certain 
limited goods – peace and a basic level of justice - as being possible to attain in the transient 
earthly City.24 The Gelsian development of this Two Cities theology - granting auctoritas to 
the sacerdotium (priesthood) and potestas to the King - had its various corruptions including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism: A preliminary discussion’, at 855. 
21 Richard Bellamy, ‘Constitutionalism’, (September 13, 2010), International Encyclopaedia of Political 
Science, B. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser and L. Morlino, (Eds.), (London: IPSA/Sage, Forthcoming), available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676321, accessed 9 May 2011. 
22  Philip Pettit, for example, argues that neorepublicans should make a case for: “constitutional and legal regime 
that enables people to claim the status of free persons in relation to one another. And though the regime required 
will license quite a rich form of intervention in civic life.....considerations of liberty will also argue for 
constraining the regime in important ways. They will make a case for embodying constraints within the regime 
that help to make its imposition on citizens assume the proﬁle of a controlled, nonarbitrary form of interference 
in their lives”. See Pettit, ‘Law and Liberty’, 39-59. 
23	  Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).	  
24	  Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, edited and translated by R.W. Dyson, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), at Book XIX. 
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the baleful notion of ‘political Augustinianism’ and the later ideas of papal supremacy and the 
medieval canonists theory of the Church’s potestas directa. Some of these theories never 
fully came to pass historically, not least because “in practice Augustinian dualism was 
replaced by a political-ecclesiastical monism in which secular power had the Church at its 
service”.25 
 
The nature of sovereign power is especially relevant to the development of constitutionalism 
in reaction to absolutism. It begins with a theological question. In Christian theology the 
sovereign Body after the Ascension was considered to be the glorified Christ. Christ was 
seen as the heavenly Sovereign, and his bodily presence was, in the early centuries of the 
Church’s existence, considered to be that made present sacramentally in the Church’s 
Eucharistic celebration. The Jesuit Henri de Lubac charts the gradual change in the ecclesial 
understanding of the sovereign Mystical Body of Christ and how it moves over time to the 
institution of the Church itself rather than in the Eucharistic action.26 Ernst Kantorowitz, in his 
canonical history of medieval political theology in The King’s Two Bodies, relays the passage 
through the period of Constantinianism to medieval political theology after the Gelasian ‘two 
swords’ regnum-sacerdotium duality emerges.27 
 
In these later developments the Divine Body and its sovereignty is shared and directly 
received from God – full spiritual authority is invested in the institutional Body of the Church 
(through the ‘Princes’ of the Church – the Bishops - especially the Pope) while full temporal 
authority is granted to the King’s Body. Thus a sacral dimension was granted to the temporal 
exercise of political authority, something barely envisaged in pre-Constantinian Christian 
political theology. With the advent of voluntarism the picture evolves in unpredictable ways. 
The doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings is one expression of this while in the late medieval 
and early modern period theorists envisaged the citizens of a civitas consenting to grant 
extensive powers to a secular sovereign (in Marsillus of Padua’s Defensor pacis and in 
Hobbes Leviathan), who would respectively restrain papal power and the violence generated 
by ‘hot’ religious disputes. Martin Rhonheimer sees the early modern theories of the state 
advanced by Marsillus and Jean Bodin as being precursors of modern constitutionalism in 
correcting the distorted and undue claims of the Medieval church. He sees in Bodin’s 
approach a “nuclear political ethic” distinguishing higher existential claims clearly from lower 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Rhonheimer: ‘The Political Ethos of Constitutional Democracy and the Place of Natural Law in Public 
Reason’ at 15. 
26 See Henri Cardinal de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages (London: 
SCM Press, 2006).	  
27	  Ernst H. Kantorowitz, The King’s Two Bodies: a study in mediaeval political theology (Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press, 1957). 
125	  
	  
political goods (though he does so in a way that grants too much power to the secular 
sovereign for Rhonheimer). Later modern political theorists such as Rousseau align plenary 
sovereign power clearly with the temporal state. The historical development of sovereign 
states in the post-Westphalian era in some ways accompanied this theoretical perspective. 
The absolutist monarchies of France and Britain in the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
are examples of this. 
 
Jean Bethke Elstain, in her 2005-2006 Gifford Lectures, sees this gradual development as 
representing a shift in sovereignty from God in the early Church, to the King’s Body in the 
medieval era, to the State in modernity, and then to the autonomous individual in nineteenth 
century and twentieth century liberal thought. 28 The development of liberal political theories 
with their conception of subjective natural rights, such as those of Thomas Paine or John 
Locke, occurred in contradistinction to theories of the ‘divine right of Kings’ and absolute 
sovereignty. The sequence of revolutions in Britain, US and continental Europe from 1689 to 
1848 were the clearest signs of resistance to the notion and practice of absolute state 
sovereignty. As modern constitutionalism developed from these revolutions some of the 
more fundamental philosophical underpinnings of constitutionalism as a doctrine were 
gradually superseded by a somewhat different understanding. Modern constitutionalism is 
thus often described as the process by which a political society experiences a ‘constitutional 
moment’ - typically a revolution or regime change - at which point a constituent body 
formulates a codified written constitution which clearly describes and delimits the powers 
and role of various parts of government within a political society. Often in modern 
constitutions this is accompanied, initially or later, by a Bill of Rights, as paradigmatically 
seen in the American or French Constitutions. 
 
Grappling with the challenge of conceiving sovereignty in the twentieth century Jacques 
Maritain attempted to use Aristotelian-Thomist resources to tease out the appropriate 
theoretical nature of the state, the ‘body politic’ and political sovereignty. For Maritain, the 
body politic is the modern term for the polis or civitas, not the state. The state thus serves 
members of the body politic (‘a people’) by enacting and enforcing the common good 
through positive law. The state, in a philosophical sense, is part of the body politic and is 
accountable to it as its “instrumental agency”.29 The state is thus not sovereign, and even the 
autonomous body politic is sovereign in only an analogous (and temporal) sense and does 
not bear a legal or political omnicompetence. Maritain’s neo-Thomist normative 
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  Published as	  Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State and Self (New York: Basic Books, 2008).	  
29 See Maritain, Man and the State, at 42.	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understanding helps us conceive of how questions on the role of the state in relation to the 
political community may helpfully be framed.  
 
c). Political constitutionalism and the internal relation between rights and 
politics 
 
For us the theoretical question of the relationship between constitutional law and democracy 
or popular sovereignty has what Habermas has called a fundamentally “internal relation”.30 
In other words law and democracy are not capable of being fundamentally traded off or 
opposed, as if they were principles that essentially contradict each other. The democratic 
principle ‘one person, one vote’ in elections or referenda is a concrete expression of this 
common root principle. Treating ‘like cases alike’ (the generality principle) is also an example 
of a legal principle predicated on human equality. Thus we can say that to maintain 
consistency and to avoid a performative contradiction, the embrace of the theoretical basis 
for democracy will also entail a baseline respect for core human rights through some 
generalised restraints on sovereign power.  
Philip Pettit, advances a form of deliberative democracy (‘contestatory democracy’) that he 
sees as sharing certain characteristics with Habermas’s discourse theory.31 Neorepublican 
thinkers have emphasised the importance of deliberative democracy in their political outlook 
in a way that also has similarities with Rawls’s conception of public reason. For the purposes 
of this thesis we can broadly define deliberative democracy as: 
“a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), 
justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions 
that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.”32 
Habermas sees a clear connection between law and morality despite rejecting natural law 
theory as an antecedent theory of law that connects law and morality. He views natural law 
as being a ‘higher law’, founded on the recognition of a theistic metaphysics. In this reading, 
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  See Jurgen Habermas ‘On the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy’, in Ciaran Cronin and Paolo 
De Grieff (Eds.), The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1998), 253-264.	  
31	  As Pettit says we let the people rule when each person “can claim an equal part, being equally party to the 
acceptance of the reasons by which that interest is defined. If the public rules in this sense, then members of the 
public can see the laws imposed as the laws selected by criteria in the ratiﬁcation of which they are fully and 
equally complicit. They can see the laws, not as affronts to their freedom as non-domination, but rather as 
constraints that are sourced, like the actions of Ulysses’ sailors, in their own will”. Pettit, ‘Law and Liberty’, at 
58. 
32 Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 7.	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positive law is hierarchically subordinated to the higher law of nature. Though this picture 
may be not wholly inaccurate from a ‘God’s eye’ perspective, as we have seen this is not 
how theorists such as Rhonheimer or Finnis see the relationship between natural law and 
positive law. In their different ways these authors – as I do – see natural law as a theory of 
practical reason through which human goods are apprehended by the agent, without the 
person necessarily accepting any metaphysical conclusions from their experience of striving 
for human goods.  
From the ‘God’s eye’ perspective natural law is indeed the rational person’s participation in a 
higher law (the eternal law) representing the logos in the created order. However, this is not 
how natural law is experienced by the acting person – as a form of moral autonomy – and 
without a supplementary (and intellectually challenging) metaphysical exploration though 
theoretical reasoning. On this view natural law, through its expression in natural right, may 
be legislated into positive law in order to help coordinate the life of a community in a way 
oriented to the common good of that society - or even the global community. As we have 
seen however, once natural law or natural right is seen not as an external metaphysical 
imposition on political association, but itself a theory of practical reasoning positing moral 
self dominion the picture changes.33 Just as Habermas’s (Kantian-based) fears about the 
heteronomy of the natural moral law is in this picture allayed, can his concerns about the 
viability of natural law as a basis of the public autonomy of a political society be properly 
addressed? 
Habermas fears a vision of human rights that is pre-political and determined through natural 
law would serve as an undue and “imposed… external constraint”34 on the legislator, thus 
breaching the public autonomy of a political society, which is a legal autonomy that 
“demands that the addressees of law be able to understand themselves at the same time as 
its authors.”35 He sees human rights as internally related to popular sovereignty through a 
procedure of rational communicative discourses in which each agent can accept as her own 
the reasons for a proposed legislative measure. Through such a process private autonomy 
becomes a public autonomy for the constitutional republic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 This view is expressed even in contemporary Catholic Social Teaching, as in Benedict XVI’s Encyclical Deus 
Caritas Est attests: “Politics is more than a mere mechanism for defining the rules of public life: its origin and 
its goal are found in justice, which by its very nature has to do with ethics. The State must inevitably face the 
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Encyclical Letter Deus Caritas Est, promulgated 25 December 2005, accessible at 
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  Habermas, ‘On the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy’, 259 
35 Habermas, ‘On the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy’, 260. 
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I hold that Habermas’s concerns miss the mark, however, in relation to the eudaimonistic 
and natural law ethic propounded here. In such a view, proposed laws significantly 
addressing matters of human rights are subject to a process of public reasoning in 
democratic deliberation which, though not the same as Habermas’s discourse theory, serves 
much the same purpose. Our view of democratic deliberation, as a (secondary) political 
constructivism that is in principle open to metaphysical argumentation, equally allows one’s 
personal ethical autonomy and striving for the human good to contribute to the public 
autonomy of a republic. In Habermas’s case constitutional law is superior to other legislation 
and enumerates justiciable rights guaranteeing equal respect. For legal constitutionalists 
such as Habermas and Rawls, judicial review of statute is thus an essential ballast to 
democracy. 
Habermas’s claims about the intrusion of pre-political rights and their grounding in ethics into 
political morality seems misplaced to us. Some of this may reflect in part the ongoing 
misunderstanding in relation to the concepts of lex and ius in legal theory since the twelfth 
century, and how it developed over time into a pervasive imprecision in juristic terminology 
that hastens the development of strands of thought that later emerge as legal positivism. It is 
the polarity between legal positivism and natural law (or between facticity and validity in 
Habermas’s nomenclature) that philosophers such as Habermas and Rawls try to reconcile 
with their political-legal theories. According to the canonist Kenneth Pennington, lex and ius 
do not have the same conceptual underpinning but have become very much confused in 
modern legal and political theory.36 He argues that theorists, including Thomas Aquinas, did 
not consistently distinguish between lex and ius. The importance of this distinction was also 
stressed by Michael Oakeshott who noted the clear conceptual differences, but some limited 
overlaps, between lex and ius.37  
Oakeshott and Pennington follow the Roman and canonist view that lex refers to the non-
instrumental character of law. Its rational basis is its basic conformity to the rules of natural 
justice and what we would now call due process (for example, ‘hear the other side’), though 
Gratian also linked it to the notion to consent. The ius of lex was often limited to establishing 
‘the Rule of Law’ rather than enshrining a notion of human flourishing. Pennington quotes a 
gloss on Justinian that “[j]ustice and ius are in effect the same or ought to be the same”,38 
and writes that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Kenneth Pennington, ‘Lex naturalis and Ius naturale’, The Jurist, 68 (2008), 569-591.	  
37 See Michael Oakeshott, ‘The Rule of Law’, in Michael Oakeshott, On History and other Essays (Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 1999), 129-178, at 151-178.	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  Pennington, ‘Lex naturalis and Ius naturale’, 574.	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“Ius reminded the jurists constantly of the transcendental significance of a legal 
system. It existed not just to establish right and wrong and to punish the wicked. It 
was the source of justice, equity, and rights. ….[T]he penumbras of ius were justice, 
equity, and the common good.”39 
 
The early mediaeval thinkers thus referred to ius naturale, ius gentium and ius divinium as 
deliberately referring to these penumbras and principles such as the Golden Rule, which 
they saw as a natural law precept. From the twelfth century a further development occurred 
as Christian thinkers started to draw on the Stoic (but not Roman law) tradition that ius was 
linked to the common good. This can be seen in the work of Abelard and Aquinas. 
Pennington argues that even Aquinas’s mixed usage of ius naturale and lex naturale to refer 
to natural right or natural law may well indicate that he was not fully appraised of the 
significance of the philosophical differences between lex and ius in Roman legal thought. 
I would wish to link this general line of argument to the notion of the ‘internal morality of law’ 
as outlined by Lon Fuller (in chapter 2 of The Morality of Law).40 Here Fuller outlines how 
key legal principles constitute “a procedural version of natural law … concerned, not with the 
substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a system of rules for governing 
human conduct must be constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious and at the 
same time remain what it purports to be.”41  
 
The difference between lex and ius can also be drawn in some later juristic distinctions 
analysed by the contemporary legal philosopher Martin Loughlin.42 Loughlin makes a similar 
but important point about positive law and ‘political right’ (droit politique) in the formation of a 
constitution of a state. Political right can be clearly linked to natural right, the topic of chapter 
5.43 Fundamental law, which in turn was thought in some sense to be derived from the ius 
naturale, refers to law “that bound morally and politically rather than through the 
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  See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed., (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969).	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  Fuller, The Morality of Law, 96-97. One could say that the ‘ius of lex’ in the way I have touched upon it here 
is of the sort outlined in Lon Fuller’s ‘eight excellences of law’.	  
42	  Martin Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
43	  For as the philosopher V. Bradley Lewis appositely notes “The locus classicus of Aristotelian natural right, 
Nicomachean Ethics 5.7, for example, indicates that natural right is to be understood within the more general 
category "political right" (politikon dikaion) and as specifically correlative to legal right (nomikon dikaion). 
Natural right is the part of right that is the same everywhere, where legal right, originally indifferent, varies from 
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Aristotle says, there is one regime that is "everywhere best by nature." See V. Bradley Lewis, ‘Gerhart 
Niemeyer: Political Order, and the Problem of Natural Right’ The Political Science Reviewer, 31 (2002), 117-
61, at 144. 
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mechanisms of ordinary law”.44 Fundamental law thus referred to the constitution of the state 
- the lex regia or the later term droit politique - rather than the constitution of the office of 
government, which is regulated by positive law.45 In Jacques Maritain’s language this refers 
to the basic principles regulating the relationship between the body politic and the state.  
 
In modern constitutions, the fundamental law was posited in the written and enshrined 
constitution. In the US over time this fundamental law was primarily interpreted by the courts 
via judicial review, even to the extent that legislative measures could be overruled. In 
England, Blackstone refers to the fundamental laws of England as the Magna Carta, and its 
reaffirmations through to the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights, the 
Act of Settlement, and so on. 
 
What conclusions do I draw from such distinctions? First, that they help clear up some of 
what was explored in Chapter 3. Following Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas I affirmed the 
relative positivity and autonomy of law while also affirming human law’s irreducibly moral 
aspect. This moral aspect is exhibited most paradigmatically in public law, specifically the 
fundamental or constitutional law of the civitas/republic which sets the basis of the legitimacy 
or ius of positive lex. When the basis of the constitution of state is breached, or the 
procedural basis of lex (due process) is set aside by the governing powers, the Augustinian 
maxim lex injusta non est lex (‘unjust law is no law’) begins to seem eminently reasonable. 
 
Scholars working in the Thomist tradition, especially those utilising Aquinas’s transformation 
of Aristotle’s ethics and politics, have set out a number of principles of ius that may be 
described as constituting aspects of the fundamental law of a constitutional regime. John 
Finnis argues that Aquinas was the first theorist to write explicitly of restricting or limiting the 
powers of the government in this way.46 The restrictions he highlights include: 
1. The conformity of rulers to positive law (the rule of ‘laws and not men’ derived from 
Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics), on the basis that law is intrinsically an order of reason 
while the actions of rulers may be unduly swayed by particular passions. In Aquinas’s 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics he implies a preference for ‘political’ rule (rule in 
accordance with laws of the polity) rather than to ‘regal’ rule, with its plenary powers for 
the King. 
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  Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law, 228-289.	  
46 Finnis, ‘Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?’ at 1.  
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2. The conformity of rulers to the moral law and to the principle of subsidiarity. Aquinas 
sees natural law precepts as being universal and does not allow for exceptions to the 
precepts for rulers – even in times of war or emergency – and, following Aristotle, sets 
out clear roles for societies within the polity that cannot be eliminated or unduly reduced 
by the state.47 
3. The presupposition of “freedom and equality” between citizens (as opposed to the 
master-slave relationship in despotic rule) in ‘political’ rule and some degree of 
participation in ruling. This requires that the rulers and ruled, “because of their equality, 
exchange roles, and many persons are also constituted rulers in the same or different 
offices”.48 Finnis sees this principle as being “correlated with elections”.49 Aquinas’s 
seemingly approving commentary on the definition of a citizen as one who is able to 
“participate in the regime” (commenting on the Politics, Book III, Chapter I) is also 
relevant here. In his more constructive work, the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas favours a 
mixed constitution of regal, aristocratic and democratic rule with offices open to election 
and a share in ruling held by all citizens, much in the vein of a modern constitutional 
monarchy.50 
4. Political rule also requires, following Aristotle, that rulers do not govern for their private 
benefit, but rule for the common benefit or advantage (the common good or public 
interest) of the citizenry.  
 
The right to political participation is in my view absolutely central, and is the cornerstone of a 
political or democratic constitution. Jeremy Waldron has called the right to participation in 
political decisions, especially legislative ones, the “right of rights”51 reflecting its pivotal status 
within the democratic constitution. In the political form of constitution each citizen is granted 
a fundamentally equal share of political influence through the ‘one person one vote’ system 
and open elective access to the political offices of state. Though majoritarianism has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In this instance the principle of subsidiarity (as a correlate of constitutionalism) as a principle of political 
construction, would prescribe that citizens should refrain from deliberately attempting to smuggle into the 
classifications of core ‘political goods’ various aspects of the human good that are focally the proper functions 
of other human communities such as the domestic unit or a religious community. Insisting, for example, that the 
state should control absolutely every aspect of a child’s education (leaving no role at all for parents) might be 
one example, or at another extreme insisting that the nation-state is the direct agent of a quasi-religious 
‘salvation’ for people might be another (as some interpretations of Nazism/Fascism held for example). 
48 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, translated by Richard J. Regan, (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 2007), comment on Book 1, chapter 5, at 40. 
49 Finnis, ‘Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?’, at 2. 
50 As Aquinas writes in ST I-II q. 105, a.1: “the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at 
the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e., 
government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to 
choose their rulers. Such was the form of government established by the divine Law” [referring to ancient 
Israel]. 
51 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), at chapter 11, 232ff.	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become a term somewhat tinged with derogatoriness we should not forget that it is a 
foundational principle of democratic politics - and the alternative of oligarchy or rule by a 
cabal hardly seems attractive.  
 
The operation of the political constitution sets normative boundaries on the three powers of 
government. In a typical Western constitutional structure the ‘power’ most clearly accessible 
to participation by citizens is the legislature via elections. As courts are largely technical in 
their implementation and enforcement of law, appointment to judicial roles is usually based 
on different considerations and qualifications that make direct election or participation 
inappropriate and impractical. Thus the most appropriate responsibility for ensuring that 
human goods are advanced and moral norms are translated into positive law is focused on 
the legislature. Courts must interpret but should not normatively ‘make’ law or overrule 
statue without prior legislative consent to do so. In this basic reading the role of judicial 
review would appear limited to ensuring that the executive has acted lawfully. 
 
Democratic deliberation takes place in many venues in the public sphere, from civil society 
and the media, to the crucible of the legislature itself. Following this deliberative process, 
Philip Pettit does not see it as utopian to believe that if the democratic process is successful 
and takes place according to the right principles of deliberation then the outcomes must, in 
principle, be seen as congruent with the political common good or public interest.52 The 
converse of this is that without the use of such deliberative and constitutional principles in 
the process of determining the content of the political common good, citizens may have 
reason to doubt that what has been determined is in reality a political bonum honestum, and 
may only be an apparent political good.  
 
As outlined in chapter 4 civil and political rights in this reading is an aspect of the political 
common good, which is principally the role for the legislature to enact. This does raise the 
question whether is necessary to enact explicit and justiciable human or civil rights into 
positive law (via the enactment of certain rights declarations - as in the UK’s Human Rights 
Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights). That some of these legal rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Petitt writes “the public interest has to be deﬁned on the basis of an active enterprise of democratic discussion 
and contest amongst the citizenry and so that it requires institutions that make room for such deliberative 
processes....The public interest is identiﬁed with those policies that are supported by criteria of selection—the 
commonly accepted reasons—that are implicitly ratiﬁed.... But though I have said nothing substantive on how to 
institutionalize the public interest, deliberatively understood, it does not seem outlandishly utopian to assume 
that things might be organized so that a polity does quite well in this regard..... Does the fact that a polity 
empowers the public interest in this way mean that the laws and other measures it imposes on the citizenry are 
controlled by them on an equally shared basis? Assuming that our abstract answer to the question about law is 
correct, does it mean that those laws and measures are non-arbitrary and non-dominating? I claim that it does.” 
Pettit, ‘Law and Liberty’ at 58. 
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may be accorded a particularly preeminent status (as constitutional rights) on account of 
their relationship to ius or droit politique, or as being an intrinsic part of the ius of lex (such as 
due process rights presupposed by the Rule of Law), does not seem objectionable. This is 
because legislators may rationally wish to use a precommital device to ensure that any 
undue and unforeseen consequences of their legislation is mitigated, or may wish to hedge 
against shortcomings in the deliberative process which may lead to the enactment of future 
laws that fall short of the requirement of human rights. In such circumstances statute may be 
subject to ‘weak judicial review’, that is subject to review comparing it to constitutional rights. 
The UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 is an example of this - a statute can be reviewed for its 
consistency with Convention Rights and, where possible, be read to conform to the 
Convention. When there is an inconsistency, however, the court can only issue a 
‘declaration of incompatibility’ which does not overrule the existing statute.  
 
‘Strong judicial review’ goes further than this. It would, as the US Supreme Court, Canadian 
Supreme Court or Israeli Supreme Court can (and regularly does), strike down legislation as 
being inconsistent with constitutional rights. This is a key tenet of modern legal 
constitutionalism. Normative political constitutionalists, such as Richard Bellamy and Adam 
Tomkins,53 fear that such strong judicial review powers undermine the political basis of the 
constitution and its proper democratic orientation. Their practical fears include that strong 
judicial review short changes genuine political debate over controversial political issues in 
the public sphere serving to aggravate social tensions or at least delaying the political 
resolution of controversial social and political matters. Strong judicial review, by removing 
matter from the legislature’s control thus shortcuts a wider deliberative process and gives the 
false impression that deeply controversial issues are resolvable by neutral legal-moral 
arbiters with specialist knowledge (i.e. judges). Instead political constitutionalists hold that 
legislative deliberations hold out the opportunity for partial agreement and political 
compromise in a dispute mechanism that involves a wider degree of participation than the 
judicial branch.  
 
Where do modern natural lawyers stand on the question of the ‘strong judicial review’ of 
legislation? As advocates of the importance of human rights they may be expected to 
support judicial review on the basis of subjective human rights. Finnis seems to think the 
arguments are closely balanced, with clear advantages to judicial review in federal systems 
due to need to ensure vertical consistency between state and federal law. Yet at the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), and in Bellamy’s Political 
Constitutionalism.	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time he allocates to the legislature the retention of “high responsibility for human goods 
which ‘modern manifesto rights’ and principles pick out as basic goods to be shared by all” 
and worries about the supposed “moral neutrality” 54 of courts in deciding substantive matters 
of the common good of a society. Other natural law theorists take a similar view, seeing the 
legislature as the normal and proper place for positive law making, but also noting that 
Aquinas’s writings on the judicial role and natural right do not answer directly the normative 
question of the desirability of the judicial review of legislation.55  
 
This tallies with the view of natural law thinking explored in chapter 3, in which rights are 
seen fundamentally as a component of the political common good rather than as a 
Dworkinian side constraint on it. Weak judicial review of constitutional law by the courts can 
do this by naming potentially egregious examples of legislative decisions in relation to civil 
rights, without overriding the democratic pre-eminence of the legislature in making statute. 
Though without agreeing to a strong conception of essentially contested concepts or ideas, it 
is nonetheless difficult to see how, for instance, political questions that relate in clear ways to 
a philosophical anthropology (such as the legal permissibility of abortion, capital punishment, 
embryonic stem cell research, transhumanistic research and so on) can be prudently 
decided by the judicial branch in a definitive legal manner without undermining the integrity 
of the democratic or political constitution.  
 
Political constitutionalists also challenge whether the proper role of the courts is that of a 
neutral arbiter, benignly presiding over disputes between citizens and their government, or 
clashes between the political right outlined in the in the constitution and majoritarian 
legislative decisions on the wider political good of the republic. Following J.A.G. Griffith56 and 
Oliver O’Donovan57 (in their different ways), I hold that the Courts have a properly ‘political’ 
role as they are themselves an ‘arm’ or ‘power’ of republican government. Using a Trinitarian 
analogy, the powers of the state are ‘three in one’ – that is, having three identities and roles 
but having but one fundamental level of being and purpose. The fundamental purposes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  John M. Finnis, ‘A Bill of Rights for Britain?: The Moral of Contemporary Jurisprudence’, Proceedings of the 
British Academy, 71 (1985), 303-331 at 329.	  
55	  See Russell Hittinger, ‘Natural Law in the Positive Laws: A Legislative or Adjudicative Issue?’ The Review of 
Politics 55 (1993), 5–34. Also Robert George finds that “natural law does not dictate and answers to the 
question of its own enforcement, …authority to enforce the natural law may reasonably be vested primarily, or 
even exclusively, in the legislature; or …a significant measure of such authority may be granted to the judiciary 
as a check on legislative power. The question whether to vest courts with the power of constitutional judicial 
review… is in important ways underdetermined by reason”. See Robert P. George, ‘Natural Law, the 
Constitution, and the theory and practice of Judicial Review’, Fordham Law Review, 69 (2001), 2269-2283. 
56	  See especially chapter 9 ‘The Political Role’, in J.A.G Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1977).  
57 See Oliver O’Donovan, ‘The Powers of Government’ in Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgement (Grand 
Rapids, MI.: W. B. Eerdemans, 2005), 186-210. 
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government affect each branch equally even if they discharge these roles in a functionally 
different manner within the regime or constitution. In other words, each power of government 
is under the same general obligation to further the public interest or common good of the 
republic.  
The role of each power of government in a regime must be complementary58 and thus the 
notion of a full ‘separation of powers’, as Montesquieu outlined, may not be an apt maxim. A 
more helpful approach to the powers of government was symbolised clearly in the British 
Constitution with the notion of the ‘Crown in Parliament’ in which the Monarch summoned 
and prorogued Parliament within the law; which itself included all members of the executive, 
and the Law Lords who sat as the Judicial Committee of the Upper Chamber.59 
 
e). The philosophical and theological complementarities of constitutionalism 
 
Following the methodology I have outlined the potential consonances between philosophical 
approaches to ethics and politics and a theological orientation to politics is of some 
importance. One conventional story of the history of political philosophy grants the 
undoubted roots of the and modernity in Judeo-Christian thought, though speaks of a ‘Great 
Separation’ between the predominantly theological understandings of politics and the 
principally philosophical ones from Hobbes onwards.60  
 
Part of this narrative focuses on the development of Augustine’s dualistic two cities theology. 
In this understanding the polis is simply unable to deliver perfect eudaimonia to its citizens, 
the very function of politics is chastened. As James Schall puts it: “In political philosophy, 
this settling of the problem if that which human happiness exists, in an invitation to the divine 
life, allows politics to be – almost for the first time in human history – merely itself.”61 In this 
Christian “de-divinisation of politics”,62 the monistic polis-ethic set out by Aristotle was 
rejected, in favour of Augustine’s Two Cities duality – where Christians make a spiritual and 
eschatological pilgrimage to the Heavenly City limiting the earthly City to the task of allowing 
true worship and the securing of temporal peace and justice. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 “The differentiation of roles is dialectical and complementary” in Oliver O’Donovan, ‘The Powers of 
Government’, 191. 
59 This was altered by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 where the judicial role of the House of Lords was 
changed, and a distinct UK Supreme Court founded outside of the House of Lords. 
60	  Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics and the West (New York: Vintage Books, 2008). 
61	  James V. Schall, ‘The Right Order of Polity and Economy: Reflections on St Thomas and the ‘Old Law’’, 
Cultural Dynamics, 7 (1995), 427-440 at 433-434.	  
62	  Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), at 106. 
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The political thinker Eric Nelson has challenged this narrative by drawing on the wide range 
of political theology conducted throughout the seventeenth century that based its thinking 
about republicanism and the political constitution on the biblical Israelite constitution (such 
as Pufendorf, Grotius and influential republicans such as James Harrington). This contrasted 
with some earlier Renaissance humanist political thought (such as Petrach or Bruni) that 
was relatively light on scriptural reference by comparison.63 This Hebraic revival was 
stimulated by the full emergence of Protestant thought against the social background of the 
persistence of absolutist monarchism in Europe. From this specifically theological context, 
notions such as the primacy of conscience, religious freedom and toleration emerge with 
great clarity. Nelson claims that “we owe several of our most central political commitments to 
an age that was anything but [secular].”64 Moreover, political philosophers have, in recent 
times, also begun to take seriously the theological commitments of canonical liberal thinkers 
such as John Locke. Whereas some approaches neglect Locke’s richly scriptural treatment 
of government in the Second Treatise, recent monographs such as Jeremy Waldron’s give 
full weight to the theological seriousness of Locke’s work. 65 
 
Characteristic of Aquinas’s thought is his understanding of the relationship between natural 
human reason and revealed truths. Aquinas sees the moral precepts of the Old Law - though 
they are revealed - as also reflecting the natural moral law which can, in principle, be 
apprehended by humans as a rational beings. In Aquinas’s treatment of the best regime he 
uses not only Aristotle, but also a theological understanding of scripture.66 Similarly, Aquinas 
sees the Hebrew constitution, in which the Moses was accompanied by seventy two elders 
who were elected, as the revealed expression of the best regime. Carl Friedrich suggests 
that this positive allusion to constitutionalism may have resonated particularly with Aquinas 
as it formed part of the ecclesial structures of the Dominican order with its convocations and 
elections.67 Though the lineage from the early medieval canonists’ understanding of 
conciliarism to early modern constitutionalism to is subject to recurrent and trenchant 
historical disputes,68 it is suffice to say perhaps (with Francis Oakley) that in “the Middle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Eric Nelson, Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
64	  Nelson, Hebrew Republic, at 5.	  
65	  See	  Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke and Equality: Christian Foundations of Locke's Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Waldron is not the first interpreter to take such an approach - 
John Dunn has emphasised similar themes in his scholarship on Locke.	  
66	  At ST II-I, q. 105, a.1.	  
67	  Here Friedrich cites Ernest Barker’s work. See Carl J. Friedrich, Transcendent Justice: The religious 
dimension of constitutionalism (Durham NC,: Duke University Press, 1964), at 38.	  
68	  For a taste of this dispute Cary J. Nederman, Lineages of European Political Thought: Explorations along the 
Medieval/Modern divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2009), at 9-12, and chapter 3 ‘Pathologies of Continuity: the Neo-Figgisites’, 30ff. 
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Ages secular and religious were intertwined, and ecclesiology and secular constitutional 
thinking, whether more absolutist or constitutionalist, constantly influenced one another”.69 
This trend can been seen today in the theological work of thinkers such as Oliver 
O’Donovan, who despite distancing himself from liberalism and figures such as Maritain, still 
propound a form of ‘political limitism’70 that has clear parallels with certain key 
constitutionalist (and liberal) notions.71 
 
5). Conclusion 
In this chapter I have dealt with three compatible philosophical and theological ideas as they 
relate to political theory. First, the republican conception of freedom as non-domination; 
second, a normative conception of political constitutionalism; and third, the theological idea 
of ‘political limitism’ inferred by Augustine’s Two Cities duality. I have argued that each of 
these ideas can be held to be a helpful complement to the species of political liberalism 
outlined in chapter 4. With Henry Richardson I believe that neorepublicanism can benefit 
from the incorporation of key principles incorporated in political liberalism. Inversely, I have 
argued that political liberalism can be strengthened by the inclusion of a neorepublican 
notion of freedom and the ‘internal morality of law’ provided by natural law principles. 
The neorepublican conception of political freedom has significant advantages over the 
classical liberal notion of negative freedom as it helps frame how civic virtue or liberal 
education may be conceived in a way not always coherently addressed by classical or 
political liberals. In my brief overview of constitutionalism I have stressed how democratic or 
political constitutionalism has key advantages over strong forms of legal constitutionalism. In 
this view political liberalism and constitutionalism are compatible (and overlapping) 
normative approaches with different focal points, the former in political principles and the 
latter in legal principles. Rawls himself saw the clear connection between constitutionalism 
and political liberalism writing that the latter “understands itself as a defence of the possibility 
of a just constitutional regime”.72 This overlap is especially apparent with political liberalism 
in that this approach is not directly derived from a theory of final human ends but can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Francis Oakley,	  The Conciliarist Tradition: constitutionalism in the Catholic Church, 1300-1870 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), see chapter 6:‘ Democritus’s Dream: Conciliarism and Political Thought’, 
217ff.	  
70	  See David Halliday McIlroy’s treatment of O’Donovan and other theorists in: David Halliday McIlroy ‘Idols 
and Grace: Re-envisioning Political Liberalism as Political Limitism’, Political Theology, 11 (2010), 205-225.	  
71	  See Jonathan Chaplin, ‘Political Eschatology and Responsible Government: Oliver O’Donovan’s Christian 
Liberalism’, Craig Bartholomew et al (Eds.), A Royal Priesthood (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2002), 265–308. 
See Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of Nations: rediscovering the roots of political theology (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).	  
72 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 101.	  
138	  
	  
affirmed as a political-legal doctrine. These overlaps and complementarities are helpful in 
addressing key questions in political theory – particularly those questions we have set out to 
answer in this work. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This work has moved from an understanding of ethics, to a conception of justice and natural 
right, through to a species of permissive political liberalism in the form of a particular kind of 
republican constitutionalism. 
The classical ethical approach broadly outlined in chapter 2 has been described as the 
“recognitional model” of practical reason, in contrast to constructivist and intuitionist models 
of practical reasoning. In this model the agent’s practical reason has “the capacity to 
recognize and be motivated by what has objective value”.1 Though in the conception of 
ethics advanced here the acting person acts spontaneously towards their proximate goods 
and towards final ends, those ends - when considered from a metaphysical viewpoint - 
reflect the kind of rational animals humans are. In a particular way therefore, I do not deny 
what some might view as a certain ethical naturalism. The label “naturalist objectivism” 
therefore does not seem to be a misnomer here.2  
This recognition of moral value is transferred into the political domain through the concept of 
natural right, as I explored in chapter 3. There I defined natural right as that part of the 
natural law that is related to the virtue of justice or that part of natural law pertaining to the 
social order. I have argued that human rights can be seen a philosophically consonant 
extension of the natural right tradition, the hermeneutical difficulties of claiming that Aristotle 
or Aquinas actually propounded a theory of human rights are worth conceding.  
An outworking of the naturalist objectivism that I have advanced in the civil realm is the 
notion of the political common good. If there are goods or needs that individual humans have 
on the basis of their common humanity then, at least at some ‘thin’ level, there must be 
some shared goods or needs, even if there may be great variation in how those goods or 
needs are conceived in different cultures or linguistic traditions. I can therefore state that a 
proper end of political association is the optimisation of political common goods, that is, of 
the common goods of persons in their role as citizens.  
How does a political community come to a decision as to what constitutes the political 
common good in contingent circumstances? In chapter 4 I argued that a form of public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Berys Gaut, ‘The Structure of Practical Reason’, in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Eds.), Ethics and Practical 
Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 161-188, at 183, italics added. 
2 An apt label given by the Thomist John Haldane as noted in chapter 2, see: John Haldane: ‘Natural Law and 
Ethical Pluralism’, in Richard Madsen and Tracey B. Strong (Eds.), The Many and the One: Religious and 
Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World (Oxford: Princetown University Press, 2003), 
89-114, at 97.	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reasoning is helpful here. As I maintained in the same chapter this is consistent with what 
Aquinas held about public disputations on matters that are not theologically revealed. The 
nature of pubic reasoning in the model outlined in chapter 4 is different to John Rawls’s own 
formulation in Political Liberalism and his late writings. Like Rawls, the focus is on what 
practical reason can justify in building an overlapping consensus on a political conception of 
justice, based on some understanding of (primary) human goods.3 I outlined in earlier 
chapters how practical reason can deliver - though not without difficulty - some 
understanding of human goods or needs that can be applied selectively to the legal-political 
domain as political goods (by using the principle of subsidiarity and other relevant 
principles). Despite my emphasis on the role of practical reasoning in public reason I would 
not restrict the latter exclusively to the deliverances of practical reason. The conclusions of 
speculative reasoning can also be admitted to public reasoning, though I are not optimistic 
that any significant degree of agreement on final ends is attainable in the diverse societies 
that characterise modern nation states. Overlapping agreement/consensus based on 
practical reasoning can suffice as the basis of political association. 
Some traditionalist Thomist or Radical Orthodox thinkers may well claim that allowing any 
normative role for democratic deliberation or public reason into political matters is to risk 
reducing political agreement to a lowest common denominator, jettisoning all metaphysical 
or theological considerations in the process. This criticism is wrongheaded if directed against 
the species of political liberalism advanced in this thesis for two reasons. First, I allow for the 
admissibility of discussion of final human ends in public reason. Citizens, however, have 
safeguards against the imposition of authoritarian final ends in political life, as my approach 
insists that the full range of human rights (including freedom of thought and religion) have to 
be in place and implemented in any valid scheme of political liberalism. In eudaimonistic 
language, in matters related to civil association, priority is granted to the agreement of 
certain intermediate/infravalent ends before overlapping consensus on final ends can even 
be sought. This is not to say that intermediate/infravalent ends are more important than final 
ends in human life considered integrally, only that politics is not the site where final ends are 
truly attained.4 
Secondly, I would note that some of the methodological devices used by contemporary 
liberal theorists have clear consonances with pre-modern philosophical ideas rather than 
Enlightenment ideas. This is clear in relation to constitutionalism (a strong theme in 
Aristotle), and I note (with Nussbaum) that the notion of reflective equilibrium is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Though I differ with Rawls about the nature of primary (human) goods, as noted in chapter 4. 
4 Referring here to the Augustinian Two Cities duality and the de-divinisation of political life that may be said to 
flow from it.	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development of the Socratic dialectical method and is therefore consistent with the 
underpinning dialectical method set out in chapter 1.5 I hold that the method of reflective 
equilibrium, especially in relation to political justification, is a helpful tool in coming to a 
determination of the content of the political common good. 
I hope to have provided, along the path of this work, both an internal and external critique of 
the species of political liberalism espoused by Rawls and of Nussbaum. For instance, the 
notion of structurally inclusive human ends (dealt with in chapter 2) addresses some of the 
problems created by the idea that a political conception of justice must be freestanding. In 
this understanding of classical eudaimonism,6 infravalent social and political goods/ends are 
distinct from, but structurally incorporated into, the agent’s overarching conception of ‘a life 
well lived’ (eudaimonia). This is a more philosophically satisfying way of thinking about 
political goods than the Rawlsian notion of a module, while the understanding of structurally 
inclusive ends importantly retains the ability of attaining an overlapping consensus on a 
political conception of justice without the necessity of agreement on final ends. 
This work has sought in part to reclaim political liberalism for the Thomist tradition, the 
tradition from whence it arguably emerged in the wake of the Second World War.7 In this I 
have clearly been inspired by Nussbaum’s similar retrieval of an Aristotelian species of 
political liberalism and neorepublican efforts to resolve some of the aporiae of modern 
liberalism. My view differs from Nussbaum’s political liberalism in that it permits a role for an 
integrative metaphysical perspective in philosophical anthropology, without undermining the 
primary role of practical reason in political association which is, after all, a branch of practical 
philosophy. Such an explicit link between Thomism and political liberalism might have been 
expected to have been made by New Natural Law theorists with their innovative and helpful 
understanding of natural law as a theory of practical reason. However, despite the potential 
for a productive exchange, John Finnis and his collaborators have seemingly been wary of 
saying anything genuinely appreciative about political liberalism for fear of endorsing what 
they view as Rawls’s unjust positions on abortion and euthanasia. In their writings on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: the Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 77-78. By way of a definition, the method of reflective equilibrium “consists 
in working back and forth among our considered judgments (some say our “intuitions”) about particular 
instances or cases, the principles or rules that r believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we 
believe bear on accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements 
wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them.” Norman Daniels, "Reflective 
Equilibrium", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/reflective-equilibrium/> . Accessed 1 September 2011. 
6 A form of eudaimonism viewed ‘through the lens’ of the work on this topic by Henry Richardson, Julia Annas 
and Martin Rhonheimer, as cited in chapter 2. 
7 As I have noted, Nussbaum identified that “the first example of political liberalism in the Western tradition is 
probably the neo-Aristotelian Thomism of Jacques Maritain.” Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Political objectivity’, New 
Literary History, 32 (2001), 883–906, at 892.	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political liberalism New Natural lawyers appear to treat Rawls’s stance on these matters as 
exposing a structural problem with the very concept of political liberalism (a position I have 
questioned in chapter 4). 
More traditional Thomists or radical theologians such as John Milbank often attack political 
liberalism on the basis one has to subscribe to a deontological or constructivist view of ethics 
to make it work effectively. I have sought to demonstrate that this is not the case and that 
even a eudaimonist moral theory prioritising the good over the right can be fully consistent 
with a certain species of political liberalism. Constructivism may be found useful in the 
political sphere in helping to specifying the political common good and in justifying social 
duties and rights (which are themselves aspects of the political common good). Conceiving 
rights as an aspect of the political common good rather than a side-constraint on it 
addresses a central concern about reconciling the private autonomy of persons and the 
public autonomy of citizens. As Habermas frames the issue from a different philosophical 
perspective, democracy and rights must flow from the same fundamental source as “private 
and public autonomy mutually presuppose each other in such a way that neither human 
rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy over its counterpart.”8 
In this sense I have made some useful progress in answering the question posed in chapter 
1: Is (a form of) political liberalism and human rights consistent with the philosophical-
theological framework expounded by Thomas Aquinas? My affirmative answer has outlined 
how persons recognise or apprehend human goods without the necessity of procedures of 
moral constructivism and how those human goods may be considered relevant and specific 
as political goods through the application of political principles – some of which may also 
operate as legal principles – as outlined in Lon Fuller’s notion of the ‘internal morality of 
law’.9 
In this vein it is helpful to address one remaining issue raised in chapter 1; what Gerald 
Gaus calls the ‘problem of public reason’: “how can we identify social demands that all have 
sufficient reason to acknowledge as moral demands?")10 This might seem to be a problem in 
a work that has deliberately taken an ‘ethics first’ methodological approach. My response 
would be that this ‘ethics first’ method in political theory does not preclude an inverse 
influence, as the perception of political or legal duties can affect’s one’s own understanding 
of ethical imperatives. This should rightly be understood as an important aspect of reflective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms: an author’s reflections’, Denver University Law Review, 76 
(1999), 937-942, at 940. 
9 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised edition, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1969), chapter 2. 
10 Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 262.	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equilibrium (or the more traditional dialectical method). Legal claims may in some instances 
illuminate matters of moral import11 and I see the development of subjective human rights as 
a case in point of the inverse influence from the legal to the ethical.12	  
That political principles significantly overlap with legal principles makes the consonances 
with constitutionalism clear. Constitutionalism delineates the appropriate role of the state, 
rendering political power subordinate to lawful authority. Citizens are protected from wilful 
governmental action as state power is forced to track the interests of its citizens who are 
considered to be both free and equal. Associated with the revival of contemporary 
constitutional thought is the emergence of neorepublicanism, which again has unmistakable 
premodern roots in Ancient Greek and Roman thought. There are undoubted affinities 
between the genus of political liberalism and republicanism or civic humanism - even if I 
hesitate in going as far as some in claiming the late Rawls for the republican tradition.13 I 
may concur, however, that Rawls was perhaps overhasty in judging that civic humanism was 
necessarily a comprehensive doctrine and could not be seen as a political conception.14 
That Aquinas was profoundly influenced by Ancient Greek and Roman thought makes the 
possible alignment of normative Thomist moral and political theory with aspects of 
neorepublican and constitutionalist thought fitting and less open to accusations of an undue 
eclecticism. The lack of work in normative political theory on how a contemporary natural law 
theory may contribute to, or benefit from, an interlocution with neorepublicanism and 
(neo)constitutionalism is surprising, but it has at least provided us with the basis for a wide 
ranging and original contribution to a series of important questions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This was arguably seen in some prominent legal cases (such as the Somersett case) in eighteenth century 
England where the courts challenged the legality of holding of slaves on British soil (e.g. R v Knowles, ex parte 
Somersett (1772) 20 State Tr 1). It is generally considered that the Somersett case significantly advanced the 
cause of abolitionism in public opinion both in the UK and the America, though it was several decades before 
the passage of the Slave Trade Act of 1807 in the UK. 
12 As the philosopher V. Bradley Lewis writes, citing Finnis’s and Brian Tierney’s jurisprudential research: 
“The legal concept of [natural/human rights] comes first and reflects legal practice [i.e. canon law]; the moral 
notion of rights comes later and absorbs it. One reason for the increased importance of rights language is that, as 
political discourse separated itself from theological discourse, the language of the law became expressly less 
theological.” V. Bradley Lewis, ‘Theory and Practice of Human Rights: Ancient and Modern’, Journal of Law, 
Philosophy and Culture, 3 (2009), 277-296, at 293. 
13 See Andrés de Francisco’s wide ranging article: ‘A Republican Interpretation of the Late Rawls’, The Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 14 (2006), 270–288. 
14 “Historically, however, the doctrine called (by Hans Baron) “civic humanism” was, rather, a political 
conception in the Rawlsian sense: it sought to define the type of citizens needed by a republic which, in the face 
of a tangible and imminent threat of external tyranny, wanted to preserve its political freedom.” De Francisco, 
‘A Republican Interpretation of the Late Rawls’, at 280, 287-288.  
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